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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1370

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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Requirements for Special Training on Shipboard

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Capt. 3d Rank V. Katanskiy: "Without Pauses, in a Precise Rhythm"]

[Text] There are, of course, academic tasks which have, if it may be expressed, a seasonal nature. Suppose, let us say, there is something that is only done in winter. This means that it cannot be put off until summer. But there are facets of troop training and maintenance of weapons in constant combat readiness for which seasonality is contradictory. On ships, as is known such facets include special training and observance of standards in the operations of combat equipment. Specialty lessons, as required by regulation, must be conducted regularly, in a timely manner as determined by the weekly schedule, in the process of all combat training, and not only while the ships are stationed in port, but also while they are located on roadsteads or are on extended voyages.

But strangely enough, in the specialty training of sailors in individual commands and groups there arise, figuratively speaking, seasons of activity. On the threshold of and at the beginning of the academic year a lot is usually done to improve specialty training. The training facilities are renovated and methodological assemblies and showy lessons are held. The best trained specialists conduct the first lessons. Staff representatives and senior commanders attend them.

But time passes and here and there control of specialty training slackens. Individual young officers stop attending the lessons and entrust them to petty officers whose methodological competency is not always indisputable. Thus the regulation requirement that lessons with sailors be conducted by petty officers under the leadership and control of their superiors is thrown out the window.

I had occasion to run into these facts when a certain subunit commander, under the pretext of training for a combat exercise, replaced the planned specialty training with work by the sailors on management. But when this exercise was carried out in a mediocre way, the very same officer found any kind of excuse except the main one—the slackening of attention paid to specialty training. It is as if to say the successful accomplishment of fire missions is not integrally connected with a thorough professional training of the sailors.

Achievement in such training is unthinkable without a high degree of personal specialty and methodological training of the officer. Complex modern weapons and equipment require that stock be taken of many peculiarities in the training of crews. Let us say that each specialist in a combat crew operates a certain kind of individual piece of equipment, instrument, or group of instruments which sometimes differs fundamentally from the others. On the other hand, a complex is collective weapons, which requires amicable, coordinated actions from the whole crew. The academic process takes this duality into account. The operator, in order to master his instrument, studies his specialty with a petty officer. But parallel to this, he gets used to operating within the framework of the combat crew, where the sailor's main teacher is now the group or battery commander.

With this in mind, it is necessary to flexibly and rationally combine the various methods of instruction. At times there is the sailor's independent work with technical descriptions and instructions for, in part, individual tasks. At times there is individual and even overall training of the crew, which is conducted in a competitive atmosphere, in coordination with commitments which have been taken on for this period. And the officer must see everything, notice and analyze everything, and mobilize his men to effective labor with an ardent personal interest.

From these positions I mentally compare two lessons. One was led by Sr. Lt. S. Blyumin, and the other by Sr. Lt. N. Topchiy. Outwardly both groups were alike: each sailor had individual lesson plans, technical literature, and diagrams. The leaders were at their accustomed places. But how profoundly varied, in essence, was the performance of the role of trainer by the officers! Sr. Lt. Blyumin saw how much time a sailor spends in reading a page, ascertained at times, by means of an indirect question, to what extent the specialist had mastered the procedure for inspecting an instrument, and gave advice on the quickest way to learn the text. Having noticed hesitation in someone, he would go to him himself and explain. Time after time he concentrated the attention of all the troops on important questions. In a word, the officer constantly stimulated the interest of the sailors. The lesson, which could be said to be passive—the reading of a technical text—was, in essence, conducted actively and attained its goal.

In contrast, Sr. Lt. Topchiy limited his role to being formally present in the classroom, and rarely made any remarks on the general procedure. There were almost no questions for the officer. And this is a true sign that the men's interest in the subject had not been aroused.

What the loss of interest in studies can lead to might be illustrated by the following example.

One day, in a subunit commanded by Sr. Lt. Yu. Kryukov, it was ascertained during an inspection that an operator 2d class, who had already served for 2 years, did not have a sure knowledge of how measurements are done according to the monthly schedule. The sailor, not motivated to strengthen his knowledge and skills, had simply lost much of his earlier knowledge. On the other hand, several young troops, in contrast, were glad of their knowledge and interest in the equipment and their enthusiasm for their studies. Such contrasts were obtained because the officer devoted more attention to newcomers and those needing remedial help, while he left the rated specialists, so to speak, alone, relying upon their independence. Moreover, some of them, instead of actively helping in the development of the newcomers, and to enhance the strength of their authority among the youth by means of their knowledge, intended to "take it easy" in their last year of service.

The conclusion is clear. The troop who has a thorough knowledge of instructions and outstandingly fulfills the military standards ought to be given an individualized program. If, for example, he has mastered the measurement procedure, give him a lesson in parameter adjustment and then on the tuning of the instrument and the elimination of defects. The principle "from easy to difficult" is not new, and it excellently justifies itself today by stimulating interest in the mastery of a skill.

Experienced officers are constantly concerned not only about the precise organization of the studies, but also about the necessary introduction of elements of competition in lessons and training.

Capt. Lts. V. Lenskiy and V. Potryakhayev possess edifying experience in this regard. Without fail they find time for conducting separate or additional lessons without losing sight, moreover, of even one person.

Thus, when a portion of the subunit troops have been assigned to a detail, the ones remaining are given individualized lessons. For a detailed examination of techniques, a strengthening of skills, and a comparison of the degrees of training among the troops, similar types of combat crews are here periodically combined into one complex, prescribed for the inspection. The crews are successively reviewed and then the

obtained results are compared. This method allows not only a better disclosure of the state of the art by a cross-inspection, but also develops competitiveness and allows the general dissemination of advanced experience.

Yet Lt. V. Kharlamov attempted, by means of watches, various works, and other measures, to "copy out" lessons and training which had not taken place. And those which had been conducted were not always distinguished by precise organization. Incidentally, during the inspection it turned out that there were gaps in this same officer's knowledge.

Unfortunately, some young officers do not immediately understand the fact that professional training cannot tolerate pauses or seasonality, and that it requires precise rhythm, a strict system, and consistency. And it would be a poor thing indeed if their commander did not remind the lieutenants of this.

Lts. P. Zavgorodniy and O. Shubnikov arrived on board ship not too long ago. Their arrival coincided with the beginning of an extended voyage. Shortly afterwards the officers had already taken their first independent watches. However, they allowed themselves a fairly good pause in specialty training, and the sailors' specialty training was completely turned over to the petty officers. Of course, the technical teaching worried the young officers period but a fact remains a fact: the ship's commander looked more at how the lieutenants managed things on the bridge, not going any deeper into other important questions of their development. This continued until the lieutenants, who had been successful in the role of watch officer, allowed mistakes in firing practice. They had to urgently make up for what had been neglected.

Of course, it is necessary to comprehensively resolve questions of the development of officer youth without overlooking either the purely naval or the purely engineering and highly specialized aspects. An approximate knowledge of equipment on the part of a group commander or a battery commander can lead to incorrect operations at sea, an inaccurate evaluation of the situation, and fictitious reports in complex situations on a cruise or in battle. It is precisely the professional competency and the ability to intelligently teach and educate their subordinates that most clearly attests to the command qualities of young officers.

Neither thorough knowledge nor sound skills are attained through cramming. Hasty, uneven work and unjustified seasonality avenge themselves by adversely affecting the training of the troops and of the collective as a whole. Providing it with a reliable covering detachment is an important mission of the commander and staff.

Submarine Crew Training Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Capt. Lt. V. Filatov, deputy commander for political affairs of the submarine "Ul'yanovskiy Komsomolets": We are Ul'yanovites"]

[Text] The crew of the submarine "U1'yanovskiy Komsomolets" accepted high socialist commitments on the eve of the current training year. The personnel resolved to retain the title of outstanding ship, which the submarine has carried for a numer of years. Upon accepting these commitments we understood that what had been outlined was not the limit and that we can and should find potential for improvement of combat skill. The Letter of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU, and the Komsomol Central Committee on the development of socialist competition in 1978 promoted the realization of this idea as did the subsequent appeal of both the Komsomol organizations of the units and of the nuclear submarine—initiators of socialist competition in the services of the armed forces—which had called upon youth in the army and navy to give a worthy greeting to the glorious anniversary of the armed forces, the 18th Komsomol Congress, and the 60th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol.

A number of interesting proposals were expressed at meetings of the ship's personnel. PO 1st Class V. Stekachev and S. Birka called upon all of those who will be transferred into the reserves this year to master the skill standards of military affairs and to train themselves to become equivalent to specialists of none but the highest quality by the opening day of the 18th Komsomol Congress. Many of the sailors spoke about the fact that the success of the common cause depends upon each individual. Their speeches had a principled, critical tone. Having considered the criticism, seamen Ya. Stroganov and V. Chernetskiy resolved to revise their commitments and make higher ones.

Such a fact speaks for the exactingness the sailors have toward one another. There is a Warrant Officer [Michman] V. Tsiplukhin on the ship. He has fulfilled his commitment ahead of time to become a master of military affairs by the anniversary of the armed forces. Nevertheless he was criticised at the meetings. For what reason? Because he oversimplified the method of totaling up the results of the competition in the subunits. And this, of course, to a certain degree lessens the interest of the sailors in its results.

It is already possible at this time to say something about how the sailors' words are being converted into deeds. PO 2d Class A. Tarkhovich, with the help of V. Stekachev, has already attained a rating of 1st class.

PO 1st Class V. Khudovtsov is now working on master standards, and has trained Sr. Smn. V. Gudkov to basically the level of specialist 1st class.

All of this is a result of the great patriotic enthusiasm of the ship's personnel and of the efforts of the commander, all the officers, and the party organization. Our faithful assistants and our reliable support are the Komsomols. In my view, the Komsomol organizations can be credited primarily with skillfully educating the youth in the glorious traditions of our ship and this work is carried out starting in the first days after the arrival of a young replacement.

"To start off with, Tell us about yourself. Where are you coming to us from? What did you do before entering the service? Who are your parents?..."

The questions of the secretary of the Komsomol committee, PO 2d Class O. Umrikhin, his deputy PO 1st Class S. Birka, and other activists ring with genuine interest and goodwill.

"I am from Central Asia," begins Borot Karimov. "I was a shepherd and construction worker."

"And I am from Ul'yanovsk," answers Nikolay Migin. "I arrived here on a Komsomol travel order...."

Aleksandr Svishchev and Ivan Matveyev were called to duty from Ul'yanovsk. They knew beforehand that they would be serving on the submarine "Ul'yanovskiy Komsomolets," and arrived here with instructions from their fellow townspeople to bear highly the designation of being envoys from the birthplace of the great Il'ich.

This is not the first year that I have served on a submarine, and the collective, of course, is constantly being replenished, but in principle it remains thus: healthy, cheerful, and optimistic. And I can say quite precisely that our constant links with the birthplace of Il'ich play a very large role in this. They enhance the process of educating the youth in the spirit of lofty principles and responsibility toward their service. Much here depends upon the commander. Capt. 3rd Rank Aleksey Yakovlevich Colovchenko is a competent specialist, a principled communist, and a person of great compassion. His authority in the collective is very great. The party organization headed by master of military affairs, Warrant Officer V. Fuzanov, does outstanding work

But let us return to the newcomers. Things were not finished, of course, after just a talk with them. Together with the commanders, the activists helped them to outline their commitments for the ship's

upcoming in-port shipboard refresher training session, which has given youth an excellent opportunity to familiarize themselves with battle stations, and a "chief"--an experienced specialist--was assigned to each young sailor. For example, PO 1st Class Khudovtsev, a member of the Komsomol committee, took Smn. B. Karimov under his tutelage, as did PO 1st Class V. Stekachev with Smn. N. Migin and A. Svishchev. Il'gar Isayev undertook to help Smn. A. Projopenko. The Komsomol committee regularly hears both the young sailors and their older comrades: How are things going? Who still needs some kind of help? And most important: How are you doing in your shipboard service? The veteran Ul'Yanovite seamen V. Sharov, V. Kislov, and others are themselves glad to help the young replacements in every way. And, of course, not just fellow townsmen. Thanks to all of this the young sailors mastered their specialties rather well in a short time and are now preparing to tackle a new goal.

The role of the Komsomol organization is especially evident in competition during runs. The Komsomol committee helps the commander to organize the competition for best watch session, compartment, station, and for the best knowledge of the ship's equipment and the booklet "Combat Number." Naturally, men from one compartment stand watch during various shifts and, vice versa, there are representatives of rival compartments on the same shift—both rivals and allies, that is to say, at the same time. Some—times there is a Komsomol organizer aktivist from the surveillance and communications services at one shift, and one of the motor mechanics at another. It would seem that here there would be the possibility of a prejudicial attitude toward one another. And so there is, but at the heart of the matter is each person's concern for the common success.

Having been relieved from the watch, the aktivists make the rounds of the compartments and chat with the men, and with the permission of the commander or the senior assistant, they participate in no-notice inspections of the watch. Subsequently they report to the commander, or to the watch officer, or to the watch engineer-mechanic, or to me. Thus there is formed a picture which permits the totaling of objective results. Moreover, character coefficients are also taken into consideration. Let us us say that one person acted carelessly during a dive by virtue of inexperience while another because of inattentiveness. As a rule, the real reason for the blunder is clear to the Komsomol committee.

After the totaling of the results of the day's competition, a combat list is issued to each shift, and the daily installment of the radio news program, "The Foremost Speak," is prepared. The best shift for the week is awarded the pennant of the Ul'yanovsk Komsomol gorkom in a solemn observance, the whole shift is photographed, and an amateur concert is organized for it. There are also other interesting ways of giving incentives to those who are foremost in socialist competition.

It is characteristic of the Komsomol members of our ship to have a concerned attitude toward the fulfillment of socialist commitments, and they constantly are seeking ways and means to enhance the effectiveness of the competition, not overlooking even the most minor blunders. It was the Komsomol members who questioned the fact that in a number of subunits there was a perfunctory attitude toward totaling results. The ship's commander devised a model for totaling of results, and conducted a seminar with the young officers. The common cause, of course, could only profit from this.

Now the ship's Komsomol organization is doing all it can to ensure a worthy greeting to the forthcoming 13th Komsomol Congress and the 60th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol.

Medical Facilities for Naval Personnel

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 78 p 4

[Article by Col. Med. Serv. L. Grishayev, deputy chief of the Baltic Fleet Medical Service: "Health Watch on the Ocean"]

[Text] I recall the following incident. During a cruise to Canada, and somewhere beyond the Aleutians, they reported from the "Gnevnyy" to the flag ship: A sailor has become ill; an operation is needed. A launch immediately rushed to the "Gnevnyy" with Sr. Lt. Med. Serv. V. Mel'nik. He handled the matter outstandingly. For several days in a row the sailor's course of recovery was announced on both ships, and the admiral did not forget to refer to it at conferences and briefings.

Many similar examples could be cited. And all of them convince one of the fact that military medics are reliably carrying on a health watch on the ocean.

So that no misfortune should catch the medic by surprise during a cruise, while still ashore the medical equipment and devices are carefully inspected, necessary inoculations are administered, and stocks of medical supplies are replenished. The physician, together with the medical instructor and the medical orderly, do practical work without fail in the hospital, working out the coordination of the surgical brigade. A high degree of general and clinical training of the ship's medics allows them to protect the crew's health far from their native shores just as successfully as ashore.

You do not realize immediately that you are on a ship when you are in the sick bay of the large ASW ship "Druzhnyy." The chief of the medical unit here is Sr. Lt. Med. Serv. Yu. Yefimov. His is able to perform operations and also work at disease prevention. Everything necessary for operational intervention and for rendering urgent aid during outbreaks of disease is at his disposal.

Near the entrance to the sick bay there is a colorfully designed medical instructional display where preventive measures for this or that disease are stated in layman's terms. The contents of the display are periodically renewed, taking into consideration the urgency of this or that problem. A medical wall newspaper is regularly issued. The chief of the ship's medical unit does not miss a chance to chat with the sailors in their quarters or in the mess. In contact with the physical culture organizer, he improves the physical fitness of the sailors and provides measures for toughening them up. The physician helps the young commanders to come to know the nature of stresses, the psychology of living in close quarters, and peculiarities of the microclimate in the collective depending on the specific conditions of the voyage.

This is on a ship. The network of shore facilities for treatment and fortifying the health of the troops is much broader. There are rest homes and dispensaries at the disposal of those who have returned from a cruise. The sailors are carefully examined and observed.

The scientific research of naval physicians is directed toward prevention and reduction of the sickness rate. Actively working on these matters are not only hospital workers, among whom are those who possess academic degrees, but also physicians on ships and in units—the above—mentioned Sr. Lt. Med. Serv. Yu. Yefimov, Lt. Med. Serv. A. Alekseyev, and Lt. Med. Serv. Ye. Krenok.

The physicians share all the burdens of field conditions, and instruct the command in the basics of medicine and devices for self and mutual aid for injuries caused by modern weapons. The main watch of the military medics is the protection of the health of the troops. The medical workers of our fleet are giving all of their efforts and knowledge to this noble cause.

Effectiveness of Various Incentive Measures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Capt. 2d Rank Yu. Proshin: "Stimulate the Desire to Excell]

[Text] One day in the wardroom of one of the ships the conversation turned to the educational influence of incentives and punishment.

"It is my feeling," declared one young officer in the argument, "that with punishment one should act only after a great deal of careful

consideration in order not to commit some foolish blunder. However, an incentive, no matter what kind, is always pleasant, and here there is no need to be especially thoughtful."

Officers who were more experienced and older attempted, of course, to prove to their young colleague the onesidedness of his view. But by the expression on the lieutenant's face it was evident that he was not in any hurry to change his point of view.

Facts are very demonstrative things. The lieutenant had to be told about how a petty officer whom he knew was awarded an engraved watch after successes in a competition. The supervisors had seemingly considered everything carefully: They had not disregarded the petty officer's service zeal and presented the gift to him. But they forgot about a small "trifle." Later, regarding this "trifle" the petty officer said to his colleagues:

"They could have at least engraved a couple of words on the watch. You go home and are inevitably going to be asked: 'Show us the "admiral's watch".' But it could have been either the admiral's or have been bought with my own money."

I talked about this episode with some officers and heard:

"Same here! I not only didn't get an inscription but was presented the gift in a highly original way: I was summoned to the staff, they offered to have me sign my name in a register, and gave me a watch."

It turns out that the point of view of those who believe that with incentives "there is no need to be especially thoughtful" is not all that uncommon. Now, an incentive should in no way leave behind a bitter feeling, especially one of disappointment or resentment. The definition of incentive, according to the dictionary, states that by means of approval, reward, help, and sympathy, the desire to do well or better is stimulated.

Stimulate the desire to do better... The role of moral stimuli in competition consists precisely of this. And when you hear the complaints of some officers that, say, it is difficult to increase competitive enthusiasm, you can be sure of the fact that in this case they have not pondered the moral aspects of competition, and the stimuli of moral incentives are not taken into account.

While familiarizing myself with the work of the ship's deputy commander for political affairs, Sr. Lt. A. D'yakonov, I became interested in how things stood concerning the determination of competition winners and with the dissemination of their experience. The officer opened a desk drawer, took several pennants out of it, unfolded them, and only after this began to speak.

"If I say that the factor of competitiveness has for the time being been low-keyed, then this, in spite of its paradoxicalness, rings close to the truth. You see the pennants here. They have not been awarded to anybody for quite a while now." What can you make of this? It means that the totaling of competition results has been poorly organized. It means that the competition's leading contenders, if that is the term, have not been given an incentive, and no attention has been riveted on their experience. There is no end of work to do.

For the sake of fairness, I will note that Sr. Lt. A. D'yakonov had just recently been appointed to the position. But before this, according to results of the regular phases of the competition, the ship had lost its position as leader. Thus the expression "there is no end of work to do" was used not just for the sake of rhetoric. The commander and political officer drew a correct conclusion from this very complex situation, and they adopted measures for breathing life back into the competition. And they armed themselves with moral stimuli: Photographs of outstanding personnel and first-class specialists appeared on a display of the ship's best people, and traveling pennants were placed in the best subunit battle stations and command posts. Of course the competition did not heat up by virtue of these measures alone, but they played their part. The main thing was that the troops saw that their work was noted and valued according to its merits.

The awarding of decorations has at times been carried out under prosaic conditions. Still, for a sailor, the day he becomes an outstanding man in the navy should be a holiday. So it is on the best ships, where prizes to the competition leaders for military labor are awarded in the presence of veterans of war and labor and the distinguished people of the unit and fleet.

I do not intend to assert that celebrations in honor of those who have done outstandingly should be accompanied by fanfares or by a certain reward. What should be remembered primarily, I repeat, is the attention given.

One day, on one of the ships two groups of sailors were carrying out some urgent work. A competition flared up between the two groups as to who would get the task done quicker and better. When the work was finished, the ship's commander, knowing that the troops had not been able to watch a movie together with the rest of the crew, invited them to the officers' wardroom. After the movie, a table was set out there for them and they were invited to have tea. No doubt that evening has been well remembered by the sailors.

No, it is not a matter of indifference as to how and in what form the troop is thanked for his successes and for his military shock work. In organizing a competition, this must always be kept in view.

9087

CSO: 1801

TRAINING PROGRESS OF YOUNG PILOTS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 May 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col O. Sergeyev, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "In a Jet Stream"]

[Text] Lieutenant Vladimir Timofeyev felt great bumpiness on a 20-minute flight. Ahead, right on course, enormous black thunder clouds tinged with blue rose up. If the airplane shakes like this here, then what is going on in the cloud itself!

Boosting the engine, the pilot decisively pulled back on the stick. The shaking soon stopped. The sun's rays timidly broke through the rapidly brightening blanket of the cloud cover's upper layer. Another instant, and the supersonic missile carrier plunged into the sparkling space.

... The weather forecasters had warned of the approach of this thick frontal cloud cover ahead of time. Who should be sent there, beyond the front of storm clouds? The flight operations officer looked at his planning table. Should the assignment be given to Lieutenant Timofeyev? This young officer had been in the unit for only two years, but he is already flying under all conditions. He is especially meticulous in acquiring knowledge and has special tenacity in consolidating his skills. Who has the best work notebook? Timofeyev. Who accrued the greatest number of hours in the trainer? Timofeyev. Who was the first of the young pilots to be granted the honor to take off on an air battle with an experienced pilot? Once again, Lieutenant Timofeyev.

Air battles, interceptions under simple and complex weather conditions, day and night, flights to the range--Lieutenant Timofeyev accomplished all these exercises only with an excellent grade. This is why, when the question arose of who to send on the difficult assignment, the commander had no doubts.

The pilot cut off the boost. Breaks appeared in the clouds. The pilot refined his position from the reflective surface of a reservoir which appeared for a moment in a gap and was surprised: how could he "cover" such a distance in such a short time? And then he remembered that the forecaster on duty had warned about the force of the jet streams at high altitudes in this area.

They reach several hundred kilometers per hour. If head winds retard flight, tail winds greatly increase ground speed. This is why the missile carrier found itself close to the "front line" so quickly.

One must be ready for anything: the airplane had certainly been picked up by the "enemy" radar already. Fighter attacks are possible. How to break through to the target? A model of the combat manuever is in readiness. But the lieutenant did not hurry: let the CP [command post] of the opposing side think that he didn't even suspect the attack that was being prepared. His military cunning was successful.

The lone airplane seemed to two experienced interceptors flying in the stratosphere to be easy prey. The pair leader reported to the CP that he sees the target. He was probably preparing to "launch" a missile.

At this moment, Lieutenant Timofeyev executed an energetic countermaneuver. The interceptors' attack was frustrated. And here he is, in the required grid square. Timofeyev turned on the sight. A blip shone brightly in the upper left corner of the screen. Now--to hold it and move it to the center. A few seconds--and the decisive moment: "Launch!"

The pilot pressed the button and felt a light jolt. The missiles rushed forward. Two burst clouds shot up almost simultaneously and fragments of the target spurted to the sides.

A turn into the return course. The flight in the supersonic airplane was swift. Vladimir glanced downward through the gaps in the clouds. Tractors are crawling on the clearly ruled rectangles and fields like industrious ants. A small city white with the slate of roofs had settled at the edge of a forest tract. His heart shook joyously. It was the city of his childhood! He saw it for the first time from a bird's-eye view.

It was here he went to school and sang songs at pioneer campfires. Laying on the warm grass, together with the children he followed the light soaring of the steppe eagles.

Training came easy to Cadet Timofeyev. But then flights started and he understood that the sky is not only tender and blue....

Vladimir recalls, of course, how on his seventh solo flight over the circuit he, a cadet, felt such confidence that he decided to revise the pilot's Instructions. Why, he mused, drag out the route in order to accomplish all four turns separately when they could all be accomplished together? But, completing this combined turn, Vladimir became confused: for some reason, he could not see the landing markers. He discovered them with difficulty almost beneath the fuselage. Here, according to all rules, he should take off on another circuit. But he decided to land. He completely cut back on the revolutions of the turbine. The airplane made steeply for the ground. He fed gas and the craft barely levelled out at the very surface of the

ground. The landing was rough and dangerous. Since then, for all his flying life Timofeyev has been imbued with the deepest respect for the "Piloting Instructions for the Pilot."

Lieutenant Vladimir Timofeyev was graduated from the school with a brilliant efficiency report. And in the regiment, his development proceeded as if he was accompanied by a strong jet stream. Only two years have passed, and the lieutenant already has the qualification of a first-class military pilot. He has mastered the combat employment of a missile carrier under the most difficult weather conditions, day and night. His knowledge of the equipment, aerodynamics, and tactics is profound and thorough. He is a sports parachutist. He has accomplished hundreds of jumps. And in everything, the young officer is an example to be imitated. Especially for his subordinates. They love their commander in the crew that is headed by Lieutenant Timofeyev and they try to follow his example. And the crew is firmly retaining the title of excellent in the competition.

A thunderstorm was raging above the airfield. Everyone landed at the alternate airfield. The first to return from there was the missile carrier piloted by Lieutenant Vladimir Timofeyev. The squadron commander asked him what was most difficult for him in that "stormy" flight.

"The wind on the landing," said the lieutenant, thinking for a minute. "It was as if it had flown into a rage: it flies at you from all directions. You see, the storm really untwisted the atmosphere. I barely succeeded in countering the drift. I have to drive myself with the 'lateral gusts' on the trainer."

And not putting it off until tomorrow, he set off directly from the flights to the classroom where the electronic trainer stands. He took his seat in the cockpit, an exact copy of a real one in an airplane. He "took off" and made a landing approach. "Give me a lateral gust," he asked the pilot sitting at the control panel. The latter stood, turned the knob of one of the units, and created a cross wind.

"Rather weak!" Vladimir's dissatisfied voice was heard. They increased the wind velocity, then again, and brought it to the maximum values. The wind direction was changed several times on the lieutenant's request. He left the trainer satisfied.

On the way home, a conversation began among the young pilots about the problems of cosmonautics and about flights to distant worlds. Someone took a long breath pensively: If only.... Well, who doesn't dream of becoming a cosmonaut!"

"I don't" uttered Vladimir with a faint note of challenge. Then he hastened to correct himself: "I'm not dreaming for the present. I like my profession. And I'm far from the 'ceiling' in it."

A specialist differs from a dilettante in that he undertakes a matter seriously and thoroughly. Lieutenant Timofeyev, a first-class specialist, has a dream--to become a sniper pilot. And he is convinced of its practicability.

6367

CSO: 1801

NEED FOR INITIATIVE, CREATIVITY IN MILITARY DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 May 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen A. Lizichev, member of military council, chief of political directorate of Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District: "Without Waiting for Instructions"]

[Excerpts] As is known, the summary report of the Central Committee CPSU to the 25th Party Congress clearly formulates the requirements which are imposed on the contemporary leader. In particular, it is stressed that the leader must organically combine within himself party spirit with profound competence and discipline with initiative and a creative approach toward matters. During his trip to the rayons of Siberia and the Far East and, in particular, at his meeting with the command of the Transbaykal Military District, the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, again stressed the importance of initiative and a creative approach in the work of the communist-leader.

In our activity, we are all guided by the decisions of the Communist Party and the documents and instructions from higher headquarters. Our daily work is organized on their basis. Of course, as applicable to specific conditions and with consideration of the special features of the missions being accomplished. But again, the attainment of success here already depends greatly on how deeply the leaders have mastered the Lenin work style which is unthinkable without the manifestation of initiative and creative activity.

Today, it is difficult, very difficult for one who is unable to make an independent decision and does not display initiative.

Last year, in one of the district's units the party bureau's former secretary, Captain G. Chumak, was not recommended to be a bureau member during a party election meeting. The commander and party organization concluded that the unit can and must win new positions in raising combat readiness and soldierly skill. For this, of course, there is a great requirement for the enthusiasm of the party leader and for a creative approach to the solution of all problems facing the party bureau. It is this which Captain G. Chumak

lacked. He did not display proper persistence, an innovator's view, or initiative. Working in the subunits, he was frequently satisfied with a statement of facts and avoided a deep analysis. For example, when instances of violations of military discipline appeared in one of the subunits, the party bureau and its secretary were engaged primarily in lectures and declarative appeals although the young commanders needed specific assistance. Here, it was only necessary to take one practical step and make a simple decision: to generalize and spread what is being done in the adjacent subunit where the commanders and party activists have accumulated much experience in work on strengthening military discipline. The political organ was required to interfere in order to lead the secretary to this thought and, later, to explain again what must be done and how to do it.

Unfortunately, this is not the only example of this work style.

Life constantly convinces us that to follow the force of inertia and to go along the beaten track of seeming well-being from check to check means, in the final analysis, ending up among the laggards. Everyone certainly knows this. And at the same time, as we see, the obsolete concept of efficiency is not always broken. Isn't it because to some degree the comrades have been schooled in such inertness?

Let us estimate how much paper (of course, necessary paper but also much which is completely unnecesary) reaches the executor, especially in the "lower echelon," from various echelons. How many instructions, orders, and recommendations, sometimes contradictory, he must execute! During the first three months of this year alone the political section of the district's construction directorate sent to the communists--unit leaders and party organizations-more than 60 written instructions, reviews, and recommendations on questions of improving indoctrinational work with the personnel. Doesn't this "duplication of instructions" develop into elementary guardianship in those places where clear, strict party checking of the accomplishment of decisions already adopted is fully sufficient? By the way, the mentioned political section did not monitor one of its 60 "outgoing papers." It should be assumed that there was not enough time: the comrades were occupied in drawing up new instructions.... Somewhere and for some reason, it became the norm to turn on the "paper mill" at full strength by the end of the year or of a training period--as if by increasing the number of strict instructions everything which had been neglected earlier could be accomplished. But really, are the cases rare where higher headquarters "puzzle" all the lower echelons "wholesale," without considering the missions which they are accomplishing? Does not the following really happen: lagging was noted in one collective and they strike the bell for all without exception?

This cannot fail to have an effect on the executors. First they are confused, and then it disciplines them to wait for recommendations from above on any occasion. Look for yourself, "messengers" come to the senior commander for instructions and the telephones are ringing off the hook from impatience.

The loop was closed....

There is only one way out of it. The December 1977 Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU stressed: "...to assert everywhere genuine party, creative style in administrative work, a style which is incompatible with overcautiousness and red tape, unnecessary appeals to higher headquarters, and the striving to shift responsibility to others." To encourage everything that is new and advanced means not only attaining an increase in discipline and organization in the accomplishment of plans which have been mapped out, but also stimulating the search and activity of the leaders of party collectives and all communists.

The political directorate of our district has worked out and is introducing in the troops a method for the systematic analysis of troop collective activity which permits determining the work style or, figuratively speaking, the business face of the party organizations. It includes a deep and thorough study of the results attained by the unit and subunit in relation to the obligations which have been assumed, the quality and effectiveness of the forms of party influence, and so forth. We note with satisfaction that this approach permitted an even more fruitful influence on raising the combat vitality of the party collectives and, primarily, on the development of initiative among the communist-leaders. Many of them began to comprehend creatively the phenomena which are occurring in the subunits, to rely in their conclusions and recommendations on important analytical work, and to determine prospects correctly.

Last year, many grievances were directed to the party committee of the N-th regiment; it was criticized for passivity and sluggishness. We made a deep analysis of this collective's activity. Substantial errors in the work of the party organization were disclosed rather clearly. Together with the party committee, specific ways were planned to correct shortcomings, and the comrades were warned that subsequently everything depends on their initiative. And it was recommended to the political section that it not be the guardian of the party organization as was the case earlier, but that it concentrate greater efforts on businesslike and regular monitoring.

And now the work style of this party committee has improved noticeably and is distinguished by enviable activity and purposefulness. Here, they are able to determine correctly and take into maximum consideration the capabilities of the communists, distribute people correctly among all sectors of combat and political training, and give an assignment to each one in accordance with his capabilities. Thanks to the persistence of the communist-leaders, a certain system for mutual checking was also confirmed in the party organization. Let us take socialist competition. On the initiative of the party activists the mutual checking of the competitors and their weekly reports on successes attained and experience accumulated became a rule, and the forms for honoring the leaders became more varied. This approach of the party organization is also perceptible on other directions of the training and life of the troop collective.

Of course, it is not easy to work in this manner. It became much more strained. But the communists of the regiment assure us: it is satisfying as well. In such a situation the best professional qualities are molded much more rapidly and a style of activity is developed which also becomes a school for those who join the party and for those who are not novices in its ranks. And on the whole, party influence itself grows in the regiment and the authority of the party committee and of all communists is strengthened.

The 25th Congress stressed that the primary party organizations must be constantly concerned about the creation of an atmosphere for harmonious work and creative search in each collective. Commanders and political organs are called upon to give maximum assistance in the accomplishment of this important task.

6367

CSO: 1801

IMPROVING PRODUCTION METHODS ON MILITARY FARMS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 May 78 p 2

[Article: "Party Attention and Concern for the Operation of the Military Sovkhozes"]

[Text] The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces heard a report by the deputy chief of the political department for rear services of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 2d Rank V. Chernenko. He spoke about the work of the political department and the party organizations of the fleet's military sovkhozes in accomplishing the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the decrees of the Central Committee CPSU on increasing agricultural production.

During the discussion of the report, it was noted that the political department and the party organizations of the military sovkhozes have conducted considerable work on raising the political and labor activity of the workers and employees in the struggle for a high yield of grains, vegetables, potatoes, and the productivity of animal husbandry. Measures are being adopted to improve the organization of production and strengthen the farms with qualified personnel. More attention has begun to be devoted to the organization of socialist competition. On the initiative of the party organizations, close contacts have been established with agricultural scientific institutions of the Far East. The workers of the military sovkhozes are mastering advanced procedures of agricultural production. All this is having a favorable effect on the economic activity of the sovkhozes. They accomplished the production program for 1977 by 123 percent and a considerable profit was obtained. All sovkhozes of the fleet are working profitability.

Meanwhile, the requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress concerning an increase in the effectiveness of agricultural production and improving the quality of work are not being accomplished in all productive elements of the sovkhozes. The cost price of individual types of cattle-raising products is often higher than the planned price and some sovkhozes are not accomplishing the assignment for yield of fodder crops. The turnover of personnel is still great and there are instances of the violation of labor discipline.

The political department and the party organizations are still not doing everything to mobilize the specialists and workers to increase the effectiveness of production and are not making full use of socialist competition. number of cases, the obligations of its participants are put too low and do not stimulate a struggle between the competitors for the attainment of higher indices. Insufficient attention is devoted to the introduction of the advanced experience of the country's machine operators. The proper concern is not manifested for increasing the activity of the trade union and Komsomol organizations, for indoctrinational work with the youth, or for a growth in the Komsomol organizations. The party organizations of the sovkhozes are not always persistent in the search for internal reserves to increase the effectiveness of production and make poor use of the right to monitor the activity of the administration which is granted by the CPSU Regulation. The party layer among the workers of the leading production branches is still low. Personnel of the political organ rarely visit party meetings and at times do not delve into the economy of the sovkhozes in quite a qualified manner.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces demanded the elimination of the shortcomings which have been noted. In the course of the discussion, measures were planned to intensify party influence on the activity of the labor collectives of the military sovkhozes. Ways were also planned to strengthen work on accomplishing the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and implementing the instructions and recommendations of the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, which he expressed at a conference of party kraykom and obkom chairmen in Vladivostok in April 1978. These concerned the maximum satisfaction of needs for agricultural produce through local resources.

It is necessary to increase the responsibility of the communist-leaders for the development of the material and technical base of the sovkhozes, the conversion of agricultural production to an industrial base, and improvement of housing and cultural and living conditions for the workers and employees. It is important to concentrate organizational and political work directly in the brigades, sections, and on the farms, directing it for the further raising of production effectiveness and the introduction of scientific achievements into practice. They should delve more deeply into the economy of sovkhoz production and the prospects for its development.

Great attention should be devoted to strengthening the sovkhozes with middle-level personnel, machine operators, and other mass professions as well as with experienced specialists, skillful organizers, and teachers for the labor collectives. Their role and responsibility for production style and the skillful use of the land, equipment, fertilizer, and other material resources should be increased. There should be daily concern about increasing the economic education and agricultural, zoological, and technical knowledge of the workers and employees

There should be more objective work on the communist indoctrination of the workers and employees and increasing their ideological and theoretical tempering and an integrated approach to the indoctrination of people should

be persistently implemented. Indoctrinational work should be more closely tied to the accomplishment of tasks for strengthening labor discipline and an efficient, thrifty attitude toward the national good as well as for increasing the effectiveness of labor.

It is necessary to achieve a further growth in the combat vitality of the party organizations of the sovkhozes and their sections, delve more specifically into the placement of communists in production, ensure that all communists and Komsomols are examples in labor and discipline, and be constantly involved with questions of replenishing the ranks of the CPSU with leading workers. The level of party leadership of the trade union and Komsomol organizations should be raised.

On the basis of accomplishment of the tasks assigned in the letter of the Central Committee CPSU, Council of Ministers USSR, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, and the Komsomol Central Committee about initiating socialist competition in 1978, there should be an increase in the effectiveness of the competition and unconditional accomplishment and overaccomplishment of the 1978 plans for increasing the production and raising the quality of all agricultural products. The experience of the agricultural collectives of the Primorskiy kray and the Rostov machine operators in attaining the highest productivity of labor and the maximum use of the technical capabilities of agricultural machinery should be introduced more widely in the work practice of the military sovkhozes. So should the experience of the workers of Ipatovskiy rayon, Stavropol'skiy kray, in organizing combined mechanized brigades during the period of spring field work and gathering the harvest. The attention of the appropriate political organs should be concentrated on the necessity for further strengthening of political and organizational work among the workers of the military sovkhozes. It is recommended that the organization of training for the party, trade union, and Komsomol activists be improved.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces expressed its confidence that the communists and all workers of the military sovkhozes will apply maximum efforts for the further increase in the production of agricultural produce.

6367

CSO: 1801

COMPLAINTS: FOLLOW-UP REPORTS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Spare Parts Supply Problems

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 78 p 3

[Article: "A Mountain of Spare Parts]

[Text] V. Trokhov's critical article was published in the newspaper under this headline on 21 March. It examined shortcomings in providing SPK (spare parts, tools and accessories kits) to a repair and maintenance establishment.

Maj Gen Sig Trps N. Tsarev informed the editors that the article was discussed at a meeting for leadership personnel of signal troops repair and maintenance establishments. The newspaper's statement was acknowledged as being factual. Supply for the enterprises really needs to be straightened out. A number of specific measures were taken for the purpose of speeding up the work on creating optimal repair SPK's and on using them efficiently. Specifically, a time schedule for correcting the kits was approved and relationships were streamlined with the manufacturing plants regarding deliveries of spare parts. Scientific research work has begun for the purpose of improving the makeup of SPK for communications equipment.

Irregularities in Housing Assignments

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 78 p 3

[Article: "Operation 'Metamorphosis'"]

[Text] The article published under this headline on 17 March of this year talked about cases of flagarant violations of the procedures for assigning and using housing resources in a Novosibirsk garrison. Engr-Col N. Klimov, chief of the BS

[Billeting Section] for the Siberian Military District, informed the editors that the newspaper's statement was discussed at a meeting of employees of the billeting agencies; the criticism was acknowledged as being correct. The documents on the procedures for assigning and using housing were studied again with the chairmen of the housing commissions of the district's garrisons. During the current year, an inspection will be conducted of the legality of housing assignments and utilization in all the garrisons of the district.

Engr-LtCol O. Popov was removed from the position he occupied and transferred to the reserve for illegally assigning apartments to I. Plyukhin and T. Borodina. F. Tolstov was dismissed from the BU [Billeting Unit] of the Novosibirsk Rayon. The living space occupied by Plyukhin has been vacated. The case for evicting Borodina is being handed over to a court.

In his reply, the chief of the BS also states that other officials who were involved in illegal housing assignments were punished by the unit commander.

At the same time, the editors received a letter from LtCol V. Nechesov who is trying to divert the criticism directed at him.

Of course, in his reply, the chief of the BS did not evaluate the actions of people who are not officially subordinate to him. Therefore, the editors are awaiting an appropriate response from the district's political directorate.

Shortcomings in Organizing Sports

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 78 p 2

[Article: "Write with Chalk..."]

[Text] This was the title of the article by the participants of the military correspondent's raid which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 26 January. It uncovered serious shortcomings in organizing mass sports arrangements in two units of the Siberian Military District.

The editors received a reply from Col A. Isayev; it reports that the statement of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was considered at an expanded meeting of the unit sports committee where Capt I. Zernyakov is the chief of physical training. The command element and the political agency have taken measures to

eliminate the shortcomings; a plan was drawn up for improving the organization of mass sports work. At the same time, the reply reports that the unit gymnasium will be used for its express purposes in May-June of this year.

The other reply, which was signed by LtCol Dorrendorf, admits that the criticism of the situation in developing masss ski sports in the military construction detachment commanded by LtCol I. Raykhman was justified. The article "Write with Chalk..." was discussed at a meeting of district military construction detachment commanders, their deputies for political affairs and other officials. Meetings of the sports committees were conducted in the military construction units and organizations; specific measures for improving mass sports work among the construction soldiers were developed at them.

Lt Col I. Raykhman, the unit commander, and Capt V. Gonchar, his deputy for political affairs, were severely admonished for their failure to properly evaluate the development of ski sports among personnel.

Support Problems at Military Institute

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 May 78 p 2

[Article: "What is the Conclusion?"]

[Text] This was the title of the article by Engr-Col Yu. Galkin which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 5 April. It talked about the shortcomings in organizing the motor vehicle and motor pool service at the Poltava Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command Institute imeni Army Gen N. F. Vatutin and it talked about the unhealthy relationships which have developed between WO D. Marusich, the former chief of the TCP [Technical Control Point], and several officials of the motor vehicle staff and the academic support battalion.

Lt Gen Arty V. Obraz, the commander of the institute, informed the editors that the newspaper's statement was discussed with the technical service officers and with the officers of the academic support battalion; it was also discussed at a meeting of party and Komsomol activists. The command element and the political section of the institute conducted a number of measures to eliminate the existing shortcomings. They planned to review the issue on the status and measures for improving the use of motor vehicle equipment and the

motor pool service at the institute's council and they planned to listen to Maj A. Sandin, a CPSU member and chief of the institute's motor vehicle service, at a meeting of the directorate's party bureau.

DOSAAF Range Unusable for a Year

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 78 p 2

[Article: "A Range Without Shooting"]

[Text] The article published under this headline on 30 March of this year told about the fact that a rifle range which was built with resources of the Moscow DOSAAF City Committee (MCC DOSAAF) was accepted for use in February 1977 in Zelenograd; however, over a year later, not a single shot has rung out at the range. This situation is explained by the fact that the range was accepted with flaws which had not even been eliminated by March 1978. F. Mshvelidze, the chief of the capital construction department of the MCC DOSAAF, served as the chairman of the state acceptance commission.

Mar Avn A. Pokryshkin, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, informed the editors that the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee recognized the newspaper's statement as being correct and timely. Comrade Kuznetsov, the chairman of the MCC DOSAAF, was ordered to take immediate meaures to put the Zelenograd rifle range into operation as soon as possible and to increase his supervision over the observance of deadlines and the quality of construction for DOSAAF facilities.

Based on the fact that he delayed operations at the Zelenograd range, Comrade Mshvelidze was reprimanded by a decree adopted by the MCC DOSAAF Presidium. V. Vakhonin, the deputy chairman of the MCC DOSAAF, and M. Kibkalov, chairman of the Zelenogradskiy Rayon DOSAAF Committee, were strictly admonished for the violations which were committed during acceptance of the range and for poorly supervising its construction.

Planning Deficiencies at Chemical Troops Enterprise

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 78 p 2

[Article: "The Miracle-Working Ruse"]

[Text]

Engr-Col L. Kulikov's article was published under this headline on 23 March in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. It talked about

practice of planning and fulfilling the so-called foreign orders at the industrial enterprise which is supervised by Engr-Col V. Anufriyev.

LtGen Tech Trps P. Krasota, the deputy chief of chemical troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and Engr-Col A. Kuznetsov, the secretary of the party committee, informed the editors that the article was reviewed by the directorate's command element and party committee.

The leaders of subordinate cost accounting enterprises were ordered to fill out and accomplish the additional planning targets in strict compliance with current legislation and normative documents. The directorate's officials were given the task of increasing their supervision over planning and fulfillment of orders during their inspections of the financial and economic activities of the enterprises.

Engr-Col V. Anufriyev was given strict instructions to eliminate the shortcomings pointed out in the article within the shortest possible time. At a meeting of the party committee, Col V. Kokurin was admonished for poor supervision over the activities of cost accounting enterprises and he was ordered to straighten things out in planning production output.

Miscellaneous Support Problems

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 78 p 2

[Article: "Measures Were Taken Based on Readers' Reports']

[Text] "For almost two months, the radios and television have not been working in our squadron," Guards Pvt Naybart informed the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. At our request, LtCol Teslin, deputy chief of the political section of the Armavir Red Banner Military Aviation Institute for Air Defense Pilots, verified the facts. They were confirmed. Officer Petrosyanets, the chief of the club, was admonished for a negligent attitude toward his duties; measures were taken to eliminate the shortcomings.

Comrade Kiryushin requested that the command element of the military unit where he was serving send a reference and permit for his entrance into the preparatory division of the Urals Electromechanical Institute for Rail Transportation Engineers. When he did not receive a reply, he wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about this. The editors reported this fact

to the higher political agency which replied that the documents were not sent in a timely manner because of Capt Chechulin; he was summarily punished for this. The reference and permit were sent to Comrade Kiryushin.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reader Pvt Ostrosablin wrote to us about the low quality of food in the soldier's dining hall. The editor sent his letter to the ration branch of the Leningrad Military District. In his reply, Engr-Col Merkulov states that the command element took the necessary measures to improve the dining hall's work: new courses have appeared on the menu and their quality has improved.

Military Newspaper Lax on Competition

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 78 p 2

[Article: "Competition and the Military Press"]

[Text] This was the title of the lead article published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 12 March. It criticized the Central Group of Forces newspaper SOVETSKIY SOLDAT for the fact that it seldom publishes articles on the developmental role of competition and it does not always react sharply to cases of a formal approach to organizing competition.

Col I. Morozov, the newspaper's editor, informed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that the lead article was discussed at a meeting of the editorial staff, at a party meeting and in an editorial leaflet. Measures were planned to eliminate the shortcomings. The subject plan for discussing the issues of socialist competition and progressive experience in the newspaper was made more precise and expanded.

Lately, the newspaper has published a number of articles and items on the subject of competition. Articles are being published more frequently under the heading "Implement Progressive Experience. The Experts of Combat Specialties have the Floor." They published a page on the subject "Competition Builds Character." The column "They Distinguished Themselves During the Exercise Critiques" was introduced.

Military Commissariats Taken to Task

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 78 p 2

[Article: "A Lack of Responsibility"]

[Text] Col A. Drovosekov's article was published under this heading on 11 May; it talked about the bureaucratic attitude

of several employees of the Kungradskiy Joint City Military Commissariat (JCMC) and the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Military Commissariat toward an inquiry from the commander of Unit X on the family situation of Pvt Ye. Zhetekenov.

MajGen N. Kochubey informed the editors that a group of officers from the Main Staff of the Ground Forces went to the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Military Commissariats to verify the facts set forth in this article and to study the status of work with letters, complaints and requests from workers.

The inspection showed that a number of officials of the military commissariats have a poor knowledge of the laws and orders; they display a lack of responsibility in solving the problems raised in letters from workers. Not all the party organizations and people's control groups of the military commissariats are attaching the necessary importance to this important matter. ColGen V. Yakushin, chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces, issued instructions for the staff officers among the troops and at the military commissariats to conduct an in-depth and comprehensive study of the status of work with letters during their routine work, uncover the causes of the shortcomings and eliminate them and render concrete assistance to the commanders and political agencies.

LtGen V. Mikhaylov, chief of staff of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District, informed us that the newspaper's statement was discussed with the personnel of the Kungradskiy JCMC and the rayon military commissars of the Karakalpakskaya ASSR and it was discussed at party meetings at the military commissariats where the status of work on letters and requests from servicemen and members of their families was analyzed. The district headquarters issued an order to the effect that an in-depth study would be conducted with all officers of the military commissariats on the CPSU Central Committee's decree "On Further Improving Work on Letters from Workrs in Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" and the corresponding orders of the USSR Minister of Defense and the district commander.

LtCol V. Krasnoshchekov, the military commissar of the Karakalpakskaya ASSR, was given a severe reprimand by order of the district commander for his flagrant violation of the Law on Universal Military Service regarding Pvt Zhetekenov's early transfer to the reserve for family reasons. LtCol A. Zolotnitsyn, the departmental head of this military commissariat, was transferred to the reserve. Maj Ya. In'kov, the military commissar of the Kungradskiy JCMC, was warned about perfunctory compliance with his duties. The Party Commission

of the Karakalpakskaya ASSR Military Commissariat's Political Department gave him a severe reprimand which was entered in his CPSU membership record. Regarding SrLts N. Anisov and S. Filichenko, officials of the Kungradskiy JCMC, the decision was made to turn them over to an officer comrade's court of honor.

The documents for Pvt Ye. Zhetekenov's early transfer to the reserve were sent to the unit he is serving in.

Officers Club Propaganda Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 78 p 2

[Article: "No License for a 'Dry Run'"]

[Text] The article which was published under this heading on 12 April 1978 criticized the work of the Baku District Officers Club and, specifically, the practice of propaganda lectures.

Col Bobin, chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department and deputy chief of the Baku Air Defense District Political Directorate, informed the editors that the article was discussed at a party meeting of the Baku District Officers Club and at the district's political directorate. They planned measures to further improve the quality of the projects being conducted The article was also discussed at a district meeting of propagandists and unit club officers; during this meeting, the work of all categories of propagandists was analyzed in light of the CPSU Central Committee's Decree "On the Condition of and Measures for Improving Propaganda Lectures."

They planned to create an exposition at the Officers Club which will be dedicated to the activities of the executive committee of the Baku Council of Workers, Red Army Soldiers, Sailors and Peasants Deputies during 1917-1918.

9001

CSO: 1801

CHIEF OF MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY DIRECTORATE DESCRIBES ACTIVITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen of Technical Troops B. Byzov, chief of Military Topography Directorate, General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces: "The Routes of the Military Topographers"]

[Text] In the Central Museum of the Soviet Armed Forces, topographic maps of the wartime years are stored along with weapons, documents, personal things of heroes of the Great Patriotic War, and other precious relics. Among them are both huge maps on which plans for the greatest battles were worked out and small "half-kilometer" maps from which battalion and company commanders led their subunits into battle.

The topographic maps rightly deserved the lofty honor to become museum exhibits. Before making his decision for battle, the commander at any level must study the terrain on which he is to fight thoroughly. And this begins with a map study. The information which is obtained helps him to make more effective use of weapons and combat equipment and various tactical procedures. Without a topographic map—the most important combat document—it is unthinkable to obtain the varied information necessary for the clear control of subunits. The specialists of the military topographic service create the maps and supply the troops with them.

Our service traces its genealogy from the military topographic directorate which was established 60 years ago with the Russian Main Staff. The first units of Red military topographers were formed and tempered during the difficult days of the Civil War. Under the difficult conditions of that time they not only accomplished the assignments for topogeodetic support of combat operations by units of the young Soviet Army, but they often fought the enemies of the Republic of Soviets with weapons in hand. Lofty bravery and valor were displayed by the cadets of the first Petrograd military topography courses when defending the cradle of the revolution against the White Guardists and interventionists, during the days of the suppression of the counterrevolutionary mutiny in Kronstadt, and on other fronts.

Prior to the spring of 1919, when V. I. Lenin signed the decree establishing the Higher Geodetic Administration, the military topographic service remained the only organization in the Soviet republic which accomplished topogeodetic and cartographic work.

Visitors to the museum, "V. I. Lenin's office and apartment in the Kremlin," will certainly turn their attention to the great number of various maps and atlases which the leader of the revolution used. Almost all of them were created by military topographers and cartographers. But the specialists of the military topographic service experience special pride in connection with the fact that they prepared a map specially for Vladimir Il'ich Lenin which shows the lines of the fronts of the Soviet republic from December 1919 through December 1920. Il'ich used this map when preparing the report at the 8th All-Union Congress of Soviets.

In the now distant twenties and thirties, even among the expeditions and, moreover, among the prospecting parties there was no mention of contemporary general-purpose equipment, all-terrain vehicles and helicopters, without which the labor of the topographers and geodesists is unthinkable today. Any assignment was linked with overcoming the most unexpected difficulties requiring of each of the pathfinders the maximum organization, endurance, and valor. On horses or dogs, on home-made rafts or boats, and most often on foot the topographers and geodesists advanced step-by-step with heavy loads on their shoulders over taiga thickets, across tundra, along canyons and ridges, and across burning sands and desert. They relied primarily on their own strength, on will and bravery, and on brotherly mutual assistance. And each one was helped by the knowledge that without their labor it was impossible to compile the detailed maps of the most inaccessible corners of our immense motherland which were so necessary for the country.

At that time, the specialists of the military topographic service, in accomplishing the tasks for topographic support of the Soviet Army, accomplished important work jointly with the Main Administration for Geodesy and Cartography in the creation of the astronomical-geodetic net and topographic maps for a number of rayons on the territory of the USSR. However, they were unable to completely create maps for the European part of the USSR prior to the treacherous attack of the Hitlerite aggressors on our country. But despite tremendous difficulties, the military topographers applied every effort to support the combat operations of the Soviet Army with maps in the shortest times in 1941.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the specialists of the military topographic service conducted the survey and reconnaissance of terrain on an area of more than 5 million square kilometers, created tens of thousands of new originals of topographic and special maps, and printed about 900 million map sheets. The military geodesists and topographers determined about 200,000 geodetic control points, accomplished the survey tie-in of more than 60,000 elements of artillery combat formations, and interpreted more than half a million aerial photos. A large number of intelligence, relief, and coded maps, maps of water lines, and many other graphical combat documents were prepared for control of the troops.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government evaluated highly the military and labor exploit of the service's personnel. Twenty-three units of the military topographic service were awarded orders and thousands of soldiers, sergeants and officers, workers, and employees were awarded orders and medals.

The wealth of experience acquired during the years of the Great Patriotic War is widely used in the matter of further development and improvement of the military topographic service. In the postwar period Soviet topographers created large-scale maps for sparsely inhabited areas of our country in short times.

In the postwar years, the efforts of the scientists and designers, workers and technical engineering personnel created contemporary types of geodetic, photogrammetric, and cartographic equipment, and progressive technology and new methods for accomplishing work are being introduced.

The military topographic service now has everything necessary for the successful accomplishment of its assigned missions. Its units and installations are staffed with well trained personnel who are boundlessly devoted to the party and the people. More than 90 percent of the officer personnel are communists and Komsomols and more than 60 percent have a higher military and special education. The Leningrad Higher Military Topographic Command School and the Military Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev are making a large contribution to the training of officer personnel for the service.

This year, the military topographers attained new successes in accomplishing socialist obligations. High and stable indices in training and work are shown by the units and subunits commanded by officers G. Shapovalov, B. Gavrilov, V. Aristov, and others.

For successes achieved in combat and political training and the accomplishment of production assignments and in connection with the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces many officers, warrant officers [praporshchik], workers, and employees have been awarded orders and medals. Among those decorated are Majors A. Yermolayev, N. Kuznetsov, and V. Balyberdin, Senior Lieutenant S. Lysak, and Warrant Officer I. Zakhodin.

Many workers and employees of the Soviet Army are remarkable examples of a communist attitude toward labor. Senior cartographer-technician A. Bogatova, for example, accomplished her personal five-year plan for the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Many workers and technical engineering personnel, among which are senior cartographer-technicians Ye. Ushenina, V. Shapovalova, and S. Struchalin and copier Yu. Konnov, each accomplished four annual plans.

The military topographic service is accomplishing its duty to the motherland with honor, successfully providing topogeodetic support for the troops. The military topographers, brought up in a spirit of boundless devotion to the Communist Party and the Soviet motherland, are making a worthy contribution to the cause of raising the combat might of the Armed Forces and strengthening the defensive capability of our socialist state.

6367

GENERAL DRAGUNSKIY COMMENTS ON COMMAND QUALITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 78 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Tank Troops D. Dragunskiy, twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "The Commander's Technical Horizon"]

[Text] "Dear Editors! One of our main tasks is to learn to take from the equipment everything it has to offer. But the requirements for the technical training of the specialist who operates the machine, the technical service officer, and the commander are different, of course. What is the nature of the knowledge which the commander needs most of all?

I should like to know the opinion on this matter by an experienced commander with frontline experience.

Lieutenant V. Sedov Commander of a Motorized Rifle Company

On the request of the editors, the company commander is answered by Colonel General of Tank Troops D. Dragunskiy, chief of the "Vystrel" Higher Officer Courses imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, he commanded a tank battalion and a brigade.

The question of the technical training of the combined-arms commander who is the organizer of battle is very timely. At first glance, the answer is simple: the more deeply the officer knows the equipment of the subunit entrusted to him, the better. But you see, the concept of depth of knowledge also requires interpretation.

I have had the occasion to meet commanders who could establish the nature of a breakdown in a vehicle's engine more rapidly than the driver-mechanic but in battle--actual or training-- functioned artlessly, straightforwardly, and

in far from the best manner. I also knew officers who possess the tactical flair and bold nature which the commander needs but whose attitude toward the equipment's capabilities is one of distrust. Neither the former nor the latter enjoy authority. The accomplishment of the most difficult missions was entrusted primarily to officers who are able to utilize completely the combat capabilities of the equipment and weapons in the interests of tactics.

Sometimes, the question of the necessity to expand comprehensively the technical training of command personnel is tied only to the military-technical revolution. In my opinion, the profound changes in the technical equipping of the army and the appearance of qualitatively new weapons have only intensified this question. As regards the question, "To learn to take from the equipment everything it has to offer," it was also timely in the prewar years.

I recall how much enthusiasm was aroused in us, young tankers, by our first tanks: the T-26, BT-5, and later the T-34. We studied them with great zeal. In the company which I had the occasion to command in the prewar years, many supplementary lessons were conducted in addition to planned ones. Technical study groups functioned in the subunit and competitions for best knowledge of the tank were customary. We drove the machines over steep hills since there were enough of them in the Far East where I spent my command youth and across swampy sectors, and we learned to shoot under any weather conditions.

Today, we constantly stress the great significance of a creative beginning in the daily activity of a commander of any rank. We also had a creative attitude toward the mastery of the equipment in those by now distant years. The division commander assigned our company a mission: to cross a river along the bottom. So on 13 June 1938, after thorough preparation my command tank equipped with two pipes, coated with minium and grease, crossed the rapid Razdol'naya River along the bottom at a comparatively deep place.

Today, one can hardly establish who was the first to have the thought that under certain conditions this method of crossing is also acceptable. It is only clear that he was a person in whom deep knowledge of the vehicle was combined with a broad tactical horizon and the ability to glance into the future. Instances of crossing along the bottom occurred in the combat practice of the Great Patriotic War, and all tankers mastered this method in the postwar period.

Tactics do not develop and become enriched with new procedures and methods for conducting combat by themselves, but as a result of the creative activity of the officer personnel and the mastery of the capabilities of new means of combat which arrive in the inventory. Each commander must be constantly pointed toward creative search and must attach an experimental nature to the field lessons and tactical exercises which he directs. He cannot limit himself to the study of equipment from the instructions. It is good when the commander knows the machine, figuratively speaking, "down to the last screw." But it is more important for him to be able to utilize its combat capabilities most completely and effectively.

The great Patriotic War fixed this conclusion in my consciousness with special force.

There are memorials of a special type on the squares of many cities: tanks, airplanes, and artillery mounts frozen on granite pedestals. They personify the exploit of frontline fighters, designers, and workers of the rear areas. The legendary T-34's, the indefatigable IL-2, the "katyushas" which struck fear in the enemy—these were worthy of the respect and gratitude of the soldier and his sincere love. And it is not by chance that fellow frontline soldiers meet at these memorials on the eve of the victory celebration.

In recalling one of the most valiant and skillful commanders of our tank brigade, Senior Lieutenant Vasiliy Uskov I, for example, cannot imagine him without a tank with the number 233. In this tank, Uskov went into the attack as early as 1942 on the Western Front. Then he participated in the battles at Orel and on the Dnepr. The tank engine had long ago operated for the designed number of motor hours, the track shoes were bare to the limit, and the paint did not want to stay on the scorched hull. But the crew, having become accustomed to the machine which had been knocked out three times in battle, requested that it not be transferred to a new tank. Covering many thousands of kilometers in battles, Uskov's tank ended the war in Berlin.

Love of equipment.... This feeling is filled with special content at the hour of military test.

I had the occasion to endure the entire bitterness of the war's first months when there was no demand for us, tank commanders: there were not enough tanks. How we awaited the time when the rear could supply a sufficient number of machines for the front! And this time arrived. At Stalingrad, the enemy was struck by tank and mechanized corps and, on the Kursk Bulge, by tank armies. The arrival of trains with the new equipment at the front became a genuine holiday for us. Touching with our palms the rough armor of the vehicles which smelled of paint and which had just left the plant shops, we thought with a feeling of tremendous gratitude about our party and the rear area workers who provided superiority over the hated enemy in the technical field, too.

The task of mastering the new equipment during the war days was accomplished in the shortest times. The great virtue of our equipment was the fact that with all its perfection it was distinguished by unpretentiousness and simplicity in servicing and was unbelievably durable.

When, on the battlefield, you become convinced of the strength of your machine, when it helps you to prevail and win, then you especially sense your oneness with the armor and with the reliable and perfect mechanism. You think: how I would like to embrace and kiss the people with whose hands all this was made. Much has already been said about the remarkable qualities of our tanks. I have not forgotten the impressive picture of the last war: the T-34's towing behind them the British "Valentines" and American "Shermans" over the swollen spring country roads....

Love for equipment is a specific concept. The better a person has mastered the equipment and the more completely he realizes its true combat capabilities, the stronger it always is. And who, if not the commander, should equip his subordinates with the necessary knowledge and skills!

The new qualities of today's means of combat expand considerably the combat capabilities of the troops. In addition, they force the commander to approach the solution of many problems in a new way. The requirements for his technical horizon have grown immeasurably. Today, in organizing battle the commander plans the use of helicopter gunships, tanks, artillery, missiles, antitank guided missiles, a wide range of antiaircraft weapons, infantry combat vehicles, and so forth. And he, of course, is required to have thorough knowledge of the capabilities of all types of combat equipment employed in battle.

It is necessary to see, stressed the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, that the "weapons and combat equipment are always in good working order and in complete readiness for action so that the personnel can use them with greatest effect under various conditions, especially in difficult and complex situations."

The accomplishment of this task lies primarily on the commander—the organizer and leader of the training process. Relying on the assistance of the staff, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations, and specialists of the technical services he is called upon to raise the entire technical training in the subunit and unit to the level of contemporary requirements. It is the commander who ensures the unity of technical and tactical training and gives the necessary direction to the lessons. There can be no talk of high technical training of the officer outside of a link with his tactical horizon and methodological skill.

Only a comprehensively trained commander is able to achieve the organic connection of tactics with other training subjects, the optimum combination of theory with practical work on the materiel, and the effective employment of various types of trainers and auxiliary means of instruction. The methodological skill of the commander is inseparable from his ability to make effective use of the mobilizing force of socialist competition, especially competition on tasks and norms.

Great attention is devoted to the improvement of the technical training of Ground Forces officers at the "Vystre1" courses. In recent years, much has been done here to intensify the training process and use the broad arsenal of technical means of instruction. In addition to specialized lecture halls which are saturated with various technical devices, a special center of trainer devices where electronics holds sway has been created at the courses.

The trainers help the officers of various combat arms not only to develop skills in controlling the equipment, but also to accumulate methodological experience. For training, television, motion pictures, and various types of trainers are also being used ever more widely in the units, permit presenting the material being studied more graphically and profitably, and permit "condensing" the training time and expending vehicle service life with great benefit.

Thanks to the concern of the party and its Leninist Central Committee, our Armed Forces have everything necessary for the accomplishment of their important mission—to be the guardian of the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the bulwark of universal peace. The Soviet servicemen are responding to the fatherly concern of the party and the people with a tireless struggle to increase combat readiness and master the first—class equipment and armament. And the commander is called upon to set the tone in this struggle.

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AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR PROCEDURES IMPLOVED

Mcscow KPASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 78 p 2

[Article by Eng-Col (Res) S. Kuts: "Regularity and Quality"]

[Text] The enterprise collective headed by Engineer-Colonel Ye. Pinchuk successfully completed 1977. The repairmen are performing with shock-labor effort in the third year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, achieving good results in socialist competition. The adoption of an overall system of quality control of performance has contributed greatly to this.

The first thing which strikes one's attention at the motor vehicle enterprise is the brightly lighted blocks of production buildings, the well developed grounds and the exemplary order in the shops. Looking around, one notices television cameras. They are on the roofs of buildings, in the shops and in the work sections. The cameras are elements of a system of television control of production. They are monitored from a control room or the office of the enterprise chief. Installation of yet another interesting innovation is now being completed. It is an automatic production recording system consisting of a control panel and electronic computers installed in the control room, and workers' consoles located in the shops.

The recording system makes it possible to gather information from all production sections and to record the time of breakdowns of the machines, and helps to eliminate them promptly. At the end of the work day or shift the enterprise director has a full picture of production operations and can ascertain the "bottlenecks." From the memory bank of the electronic computers it is possible to obtain any information stored therein during the month, quarter or 6-month period.

Poth systems, so to speak, constitute technical components of the overall system of performance quality control adopted at the plant after the example of the L'vov plants, which is well known in the nation.

"Introduction of the system was preceded by a great deal of preparatory work," I was told by V. Zabelin, secretary of the enterprise party committee. "It was necessary not only to work out the new technical documentation and to train the collective to work with it. We also had to prepare production, to raise its technical basis to a higher level, to develop a system of standards and moral and material incentive measures."

They began with modernization. That was not so long ago, but what changes have taken place in production since then! I had the opportunity to visit the enterprise before then. Production operations were congested, repair technology in certain sections was deficient, and there was a lack of rhythm in the work of the main shops and the enterprise as a whole... The enterprise is now a modern and progressive one with a high level of mechanization of the labor consuming processes, and the quality of repair work performed on the trucks and passenger vehicles has improved. New shops for engine repair, cab and body repair have appeared, and the assembly shop has been remodeled. The technical capabilities of the enterprise have been expanded, and the volume of work performed has almost doubled.

All of this was accomplished by the collective of repairmen and innovators at the enterprise: Engineer-Technologist L. Mushinskiy; Engineer-Major V. Tret'yakov, chief of the technical control department; Engineer-Colonel V. Shumeyko, chief engineer; A. Ivatev, production chief; G. Gudzenko, inspector in the technical control department; and workers V. Mikula, Ye. Alfimov, M. Moroz and F. Dovgan'.

The production quality control system has only functioned for a few months. It is already apparent, however, how much more exacting the repairmen are of their work. The entire enterprise collective concern themselves with the quality of the work. Labor productivity has increased, and the overall caliber of production and operational smoothness in the shops have improved. While more than 40 percent of the finished product was previously completed during the last 10 days of a quarter, 30 to 33 percent is now released each month.

A so-called reliability service has been set up at the enterprise in order to achieve maximum results from the new system. It essentially amounts to the following: agreements are concluded with the clients, under which the latter must on certain dates provide the enterprise with information on the operation of repaired motor vehicles. The repairmen now know how the equipment repaired by them operates. The evaluations are good, which means that the vehicles have been reliably repaired.

MCTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION COMMANDER ON COMPAT TRADITIONS

Mcscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 78 p 2

[Article by Gds Maj Gen A. Kozlov, commander of the Guards Motorized Rifle Irkutsk-Pinsk Division imeni Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Central Group of Forces; "The Guardsmen"]

[Text] Our division came into being in the turbulent year of 1918. And, like many of the older units (soyedineniya) of the Armed Forces of the USSR, it honorably bore the Fighting Colors through all of the wars falling to the lot of the socialist homeland.

The division's birthplace were the workers' settlements and plants of the Urals, Cossack stanitsy and peasant villages of the Orenburg region. Its first fighters were revolutionary soldiers and sailors, Ural workers and peasants, and poorer Cossacks.

They were the ones, taking the cause of Lenin, the cause of the Communist Party to their hearts, who fought to establish Soviet power in the Urals and in Siberia, led by their first commander, popular military leader E. Blyukher. It was they who completed an unprecedented march of 1,500 kilometers to join up with the 3d Army of the Eastern Front, who were the subject of a telegram from the Ural'skaya Oblast party committee: "In Blyukher and his regiments we have true heroes who have performed a feat unheard of in the history of our revolution." The telegram was addressed to V.I. Lenin.

In September 1918 V.K. Blyukher was awarded the newly established Order of the Red Banner. Soon thereafter the first order of the young Soviet Republic also gleamed on the chest of the commander of one of the division's cavalry squadrons, K. Rokossovskiy, a future Marshal of the Soviet Union. The division also became a Red Banner division, receiving the honorary name "Irkutsk." The unit was awarded a second Order of the Red Banner for the courage demonstrated by the personnel in the liberation of the Crimea.

The division's soldiers also demonstrated fearlessness and heroism during the Great Patriotic War. The unit was a part of the 18th Assault Landing Army, in which Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev was chief of the political section. Following the fighting to liberate Novorossiysk the division was awarded the Order of Suvorov 2d degree.

This was followed by new kilometers of fiery front-line roads and new trials... The division became a guards division. It was awarded the honorary "Pinsk." Remarkable traditions were born and strengthened in the fierce fighting: infinite devotion to the homeland and party, steadfastness, courage, valor, comradely mutual assistance. The names of 25 Heroes of the Soviet Union were entered for posterity in the division's history. These were Guards Major General B. Arshintsev, Guards Major P. Zhukov, Guards Lieutenant D. Akhmedov, Political Instructor G. Gardeman, and others.

The years passed. The equipment changed, and the personnel were not the same. The glorious traditions of the Soviet fighting men are still alive and multiplying, however. All of the best qualities transmitted to us by the older generations are embodied in the selfless military work, in the unceasing struggle of each officer, warrant officer (praporshchik), sergeant and soldier to further improve combat readiness. On the eve of the glorious 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR our Guards Motorized Rifle Irkutsk-Pinsk Order of Lenin, thrice Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Division imeni Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR was awarded the Order of the October Revolution for its good results in combat and political training.

The unit's legendary past and the immortal feats performed by the front-line soldiers inspire the present generation of fighting men to improve their fighting skill tirelessly. Division personnel strive to be known as an outstanding unit. During each class, training session and exercise the fighters attempt to destroy the target with the first shot, round or launching, to surpass the established norms, to make full use of the equipment and weapons.

In the recent inspection covering the winter training period division personnel demonstrated good results and fulfilled their commitments with honor. The officers achieved the best results. Among those firing accurately from the combat vehicles and driving them skillfully over the difficult routes were Guards Lieutenant Colonels G. Shevelev and E. Volodayev, Guards Major V. Kruchinin, and many others.

The inspecting officials gave a high rating to the field training and combat teamwork of the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Guards Major V. Mazin and the tank battalion commanded by Guards Captain G. Muktayev.

The achievements are the result of a great deal of work on the part of commanders, headquarters, the political section and the party and Komsomol organizations.

The unit headquarters keeps a constant finger on the pulse of combat training and socialist competition. It permits us constantly to know the real state of affairs in the subunits (podrazdeleniya), to reveal deficiencies in the combat training promptly and to focus the efforts of all on their prompt elimination.

We cannot imagine control without assistance. Once, for example, staff officers L. Savitskiy and V. Savenkov detected deficiencies in the tactical training of the companies commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenants O. Russinov and V. Golichev. They suggested a number of additional exercises to eliminate the deficiencies and took a personal part in setting up the exercises. The assistance proved effective. When a check was made the companies successfully fulfilled all of their assigned tasks.

I cannot fail to mention the great contribution made to the work of improving the division's combat readiness by political workers, party and Komsomol activists. For example, I always think with great warmth of Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Nikulin, deputy commander for political affairs of a motorized rifle battalion. I have had the opportunity more than once to observe him at work, in the field and in the dynamic developments of exercises. The young political worker is able to find ways of influencing the men, which always correspond most completely to the situation, the path to the heart and awareness of the individual. Behind each battalion indicator, and the subunit is constantly increasing its achievements, I see the fervent party words of Guards Senior Lieutenant Nikulin and his personal example.

Each day of combat training constitutes a new entry in the division's history and brings out new names of individuals excelling in the performance of combat training tasks. The routine trials of peacetime can naturally not be equated to that which fell to the lot of the unit's front—line fighters. However, I still see a direct link between the military deeds of those who demonstrated heroism in combat and those who are now making an all—out effort to master the equipment and improve their combat training. They are linked by infinite devotion to military duty and an inner readiness to perform any feat in the name of the homeland, in the name of communist ideals. The heirs of the red fighters who fought under the division's fighting colors in the distant past, in 1918, and those who fought under the same colors during the Great Patriotic War are protecting the glorious traditions and vigilantly guarding the creative work of the Soviet people. They are always prepared to perform their patriotic and international duty.

COMMAND TRAINING OF YOUNG AIR DEFENSE OFFICER

Moscow KPASNAYA ZVEZDA in Eussian 11 May 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Petrusev: "Pedagogical Tact is Needed"]

[Text] Skimming the ground, the "enemy" aircraft swept over the firing ground and faded away in the wavering mirage. A tall captain with a sunburnt face followed them with his eyes for a long time and then, turning abruptly, marched resolutely to a radar station located nearby.

"Well, what do you have to say for yourself now, Lieutenant Safronyuk"? Opening the door of the compartment, he tossed the reproach at an officer with a bewildered look on his pale face. "They have made more mistakes in this practice firing at real targets. It will soon be time for certification. We will write a complete report on you at that time...".

Having expressed his annoyance, Captain M. Mirzayev, commander of a radiotechnical battery, entered a waiting vehicle and departed. The young officer, who had committed errors in detecting the air "enemy," however, paced near the operating truck for a long time, smoking one cigarette after another. He was entirely unable to understand what had caused him to err. That evening Lieutenant N. Safrenyuk submitted to the battery commander a request to be relieved of his duty and transferred to another subunit. Without thinking long, the captain signed the request and placed it in a folder.

Captain Mirzayev's promotion to battery commander was based on the fact that he is full of energy, has an excellent knowledge of the missile equipment and possesses a strong will. His senior comrades had noticed, it is true, that Captain Mirzayev does not give proper attention to his subordinates. When he talks with the men a certain hardness is felt in his voice, and he does not always bother to choose his words. They also found reasons to justify his actions, however: after all, he sees that the job is done and does not spare any effort, and he is therefore strictly and rigidly demanding of others. How can he be criticized for this?

At first the "correctness" of this reasoning was reinforced by the practical results: there were more highly rated specialists in the battery, the crews operated with greater smoothness and the equipment was operated more competently. Following one of the inspections unit staff officers noted with satisfaction: "The subunit is becoming stronger"! and then suddenly, out of the clear blue sky, there was a gross infraction of military discipline. It was followed by several other alarming signs that things were not right in the battery. And then, finally, there was Lieutenant Safronyuk's request...

A thorough analysis revealed major shortcomings in Captain Mirzayev's method of working. He underestimated the importance of indoctrinational work with the men and was frequently crude and abrupt with subordinates. The following occurred many times, for example: someone would make a mistake when working with the equipment, and the captain would be in a bad mood all day, making no attempt to conceal his irritation. And the men could see this. On such days some of them would not even go to him with service—related questions in order to avoid incurring his ire.

When he was reminded of his excessive temper and lack of tact Mirzayev always said the same thing: "It is not for myself that I am so zealous. One must work and not forget his responsibility." To hear him tell it, the battery contained no men diligent and selfless in their service. In reality, there were many such men, but the commander did not always notice the successes of the outstanding and relied on them little in his work with the less successful.

In the very beginning of his career as an officer Lieutenant Safronyuk began to demonstrate a lack of self-discipline and organization and an inability to organize his work precisely. Captain Mirzayev should naturally have helped him to eliminate these deficiencies. Both in the meetings and when the results were totaled, however, the battery commander limited himself to criticizing the lieutenant, assigning him the lowest position, a position which had now become traditional, and issuing him strict warnings.

Could such pressure teach the young officer the art of working with people and increase his feeling of responsibility for his conduct? It is doubtful. And so he gradually became accustomed to being behind the others and reconciled himself to it.

The unit commander and political worker learned of Lieutenant Safronyuk's situation. They had a thoroughgoing talk with Captain Mirzayev, analyzed the deficiencies in his work and gave him useful advice. The following day the battery commander persuaded Lieutenant Safronyuk to withdraw his request. This was only the first step, however. The most important thing was to help the young officer to overcome his deficiencies as rapidly as possible, to fit into the formation, to become a competent specialist. And this required both pedagogical tact and the ability to work with the individual men on the part of Captain Mirzayev. He would also have to do a great deal in order, relying on the communists and the Komsomol aktiv, to create a wholesome morale in the collective.

Experience has shown that the greatest success is achieved by those commanders who, working with the collective as a whole, indoctrinate each of their men individually, selecting the best pedagogical methods and foreseeing the consequences. The art of a commander as an indoctrinator lies in relying on all of the best qualities of the individual to motivate him to evaluate his capabilities, successes and deficiencies objectively and to develop in him a desire to work selflessly, to achieve positive results.

Young officers sometimes state that there is nothing positive in this or that subordinate, that there is nothing to rely on in working with him. This is naturally a hasty conclusion. It is the experienced commander's task to assist the lieutenant to master the art of studying the nature of people and indoctrinating them.

Major V. Semak, commander of an outstanding subunit, proceeds in just this manner. He is just as demanding as Captain Mirzayev. He does not let a single offense pass without some action. While being strictly demanding of the men, however, he always attempts to treat them properly and fairly, studies their specific nature thoroughly and considers their requests and needs.

Major Semak relies skillfully on the party and Komsomol organizations. He consults the officers, warrant officers (praporshchiki) and sergeants when difficult and responsible tasks are involved. The commander employs the most diverse forms of indoctrination. They all have the same goal, however, to see that the men master fighting skills as rapidly as possible, that good moral qualities are developed and strengthened in them, and that ar atmosphere of confidence, mutual assistance and benevolence is constantly maintained in the collective.

Senior Lieutenant V. Chelapko once came to Major Semak with a request to relieve him of his position. "I will never become competent at any rate. It is too difficult," he explained. "The sergeants are weak and there is no one on whom to rely."

Vladimir Iosifovich talked with Chelapko for a long time that evening, and the senior lieutenant began to see many things in a different light. A few days later the major summoned him again and asked:

"What matters have you resolved today? What have you achieved? With what are you dissatisfied"?

It turned out that the senior lieutenant was mainly dealing with matters which could have been handled by sergeants. As a result he was taking their place, pushing them aside as it were. At the same time Chelapko was neglecting matters which he should have dealt with personally.

"Bring me your notebook and let us plan your workday," said the major. What do you have planned for tomorrow"?

Chelapko went over the list of his planned activities, and there were too many.

Vladimir Iosifovich patiently explained to the senior lieutenant that even if he were Solomon himself he alone would not be able to do everything he had planned well. He would have to determine precisely which tasks could be assigned to which of the sergeants.

Thereafter, the commander continued painstakingly and persistently to teach the young officer to work in a planned manner, with perspective, to improve his knowledge and professional skills, to rely skillfully on the sergeants and the Komsomol aktiv. This naturally took a great deal of the commander's time. His gain was considerable, however. Senior Lieutenant Chelapko learned to work out his own situation with a great deal of thought and to train and indoctrinate his subordinates with concern and creativity. Soon thereafter, his subunit became an excellent one.

Only one conclusion can be drawn from this: the commander's responsibility for his assigned job is inseparably linked with concern for his men, with his ability to work with each person individually, to outline prospects for his development, to lead him forward.

METHODS OF IMPFOVING TACTICAL TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 78 p 1

[Article by Col R. Dukov: "According To A Ready Pattern"]

[Text] The approaching summer training period will be filled with exercises on various scales. The instructive value of exercises, as proven once again by the winter training, is greatly determined by the situation created in the exercises, by how closely it conforms to the nature of modern combat. The effectiveness of exercises depends on the extent to which the principle "teach the troops that which is essential in a war" is implemented.

Captain V. Sarnov, commander of an advance battalion, had pinpointed the location of the advance party by radio many times. The commander of the company designated as march security had invariably given the same coordinates. It took more than half an hour to reach the company designated as the advance party, but it was still at the previous position.

"I am waiting for the 'enemy'," explained the company commander. "It should be somewhere near, and the line of probable encounter has therefore been placed here."

It was clear that the officer was operating by a routine pattern worked out in advance, not deviating from it in any way. One would have expected this to alarm the battery commander. After all, the main forces following the subunits (podrazdeleniya) were already quite near. If the situation were appraised from the viewpoint of an actual battle, they could at any moment fall under attack by the "enemy," which had not been detected by the march security troops. Captain Sarnov was calm, however, as though the passivity of the advance party satisfied him.

Events subsequently developed in the following manner. The "enemy's" security force, which appeared soon thereafter, attacked the advance party in the flank. At this point the advance battalion reached the flank of the attacking "enemy," deployed in battle order and delivered a swift attack.

Had we been in the battalion at that time we would obviously have attributed a great deal of the success to Captain Sarnov's good professional training, to his ability to foresee the course of events. In reality, however, this was not the case. We would simply have been witnesses to a fairly well-performed spectacle, to elementary oversimplification.

Upon reaching the designated line and not encountering the "enemy" there as anticipated, the commander of the company acting as the advance party decided to wait for the "enemy." Furthermore, the company was located in the open, as though exposing themself to an attack by the other side. The "enemy" deployed for the attack. This is where the advance guard, which appeared at the proper place and at the proper time, went into action. It appeared that everything was going well. The fact was, however, that the entire situation had been thought out in advance and the roles had been rehearsed.

We know that modern combat places great demands on the commander's tactical training. The importance of initiative, creativity and the ability to employ the weapons and equipment to their full capabilities are now more important than ever before. Naturally, the officer does not acquire these qualities without making an effort. They are developed by determined daily work. And a special place is assigned to tactical exercises in the matter of improving the commander's skill. Need we say how important it is to avoid indulgences and oversimplifications in them. The complexity and newness of the tasks involved prompts the commanders and their men to take independent action, to demonstrate creativity and initiative.

In this case, as we can see, the conditions necessary for productive training had not been created. Officer T. Fashrov, in charge of the exercise, essentially reduced the matter to the level of a thoroughly rehearsed demonstration exercise. But the subunit commanders are competent and well trained officers. If they had not been under the influence of routine action they could have demonstrated both initiative and creativity. This was not the case, however, because both the officer in charge and his men were primarily concerned with achieving a good rating.

The following circumstance also stood out. Both the commander of the advance party and the other officers saw their error and understood what might have resulted in an actual battle. None of them demonstrated independence or initiative, however, even when the situation required this. There was a time, for example, when the company could have taken advantage of terrain features to advance to meet the "enemy" undetected and forestalled the enemy in seizing an advantageous position. This would have improved the situation for committing the main forces to the battle. The company commander made a different decision, however.

"I did not take the risk," he admitted. "Imagine that everyone is performing according to a pattern worked out in advance, that I am the only one doing otherwise. Neither my comrades nor my superior officers would understand me."

It is not an easy thing to organize and conduct an exercise on a high level, in a situation approaching actual combat to the maximum possible degree, without indulgences and oversimplification. Success depends on many factors. Primarily, on the ability of the officer in charge to create for the trainees an atmosphere in which their fighting efficiency and morale are brought out most thoroughly. However, experience has shown that this is only possible when they are given independence for adopting a decision and great leeway for creativity and initiative. Experience with exercises has convinced us that the officer who is not dominated by a definite pattern worked out in advance takes a more responsible attitude.

Unfortunately, not all of the officers in charge take this into account. In field exercises the commanders frequently provide excessive information on the "enemy," describing the "enemy's" actions down to the last detail. This naturally causes certain comrades to be careless: someone will reconnoiter the "enemy" for them, appraise the situation and make the required decision.

Tactical exercise constitute a higher school of combat training. It is there that the officer improves his knowledge and skills and develops such qualities as determination, initiative and independence... Proper results are only produced on this level, however, by an exercise which takes place in a situation approaching actual warfare, in single combat with a strong and technically well-equipped "enemy." This should never be forgotten.

SUMMER MILITARY TRAINING OBJECTIVES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASMAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 78 p 1

[Editorial: "In The Summer Training — Combat Intensity"]

[Text] Soviet fighting men are entering the most intense period of summer combat training in an atmosphere of great patriotic enthusiasm. They have perceived with their minds and hearts the instructions and recommendations made by Ccmrade I..I. Brezhnev during his visits to units [chasti] and ships during his trip to regions of Siberia and the Far East and in his speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress. Personnel of the army and navy are applying all their efforts to raise their combat readiness and improve their field, air and naval training.

The summer of the anniversary year of the Armed Forces will be filled with tactical exercises, missile launchings, practice bombing and long-range ship cruises. During this time, a good time for intensive training, the subunits [podrazdeleniya] will have to perform in diverse situations, in the daytime and at night, to accomplish difficult combat training tasks, to learn to defeat a strong and technically well-equipped enemy. They will have to learn that which is essential in combat, to creatively find ways to master the new equipment and weapons and methods of employing them even more effectively. Such are the unchanging demands made of the combat training of the troops and naval forces, which make it purposeful, specific and highly intensive.

The personnel are engaging in the struggle to fulfill plans and programs of the summer training period enriched with good experience acquired during winter training. The vast majority of the subunits obtained good results from this training. It was especially productive where a creative approach was taken to the organization of the training process, where it was based on progressive methods, where a situation approaching actual combat to the maximum possible degree was created in the training and exercises, where socialist competition was an inseparable part of the training and indoctrination. This is borne out, for example, by the successes achieved by the tank battalion commanded by Guards Captain N. Loktionov. The subunit completed the last training year with mediocre results. The commander, the staff and the party organization

analyzed thoroughly and from a position of principle the reasons for the gaps in the combat training and for the fact that the commitments were not fulfilled. In the winter training special attention was devoted to tactical and other types of combat training, ideological—indoctrinational and mass political work was stepped up, all possible steps were taken to maintain a spirit of competition while working out the tasks and norms, and a regular exchange of experience was organized. All qualitative indicators improved greatly as a result. Good skill was demonstrated in the training battles, on the firing ground and at the tank training grounds, and the battalion became one of the best in the unit (soyedin—eniye).

Improvement of the professional skill of the officers, their command and methodological training, as we know, is an extremely important factor for improving the quality of the training process. A number of important tasks must be resolved in this area during the summer. This primarily applies to improving the skills involved in directing subunits in the dynamic process of a battle, organizing interaction and employing all the capabilities of the weapons and the organic and attached equipment. A great deal also needs to be done to improve the methodological skill of the officers in charge of the training, especially the young ones.

The work of headquarters as agencies of control and the daily work methods of the staff officers and the chiefs and specialists of the services and branches of troops must also be further improved during the summer training period. The staffs are expected to maintain constant control over the training process and competition, to study and efficiently summarize information arriving from above and below, to combat resolutely routine, indulgences and attempts to evaluate achievements from a noncritical position, and to adopt new and progressive methods of training and indectrination. Each staff officer is obligated to set examples of efficiency, precision and demandingness, to be a master in his work. And this brings to the forefront the need to improve the training of the staff officers themselves, to improve the quality and effectiveness of staff exercises and other forms of training.

A good level of intensity in the summer training is inconceivable without further improving the organization of socialist competition and without making full use of its activating role in the work of strengthening the military collectives and instilling in the personnel a desire to move ahead, to achieve more. It is also essential in each exercise to create an atmosphere of competition. to achieve greater concreteness and efficiency in the competition among regiments, and to give new scope to the effort to become an outstanding unit, the best group of forces, the best military district or fleet. Reality urgently requires efficient summarization of progressive experience and the exchange of this experience both within districts, groups of forces and fleets, and between them. In order to achieve greater publicity and comparability of results and broader dissemination of progressive experience it is essential to make more active use of the army and navy press, assemblies and conferences of officers, meetings of the personnel, mass meetings of those excelling in the training and winners of socialist competition, visual and verbal agitation, and the possibilities of cultural and educational establishments.

The intensity of combat training and its effectiveness are directly dependent on the effectiveness of party-political work. Party organizations are expected to employ the methods inherent in them to strive for thorough preparations for the combat training measures and good training quality, to work to make competition more effective and to participate actively in the summarization and dissemination of progressive experience. In the field, at the airfields and launching positions, on the expanses of the seas and oceans and in their combat duty the communists and Komsomol members must use the influence of personal example and the fervent party word to inspire the fighting men to perform their military work selflessly, to achieve new landmarks in the perfection of their combat skills and to fulfill their commitments in the competition completely and well.

The task of making the training process a smooth and highly effective one is a task inseparably linked with the further strengthening of organization and discipline, the establishment of strict regulation order and a high level of performance efficiency in each element of the army and navy structure. From the very first days of summer training we must persistently strive to make productive use of training time and to organize precisely each class, exercise and training session. Commanders, political organs, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations have an obligation to insure unity of the training and indoctrination, to eliminate resolutely cases of poor organization, laxity, a lack of respect for the daily schedule and the class schedule, and in proper use of the training materials base, and to work to prevent the personnel from being taken away from their classes.

Each military collective has everything necessary for the complete and quality fulfillment of summer training plans and programs and the commitments accepted in socialist competition for the anniversary year. And there is no doubt that the summer training period will be marked by new successes in the accomplishment of the tasks assigned the Soviet Armed Forces by the 25th CPSU Congress.

CRITICISMS, COMPLAINTS, AND SHORTCOMINGS

Air Force Complaints

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 78 p 4

[Article by Lt Col of Justice I. Vashkevich: "Not Enough Time..."]

[Text] "Crew, rest!" ordered the general on leaving the airplane, and he specified: "Everyone must have a good sleep. We'll fly farther at night."

"Yes, sir!" answered the commander of the crew.

"We will provide it," assured the chief of the garrison who met the general at the airfield.

Alas, rest was not provided for the crew of the airplane. During the day, the pilots who had arrived could be seen in the military cantonment, in the unit headquarters, and at the airfield. "Very well, we'll report that we had a long sleep," one of them responded to my question. And this was, perhaps, my first impression which confirmed the validity of the letter to the editors from the N-th aviation garrison.

"In our unit," wrote Lieutenants Yu. Vinogradov, G. Kononov, V. Kalinin, and others, "little attention is devoted to the living conditions and cultural leisure time of the young officers. It is uncomfortable in the dormitory and there is no place to wash clothing. One cannot take a shower after flights. We don't know what to do in our free time. Interesting measures in the club are a rarity. The library is scanty and the officers' coffee shop is miserable. But you see, there are opportunities to improve our living conditions..."

As I was convinced, not everything in this letter conformed to reality, but the authors of the letter reflected correctly the attitude toward their needs.

On the day of my departure from the garrison those who had sent the letter to the editors moved to a new dormitory. In fact, they had sent their letter when the new premises were by then almost ready. But the young officers did not know whether they had been constructed for them. During the three months that they stayed in the old dormitory neither the commander, nor the political officers, nor administrative personnel visited them, talked about their needs, or advised them what they could do with their own resources. No council was elected in the dormitory. The lieutenants displayed an obvious inability to organize their own living conditions properly. I saw in the rooms unmade beds, scattered clothing, and coarse pictures on the walls.

As was learned, a washing machine had been allocated for the dormitory. But its manager, Ye. Vovk, never even succeeded in looking for it. Evidently, someone had locked it in his room, she explained to me. This was the kind of "order" in everything here.

It seems that Elizaveta Sergeyevna listened attentively for the first time to the requests of the residents for mosquito nets for the windows, for fans, for bedside rugs....

"Rugs are not authorized," she snapped.

"But they were made for the soldiers' barracks!" someone objected reasonably.

It goes without saying that these and many other desires of the young officers could have been satisfied long ago if someone had been seriously involved in their living conditions. But the deputy commander for political affairs doubts whether it was necessary to install radios in the dormitory, and the administrative personnel with a frank whim propose the idea of creating a self-service snack bar in the dormitory. Meanwhile, the necessity for both is obvious. Not each lieutenant has his own radio receiver and there was no television set in the old dormitory. And after night flights, when the mess and coffee shop are not operating, the people simply have no place to get a snack. And there is only talk about about a refrigerator and where milk and other produce could be stored.

The "Tyul'pan" officers' coffee shop lost its former prestige only because of the inattention of the administrative personnel who were temporarily headed by Major N. Yarovyy and the post exchange personnel where the deputy chief for political affairs is Major V. Nasonov. The roof leaks there now, expensive equipment has broken down, and the variety of products is poor. The garrison has no barber shop or laundry and dry-cleaning collection points although they can and should be opened.

The personnel of the KECh [billeting operation unit] are by no means putting a new transformer into operation. Household utensils in the residences as well as refrigerators and air conditioners which are so necessary in the summer are "not drawn" from the unit and this is catastrophic.

Only a few years ago, when the garrison began a flower garden and here one could even bathe in the pond, in planning for the future a water well was drilled. However, because of improper installation the pump broke down and the hole was covered over. Burying thousands of rubles in this manner, the

military construction workers considered their mission completed. Now, many trees have died, the pond is littered, and water is fed to the houses for only hours per day.

Alas, it occurred to no one to remind the construction workers of their duty or to require of the leaders of the other services that they put right the domestic services of the garrison.

The garrison to which the letter of the young officers brought me can in no way be called separated from the cultural life of the country. The chief of the garrison officers' club, Major Ye. Tekatov, convinced me of the strong ties between the aviators and the city theaters, philharmonic society, and creative unions. Actually, many meetings are organized with cultural figures in the club. However, here the interests of various categories of listeners and viewers are not always considered. So the young officers are not drawn to some matinees to which an entire crowd is invited—both active duty servicemen and the children of officers.... I attended one of these measures "for all" and can share the lieutenants' dissatisfaction with its content. By the way, the aviators' guests also complained then about the complexity of a presentation before such a heterogeneous audience.

The epithet "scanty" is not deserved by the library of the officers' club at all. But not even such an inveterate book lover as Lieutenant of Technical Service Yu. Vinogradov suspected the presence of the 200-volume "Library of World Literature" and other interesting editions, let us say, in the library prior to my arrival. And small wonder: the library is perpetually locked up and there is no systematic or subject catalog in it. And besides, the exhibits of new arrivals which are organized here do not consider the interests of the readers from among the young officers.

"We fly a lot. There is not enough time for the rest," the unit commander admitted in a conversation with me.

But really, isn't concern for people linked in the closest manner with the growth in their combat skill? This was indicated directly by the Army-Wide Conference on Improving the Living Conditions of the Troops. It appears, however, that my conversation partner was far from such concerns. Otherwise, how can we explain that it was only from me that the lieutenant colonel learned of the grade which the garrison administrative personnel received for the results of the Army-Wide Inspection Competition for the best troop administration, medical institution, and trade and domestic services enterprise? With all the deficiencies in domestic and cultural support of the garrison, the activity of the rear services here was graded...good.

I discovered this strange grade in the statement which I was shown in higher headquarters by Colonel A. Sadovnikov. The search for the sources of this scandalous "forgery" led to Captain I. Matus. He explained that the grades were assigned to each rear support service...by the leaders of these services and he, summing up the results, transmitted the information by telephone.

"But the young officers from the dormitory have a different opinion of their living conditions...."

"And we were not interested in the dormitory," the captain replied, and he referred to the instructions that officers' dormitories, they say, should not be included in the inspection competition.

So you see what can result as soon as proper monitoring of administrative activity on the part of the commander and party organ is absent! The result is to find oneself actually overboard in this important army-wide measure. Let us add that questions of living conditions and rest for the servicemen in the garrison were not discussed at one party or Komsomol meeting.

...Before my very departure from the garrison, I inquired of Komsomol worker Lieutenant L. Il'in how the youth were mobilized for the rebuilding of one of the rooms as a dance hall: recollections of the wonderful New Year's masquerade ball which was conducted there are still alive among the authors of the letter to the editors.

"We did not participate in this 'amateur talent activity," the Komsomol leader declared quietly.

Just as for his senior comrades, for him the living conditions of the young officers is not such an important matter.

Irregularities in School Battalion

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Sychev: "By Itself"]

[Text] The letter called for help. Its authors, Captain Z. Nagayev, Senior Lieutenant M. Novikov, and Warrant Officer [praporshchik] A. Levchenko, reported that in the training support battalion of the Ordzhonikidze Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command Air Defense School where they serve, the work day of the officers and warrant officers is not regulated. Commander's training and lessons with the soldiers and sergeants are conducted irregularly and on a low methodological level.

The authors of the letter were disturbed by the state of political-indoctrinational work in the subunit. They were also alarmed because prescribed maintenance on the training equipment was accomplished with failure to observe established times. And this reduced the quality of the lessons with the cadets.

These were not minutia which were touched upon in the letter. And visiting the school, I was convinced that almost everything was correct.

A truly alarming situation had developed in the battalion. This was admitted unconditionally by the commandant of the school, Lieutenant General of

Artillery V. Melekhov and by the officers of the political and training sections. Nor did they deny their omissions in questions of checking service in the battalion or in assisting its commander. They assured me that the situation would be corrected.

It appeared that this could mark the end of the matter. But... What alerted us was the fact that the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Tenitskiy, and several other officers, as was learned in talks with them, considered the situation which had developed hardly in the order of things. They say that the battalion is not involved with the school and must do everything on its own: administrative and construction work and servicing the equipment. This takes up much time and almost none is left for planned lessons.

By the way, the battalion schedule is prepared regularly and their are notes about the conduct of lessons. Most often "hypothetical": the personnel, let us assume, are occupied with the equipping of the training-material base and this is recorded as prescribed maintenance work or lessons on tactical, technical, or special training.

"Servicing the equipment... Really, isn't this technical training?" We had the occasion to hear such opinions many times.

It goes without saying that work on the equipment consolidates theoretical knowledge. But you see, this knowledge should not only consolidate, but also supplement. Furthermore, young soldiers join the battalion twice a year, and they must be taught to operate and maintain the most complex contemporary weapons which have been entrusted to them competently. And really, other soldier sciences should not be forgotten, either.

It is really a heavy load which lies on the personnel. Under these conditions, special attention should also be devoted to political-indoctrinational work and molding in the officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers lofty moral and combat qualities and a communist attitude toward labor and the accomplishment of their service duty. Socialist competition is called upon to to play an important role here. But it was conducted only on paper, formally.

The guilt for all these omissions lies primarily with Lieutenant Colonel Tenitskiy as the one-man commander. He did not display sufficient demandingness toward his subordinates and with his own hand he sanctioned interruptions in the lessons and put up with violations of military discipline. The battalion's party organization did not occupy a principled position in the struggle against shortcomings.

The authors of the letter to the editor, unfortunately, did not display the proper devotion to principle, either. They wrote about problems in the battalion only after they themselves had violated military discipline. And they decided to take pen in hand to get out of a position of wrongdoing and assume the posture of "fighters" against shortcomings.

It is proper that the following question arises: did the school command know about the state of affairs in the subunit? Only in general outline. Lieutenant Colonel Tenitskiy tried not to wash his dirty linen in public. At least, he did not report to anyone about the delinquency of Nageyev, Novikov, and Levchenko. But you see, an analysis of the state of discipline which was made by the political section shows that a considerable portion of the violations accomplished in the school belongs to the support battalion. Could such a fact be overlooked?

Nor did the instructors utter weighty words. For the quality of the lessons which they conducted suffered because the equipment was not prepared. A log is maintained in the battalion where notes are made concerning the condition of the equipment at the training sites. The instructors conscientiously entered their remarks there, but that was all they did. And the situation concerning the preparation of the equipment for lessons did not improve. The battalion somehow "fell" from the field of view of the school's command and found itself all alone.

Messing Facilities Complaints

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 78 p 4

[Letters and Comments by Col (Res) G. Babkin: "With a Smack of Indifference"]

[Text] "Conditions have not been created in our mess for the normal feeding of the military construction workers, and there are not even enough dishes. We appealed through channels many times but there was no improvement. But you see, we could do much for the organization of public services and amenities ourselves: we are builders!"

"The commander of our aviation subunit, Major Piyanzin, knows about the disorders in the soldier's mess but, for some reason, he does not undertake any measures. And next to our's there is another soldier's mess. How clean and comfortable it is there! Why isn't what is good there adopted?"

The editors receive such letters infrequently: as a rule, the feeding of the servicemen is organized everywhere in strict conformance with the requirements of the military regulations. And here we meet two alarming signals at once—the first from an area near Moscow and the second from the Far East. The editors requested a worker of the Central Food Directorate, Ministry of Defense USSR, Colonel (Reserve) G. Babkin, to comment on them.

The facts set forth in the letters cannot but cause resentment. Today's soldier's ration, the mess equipment, the cooks' qualifications—all this permits feeding the men substantially, tastefully, and in pleasant surroundings. And the letter itself testifies to this: alongside the poor mess

the authors see a good one, and the men could eliminate many shortcomings through their own efforts. This means that everything turns on the organization of matters, on the inattention to problems in the living conditions of subordinates on the part of individual commanders, and on the negligence of some of the food service personnel.

Visiting the cantonment of the military construction workers, I was convinced of the validity of the opinions which they expressed. At the warehouse was a wide variety of high-quality products, and there were enough potatoes and vegetables until the new harvest. There is the necessary technological equipment in the mess. The dishes about the shortage of which the authors of the letter to the editor complained were also found. Why is it uncomfortable in the mess and why is the food often untasty?

"We don't have enough time for everything," explains the commander of the military construction detachment, Lieutenant Colonel S. Rysevets.

The explanation is unfounded, to say the least.

The subunit has many excellent carpenters and plasterers, but it occurred to no one to recondition the premises. Hot water is not fed for washing; it is carried in buckets. The food is passed out in the old manner—by hand; carts are not used. There are no pictures or posters on the walls of the mess nor curtains on the windows.

The mess officer, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] A. Osipov, should be directly involved in all this. But he has a negligent attitude toward the matter, and he simply was not taught much. For example, the fact that meat should be served in portions and not cut up into a common pot—who should get how much. The warrant officer does not attach proper significance to a variety of dishes in the weekly ration and the commander, in approving the ration menu, does not correct it. Up to now, there is no kitchen garden in the detachment.

And now, let us enter the mess from the rear--where the food is prepared. I found the cook, M. Frolova, at her place of work. She has a fifth-class rating and, it would appear, should not commit violations of culinary rules. But here, while it is still morning, she chopped the onions and carrots for dinner. It is clear that during the day the produce will lose both its taste and nutritional qualities.

Just as with the Far Eastern aviators, the military construction workers have neighbors into whose mess it is pleasant to drop. The dining room is adorned with a decorative strip along the walls, there are light curtains on the windows, and there are tables for four. I tasted the soup which had been prepared here with satisfaction—it was tastefully prepared!

The assistant commander of the military construction detachment for supply, Captain L. Shpurik, showed me the hothouse where onions and cucumbers are grown. It turns out that good experience can be borrowed here. If only there was the desire.

The correct organization of feeding is the most important condition for the men's normal service. This was mentioned at the Army-Wide Conference on Improving the Living Conditions of the Troops. A fundamental evaluation must be given to each case of violation of existing rules in this matter.

Reception Center Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 78 p 2

[Letter and comments by Major A. Bedzhanyan: "Half a Year Passed..."]

[Text] "Dear editors. It all began when I sent my son to the reception center located at Baladzhary Station in the Azerbaydzhan SSR. We arrived at the Narimanovskiy rayon military commissariat in the city of Baku by 0800 hours as indicated in the notice. But to get to Baladzhary from there, it was necessary to hitch-hike. At the reception center, however, they said that the draftees should arrive the following day. One day was spent like this, then a second, and only on the third day did the send-off take place...."

The editors received this letter from Vera Vasil'yevna Sudakova, the mother of a soldier, last December. It was sent immediately for consideration in the military commissariat of the Azerbaydzhan SSR. A reply was soon received which was signed by the military commissar of the republic, Major General of Signal Troops M. Kuliyev. It stated that the facts indicated in the letter had been analyzed and, with the assistance of local party and soviet organs, specific measures would be adopted to prevent such shortcomings.

So half a year later, as soon as the next call-up began, we decided to see how things are going at the reception center. In some places, changes for the better actually occurred here. But many things remain to be accomplished. During the days which I spent at the reception center, for example, the club didn't even open, a television set and a newspaper showcase were not to be seen anywhere, and no radio was heard. It was as if the reception center had cut itself off from the world. Thus far, there are no sports areas here. In return, draftees who do not know how to kill time can be seen everywhere.

I believe that the deputy chief of the reception center for political affairs, Major N. Sultanov, and some of his colleagues at work are deeply mistaken. They believe that the institution is something like a station where each one, figuratively speaking, sits on his suitcases and, consequently, does not need concern about himself. And their interaction with the military commissariats and the representatives of the troop units which receive the young replacements could be clearer. This would surely permit reducing to a minimum the delays in sending off the draftees. It seems strange, but for the present cases similar to the one reported by V. Sudakova

in her letter are occurring. Draftee Bakhram Saradzhev was sent to his unit only after three days. But Saradzhev was lucky—he could spend the night with his parents who live in Baku. But then, G. Kambarov, A. Kasumov, A. Garibov, K. Abushov, and several other draftees from distant Sabirabadskiy rayon had to seek lodging from unknown people twice.

Why did this occur? As soon as a delay occurs, is it really impossible to organize lodging and feeding for the people on the territory of the reception center as is prescribed by the corresponding instructions?

"Whoever wants to can spend the night with us," answered Major N. Sultanov. "We have sleeping accommodations for this."

Unfortunately, the political officer did not even begin to talk of why, as a rule, there are virtually no people with this desire. By the way, it is easy to explain this. In order to understand why the draftees seek lodging in another place, it is sufficient to look at the sleeping accommodations which the officer mentioned. There are no elementary everyday conveniences here.

The military commissar of the republic, Major General of Signal Troops M. Kuliyev, told about the important work conducted by the military commissariats in preparing the youth for the defense of the motherland. He also spoke of the significance of the send-offs of the draftees and of those shortcomings which still occur in their organization. But it evidently is now time to change from stating facts to deeds—to organize the work of the military commissariats so that the draftee does not lose the emotional uplift en route to his place of service and does not encounter instances of indifference and disorganization on the part of the persons who have been entrusted with a matter of great state importance.

SHORTCOMINGS IN CARRYING OUT DAILY DUTY DETAILS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 78 p 2

[Article by Col I. Fakhrutdinov: "Regulations are the Law of Military Life: Responsibility of the Daily Duty Detail"]

[Text] It is not the first time Sr Lt A. Korotun has performed the duties of regimental duty officer. Such duty means days of strenuous, strictly regulated labor, extreme composure, efficiency and execution.

The time was after midnight. The senior lieutenant had just checked performance of service by the guard and the duty officers and orderlies of the subunits and motor pool. Regulation order was being maintained everywhere. Suddenly a red light went on in the duty officer's room. An assembly signal had come.

Earlier the young officer had not had occasion to act in such an important situation, but he knew his duties firmly and had trained repeatedly in their practical fulfillment. It was for this reason that he now made decisions in strict conformity with the regulation and with requirements of the regimental duty officer's instructions. After notifying the regimental commander, other officials and the subunits, the senior lieutenant skillfully and precisely directed personnel during the assembly, issued necessary instructions and monitored their fulfillment.

Much is done in this regiment to train young officers coming on a duty detail to perform their duties strictly according to regulations. Here there are carefully conceived briefings, systematic control is exercised over performance of service by the daily duty detail, and demonstration problems are arranged. In one such problem conducted by the regimental commander the actions of the unit duty officer on receiving the assembly signal were examined in detail and typical mistakes were analyzed. During an exchange of opinions among the officers which took place after the problem, suggestions were made for improving the notification system and for a more effective resolution of other problems of troop service. These suggestions were adopted.

The unit gives much attention to an analysis of performance of service by the daily duty detail. Results of such an analysis are discussed at officer conferences and they are the subject at party and Komsomol meetings and in the wall newspaper. Periodic tests are given to all personnel on their knowledge of the regulations. The subunits successfully use electronic teaching machines, training films and slide films.

The daily duty detail in subunits and units is assigned to maintain internal order and to guard weapons, combat equipment and other equipment. Fulfillment of the order of the day and the status of discipline in the subunit and unit depends largely on service by the daily duty detail. Therefore it must be prepared to perform service with all sense of responsibility and thoroughness. Unfortunately this is sometimes forgotten. As a result, there are mistakes in actions by personnel of the daily duty detail, particularly by the unit duty officer.

Once Jr Sgt A. Kim, Pfc V. Sviridov and Pvt V. Arnaut crudely violated the order of the day in unit "X." The actions by unit duty officer Lt S. Polyakov to stop these violations were insufficiently effective, however. Why? It turns out that he did not have a precise idea as to his duties. The regulation obligates the chief of staff to brief the regimental duty officer prior to his entry on the detail. This requirement was crudely violated. The chief of staff limited himself merely to asking the lieutenant whether or not he had been a duty officer previously. Receiving an affirmative answer, he concluded: since everything is familiar, then there is nothing more to say and it remains to perform service as authorized.

And Lt Polyakov's relief of duty took place formally. He was silent about the three soldiers' violation of discipline and reported that nothing substantial had occurred during his time of watch. That concluded it.

Only later did the unit commander and chief of staff learn about the violation of military order on the day of Lt Polyakov's watch. And then they asked him why he had not reported this incident.

"But I myself took the necessary steps," answered the lieutenant.

But he did not uncover the true reasons for the violation of discipline, and the misdeed of these soldiers did not receive a fundamental assessment. As a logical consequence, they again crudely violated military order.

It is possible to draw proper conclusions and take precautionary steps from separate facts which are at first glance even insignificant ones, but which are repetitious. Not all commanders, however, attach proper significance to such an analysis. Once a group of officers of the senior headquarters was monitoring the performance of service by the daily duty detail in the subunit commanded by Officer A. Baziyev. It was decided to analyze all violations during the day, the reaction to them and what steps were taken by the subunit duty officer. It turned out that they had become accustomed here to minor violations of the order of the day, they did not react to them and did not take any steps in response to them. Neither the subunit commander nor personnel of the daily duty detail were disturbed by the circumstance that violations were essentially being made by the very same soldiers. Here is a specific fact. It was reported to the subunit commander that Sgt V. Yeroshenko and Jr Sgt N. Bakanov had not attended physical training and had visited the messhall without being in formation. He completely ignored this signal and did not brief the next duty officer in the proper manner. Taking advantage of such connivance, Yeroshenko and Bakanov went into the city without leave. Now the commander had to take strict measures of pressure against them.

In an attempt to impose regulation order in a subunit, some commanders allow actions and make decisions which are incompatible with regulation ones. Not long ago we encountered the following fact. Infractions of discipline became more frequent in one subunit. The commander decided to assign a "responsible" duty officer for the evening and nighttime to help the subunit duty officer. His duties included checking every three or four hours whether or not the privates and sergeants were present and whether the orderlies were performing service punctually. This "innovation" produced no noticeable changes for the better, but the damage was obvious: the role of the sergeants and the daily duty detail was degraded and the sense of responsibility of officials for imposing proper order in sectors entrusted to them was reduced.

At the present time such "innovations" by the unit command element have been decisively condemned and supplementary duty officers not covered by the regulation have been eliminated. An acute question was raised at party and Komsomol meetings as to the leading role of party and Komsomol members in strengthening military order. Steps have been taken to increase the sense of responsibility of all officials as well as that of the daily duty detail for performance of duties imposed on them. This has produced positive results. It was proven once again that the imposition of military order is possible only on the basis of strict observance of the regulations.

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NEW TRAINING FACILITIES FOR SIGNAL TROOPS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 78 p 2

[Article by Lt Col G. Gubarev, of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District: "In Reduced Time Periods"]

[Text] Entry on combat watch is always a memorable event in the life of soldiers, but for subordinates of Sr Lt Ye. Kadeyev it became especially impressive. The young communicators were warmly congratulated by coworkers, a colorful operational newssheet was dedicated to them, and an amateur concert was held in their honor. The fact is that Sr Lt Kadeyev's subordinates completed preparations for independent performance of combat watch ahead of the prescribed time. The soldiers also confirmed their outstanding knowledge of complex equipment in the course of service.

I will not conceal the fact that at first there were fears: Wouldn't the reduction in time for preparing the communicators lead to a reduction in their level of training? Even without this, the program is so strenuous. But the communicators successfully fulfilled their socialist pledges. Following the example of the leaders, soldiers of the subunit commanded by Lt V. Zhestkov also prepared ahead of schedule for independent performance of combat watch.

Just what helped the specialists honorably accomplish the difficult task assigned them?

At times one has occasion to hear that success in a matter is determined wholly by the people's noble impetus—and enthusiasm. There is no question that a fiery call addressed directly to a soldier's heart is capable of doubling energies and attuning them to overcome all difficulties. But all this must be combined with organizational work and with a precisely adjusted training process.

In particular I like the fact that this idea is traced in the article by Gds Maj V. Vityazev published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 15 Feb 1978 entitled "Motto: Not One Laggard Nearby." It attracted the attention of all soldiers in our unit. The motto "Not One Laggard Nearby!" found a fervent response in the communicators. First to support the proposal

by their combat friends were party and Komsomol members of the subunit commanded by Lt Col G. Leonov. They decided to end the training year without a single lagging specialist and attain the title of outstanding subunit. Young soldiers planned high goals.

But before making heightened pledges, the communicators carefully weighed their capabilities and discussed in detail the issues, the solution to which would decide achievement of the planned goal. Skilled craftsmen of the subunit headed by Capt A. Novikov outfitted a training facility according to the communications center principle. What did this provide? First of all, the communicators' training was brought close to a situation typical of real conditions of combat work. Secondly, class leaders were given control of an entire complex of various automated systems and devices helping to strengthen the graphic effect of training.

It would appear that such a training facility should be used with maximum load. But how did it actually happen?

A group of specialists headed by Lt Col Leonov carefully monitored several practice sessions and classes conducted by Sr Lt V. Dolzhikov, WO M. Nazar'yev, Jr Sgt I. Konyk and others.

It turned out that classes and practice sessions were conducted according to the old ways on the very latest training equipment. Naturally the capabilities of the training complex were far from fully used in this case.

They had to develop a special methodology for holding classes and practice sessions in the practice communications center. Specialists headed by Capt Novikov began this work. They prepared specific recommendations on the organization and conduct of various classes, tactical training problems, practice sessions and exercises.

Then Capt Novikov and Sr Lt Dolzhikov organized and conducted a demonstration class. They convincingly demonstrated the advantages of the new method, under which the entire sequence of actions of soldiers in use of communications facilities is practiced.

But the most noteworthy is the fact that under the new method all training equipment is used with a full load and maximum output. It appears to me that this is the key to accomplishing very important problems of increasing soldiers' combat training.

Practice shows that a soldier genuinely grows in his combat expertise only if he has an opportunity to give the greater part of his training time to work on the equipment—servicing it, maintaining it, and learning its features in practice. It was along this path that officers Ye. Kadeyev and V. Zhestkov achieved success in training communicators. They confidently master the new training methodology and precisely arrange classes and practice sessions for communicators during the summer training period, which is a reliable guarantee for new success.

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SUMMER TOURISM FACILITIES FOR SERVICEMEN DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 78 p 4

[Editorial introduction and commentary by Maj Gen Intend Serv A. Gashchuk: "Summer Routes Call"]

[Text] The summer tourist season has arrived. How have Army and Navy tourist bases prepared for it? What are the features of rest at a particular base? In what direction is Army tourism developing? Maj Gen Intend Serv A Gashchuk, chief of the tourism department of the USSR Ministry of Defense, tells about this at the request of a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

"First of all I should note that our bases are situated in various climatic zones," said Maj Gen A. Gashchuk. "In the country's European part, in Central Asia and in the Far East. There also are four floating tourist bases: three motor ships ply the Volga and one the Yenisey.

"We have conducted considerable preparations for the summer season. After thoroughly analyzing the results of work in the past year, we are directing our efforts now at increasing the effectiveness of use of army tourist establishments and improving services. To this end we have revised routes, schedules for calls at each tourist base, and the extent of tourist, excursion, sports and mass cultural work. Our bases have been replenished with tourist and sports inventory, gear and property.

"For the first time a family rest for officers will be arranged this summer at nine bases: 'Krasnaya Polyana,' 'Kudepsta,' 'Sukhumi,' 'Sevastopol',' 'Kobuleti,' 'Primorsk,' 'Zhdanovichi,' 'Issyk-Kul'' and 'Sochi.' They will be able to arrive here with their wives and children over seven years of age. Parents with children will be placed in special groups. Gatherings and meetings with experienced tourists, competitions in various sports and various contests will be conducted for them. Separate sports and play areas are assigned to them. Familiarization trips and tours to places of revolutionary, combat and labor glory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces have been developed. The best trained instructors have been assigned to direct such groups.

"It will be possible to purchase dairy products, juices, confectioneries and fruits for children at an additional price in the canteens and cafeterias of the tourist bases. All these conveniences make our bases similar, but each one remains attractive with its very own features.

"The 'Krasnaya Polyana' tourist facility located on a wonderful forested slope of Mt. Achishkho is rightfully called a 'mountain fairytale.' Here there are magnificent dense forests and fabulous alpine meadows, snowcapped mountains and turbulent mountain rivers, and the pure curative and aromatic air. To this we should add the presence at the base of confortable dormitories, a covered swimming pool and sports complexes.

"The 'Kudepsta' tourist facility is located in a zone with a moderate maritime climate, an abundance of sunny days and a long swimming season. People resting there have at their disposal excellent beaches, a boathouse and sports facilities. The tourist base has excellent dormitories and a winter movie theater.

"As always, there are many who wish to spend their leave at the 'Pyatigorsk' tourist base. They are offered many interesting routes to the jewels of the Western Caucasus—Teberda and Dombay. Tourists make a crossing of the Main Caucasus Range, after which they are hospitably greeted by the 'Sukhumi' tourist base.

"Bus trips arranged by the 'Borovoye' tourist base enjoy great popularity. The first route passes through cities of five republics with very interesting tours of Moscow, Kalinin, Novgorod, Leningrad, Tallin, Riga, Vil'nyus, Minsk and Smolensk. There also are the following routes: Moscow-Sevastopol'-Moscow; Moscow-Odessa-Moscow; Moscow-Leningrad-Minsk-Moscow.

"Finally, about rest aboard the comfortable motor ships 'Kosmonavt Gagarin,' 'Bagration' and 'N. V. Gogol'.' They ply two routes:

Moscow-Astrakhan'-Moscow (via Uglich-Kostroma-Gor'kiy-Kazan'-Kuybyshev-Saratov-Ul'yanovsk-Volgograd-Astrakhan') and Moscow-Leningrad-Ul'yanovsk-Moscow.

"Over 600,000 persons visited army tourist bases during the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Another three million persons took part in various tours. Every other person resting at our tourist bases became a 'USSR Tourist' emblem-wearer. In addition, around 40,000 persons were trained with ratings in tourism.

"During the Tenth Five-Year Plan it is planned to serve around a half-million persons and around five million excursionists at tourist bases and to prepare over 500,000 'USSR Tourist' emblem-wearers and over 50,000 with ratings. All this meets the assigned task of making army tourism genuinely active and massive. It must become an important means for communist indoctrination, for moral and physical preparation of personnel

and for strengthening the health of soldiers. We are paying special attention to the organization of rest for young officers, for after strenuous combat training and the performance of difficult military duties, tourism is a magnificent means for restoring working efficiency. It leads to an improvement in skills of campaign life, in physical qualities and in sports expertise. It provides an opportunity to learn more deeply about one's native land."

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METHODS OF IMPROVING MISSILE CHECK PROCEDURES DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 78 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Privalov, of Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Most Important is Effectiveness and Quality: Making Use of Reserves"]

[Text] For the experienced specialist the readings of the missile system's instruments are just as eloquent as the fullness of a patient's pulse for the physician. They can attest to complete readiness of the equipment for combat and about its reliability and faultless operation, but they also can put one on guard: although the equipment is serviceable, it can let you down at any moment. This is true when the parameters are at the limit of tolerances, which means the functioning of systems does not fully correspond to rated values. Consequently, steps must be taken, but some specialists believe that equipment also can work at the limit of tolerances. Such a haphazard reliance may lead to serious consequences: some unit may fail at the most inappropriate moment. In particular, this occurred in the systems serviced by officers A. Sorokin and V. Yepikhin.

It turned out during a check that they had performed a poor-quality check of the apparatus. Why? It was explained in the subunit that a careful tuning requires much time, while the norms are rigid and they do not always manage to keep within the allotted time period. is difficult to agree with such an explanation. Of course, the time for periodic technical servicing is extremely crammed, but the battalion has everything necessary for its high-quality performance. Detailed plans have been drawn up, process charts have been developed and personnel have been professionally well-trained. But sometimes specialists work on the equipment without vigor and there is an absence of competitiveness in classes. Just what is the matter? As they believe in the subunit, there are no special opportunities to develop competition during periodic technical servicing. They say that everything is prescribed from "A" to "Z" in the appropriate instructions, operations are interconnected and the time of their performance is set. And so it is difficult to develop creativeness and initiative, without which rivalry is inconceivable.

Unfortunately, some officers in other subunits also adhered to such an opinion.

The political department and headquarters together with unit specialists carefully analyzed the organization of competition during periodic technical servicing and elaborated recommendations. It was decided in particular to give consideration to the period of service and class rating of the soldiers in determining pairs of competitors and to provide for joint actions by experienced specialists and novices during the performance of specific operations.

Stricter monitoring began of the preparation of work areas, tools and control-measurement instruments for servicing the missile system. The documents regulating the sequence of work and observance of safety rules were again studied with all categories of specialists.

The search for reserves of high-quality equipment maintenance was widely developed in the subunit headed by Officer P. Bel'chikov. This search was headed by the commander and his political deputy, Maj Ye. Gan'ko, who is the wearer of the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3rd Class. Gan'ko is an officer with a deep knowledge of the missile system and a master of many combat specialties. A system of grades was developed and introduced which allows fullest and most objective consideration of the specialists' actions during periodic technical servicing and a determination of the quality of their work. Missilemen struggle to economize on engine operating time and fuels and lubricants, and to take advantage of the time they work on the equipment in order to study it.

Effective competition began for the soldiers' mastery of related specialties and for achieving complete interchangeability on the teams. System technician Lt V. Maksimov learned to work confidently in place of the intercept control officer and his duties now can be performed by Sr Sgt Yu. Yastremskas—chief of the diesel generator. Pfc Z. Sokolovich in turn mastered the specialty of diesel generator chief.

The subunit's experience soon was generalized and introduced into practice. Officers N. Moseychuk, V. Petrichenko and A. Melyushin did a great deal for this. They prepared and conducted demonstration classes for commanders of radio-technical batteries, intercept control officers and system technicians, and helped specialists master the foremost methodology for use of control-measurement gear. They also acquired positive experience in making up visual agitation during preparation and conduct of preventive measures on the equipment.

The innovators made a noticeable contribution. It became typical of them to attempt to seek out technical solutions, realization of which allows conducting operations on the gear with maximum effectiveness and significantly reducing time expenditures in the performance of laborious processes. Among the valuable innovations, for example, is the special attachment to the oscillograph prepared by Engr-Maj A. Shlikhtov. The introduction of rationalization suggestions allowed cutting the time for performing periodic technical servicing an average of ten percent. Its quality also increased.

The search for reserves continues for better organization of periodic technical servicing and socialist competition. This permits the missilemen to accomplish tasks successfully during summer combat training.

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NEED FOR CONSTANT COMBAT INTELLIGENCE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 78 p 2

[Letter by Gds Lt R. Galeyev, motorized rifle company commander, and comments by Col D. Vyskrebentsev, of Red Banner North Caucasus Military District: "A Frontlinesman Answers A Young Officer: Continuity of Intelligence"]

[Text] Dear Editors!

As we know, combat begins with reconnaissance. It would appear that its success will depend largely not only on how organic intelligence entities perform the mission, but also on the ability of each commander to conduct reconnaissance continuously on his own as well as with all personnel and means at his disposal.

I would like one of the specialists, people with frontline experience, to share their thoughts about this in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Gds Lt R. Galeyev Motorized Rifle Company Commander

Col D. Vyskrebentsev, a participant of the Great Patriotic War, answers the company commander at the request of the editors.

The young officer's letter reminded me about an instructive episode involving a tactical exercise. After encountering stubborn resistance by defenders, motorized riflemen still had not succeeded in properly consolidating on a captured line when a report already arrived from a combat reconnaissance patrol about an "enemy" attack being prepared. But the battalion commander was alarmed most of all by the circumstance that having detected the advance of "enemy" reserves, the scouts lost them from view after a little while. This was fraught with all kinds of surprises. The worst expectations were borne out: the "enemy" used the reserves which had arrived and attacked the motorized riflemen suddenly.

Just what happened with the scouts? How did it happen that the "enemy" forces detected by them slipped from their observation and appeared where they were least expected?

Lt V. Koryagin, commander of the combat reconnaissance patrol, moved precisely to the assigned area after receiving the mission, where he soon detected the "enemy" tank column. After reporting this to the battalion commander, he decided his work had been done. Instead of sending out observers or a patrol vehicle closer to the column and performing continuous surveillance of it from various points, he allowed his subordinates to rest. Meanwhile the depression where the tanks were situated was becoming more and more enveloped in fog and the noise of the engines became more and more quiet and finally disappeared entirely.

As was later learned, this was the "enemy's" ruse: while the engines of one or two tanks were operating at full power, the rest of the vehicles departed for another area while operating at low revolutions, and the attack later followed from this area.

Unfortunately, such facts are not isolated. While attending tactical exercises one still often encounters commanders who do not attach proper significance to matters of the organization of reconnaissance or improvement in reconnaissance training of personnel. A simple truth is forgotten in so doing: it is possible to have well trained drivermechanics and gunners and be able to accomplish a maneuver of subunits and fire, but lose the battle if the people have not been trained to conduct reconnaissance. And this is confirmed by the aforementioned example.

Gds Lt Galeyev is correct: a battle always begins with reconnaissance. And the more data a commander has about the enemy and his plans, the more correct his decision will be. And it is important that surveillance of the enemy be conducted constantly and reconnaissance data come in continuously. Continuity is one of the most important requirements placed on reconnaissance in modern warfare.

In one tactical exercise a motorized rifle battalion arrived at the designated area after a march and began to prepare for an attack. The scouts uncovered the "enemy" system of defense rather completely and determined the outlines of the forward edge, the boundaries of strongpoints, and coordinates of detected weapons and control points. But then the attack began. At first it developed successfully, but soon its tempo dropped, since the attackers suddenly encountered stubborn resistance. Moreover, taking advantage of their confusion, the "enemy" began a powerful counterattack. The battalion suffered considerable "losses."

Just why didn't the attack, which generally began rather well, bring the desired results? It was later learned that the battalion commander had not managed to ensure continuous reconnaissance of the "enemy." During the day careful surveillance of the defenders was conducted in all subunits, but the surveillance was relaxed at night. This is what the "enemy" took advantage of. Under cover of darkness, a portion of his forces was concentrated on a tactically favorable line. A counterattack followed from here which proved a surprise to the attackers.

Commanders who commit such mistakes apparently not only lack practical experience, but profound theoretical knowledge in the field of military art as well. The experience of the Great Patriotic War remains a valuable treasurehouse here. I will refer to facts which are very familiar to me.

At the beginning of September 1942 our rifle division shifted to the defense after stubborn offensive battles. We set up a system of fires, improved the defense and conducted continuous surveillance of the enemy. We soon noticed a movement of small groups of Hitlerites and single guns and tanks toward the front. This continued for several days. Our command element surmised that the enemy was building up forces for an attack. A prisoner said, however, that the Hitlerites were not thinking about an attack, but were preparing to repulse our attacks. Nevertheless, after analyzing intelligence data, our command element arrived at the conviction that the Hitlerites had managed to concencrate major forces for an attack even with the small groups over a period of several days. And as a matter of fact, several days later the enemy units shifted to the attack with the support of major forces of aviation. They had no success. This episode became a lifelong lesson for us: reconnaissance must be conducted continuously.

Sometimes one can observe the following picture in exercises. A commander devotes sufficient attention to reconnaissance in organizing for combat, but with the beginning of active operations he forgets about it. One has occasion to encounter such instances rather frequently during the attack.

In this connection I recall an episode involving a tactical exercise. A motorized rifle company commanded by Sr Lt V. Abakumov had penetrated the "enemy" defenses and successfully advanced. To gain time, the company commander closed up the subunit into a march column and began to puruse the retreating personnel. In so doing he took no steps of combat support, organizing neither reconnaissance nor security. Everything ended with the company coming under the withering fire of the "enemy."

As we see, even a commander who has achieved the initial success in a battle can lose the initiative or even suffer defeat if he forgets about continuity of reconnaissance. As we know, it is gained by constant reconnaissance in all types of troop combat activities, day and night, under any terrain conditions, regardless of time of year or meteorological conditions. And it is very important, as the author of the letter to the editors correctly noted, not only for specially trained personnel and subunits

to be able to do this. In modern warfare the significance of intelligence training of motorized riflemen, tankers and artillerymen—soldiers of all combat arms—grows more and more. They have fewer special classes in intelligence training than for authorized intelligence personnel. This means that success can be achieved only with good organization of classes and a thoughtful approach to their conduct. Summer training presents the most favorable opportunities for this.

6904

IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE FOR OFFICERS EMPHASIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 78 p 1

[Editorial: "An Officer's Military-Technical Horizons"]

[Text] The powerful step of scientific and technical progress becomes more and more perceptible with each passing year. Its influence on the development of military affairs is becoming ever stronger. Modern missiles, atomic-powered submarines, supersonic missile platforms and automated control systems determine today's countenance of the USSR Armed Forces. There also is a simultaneous increase in complexity of missions to be accomplished and in the responsibility of each soldier, and particularly the commander, for maximum use of the combat capabilities of weapons and combat equipment. A high degree of professional training and breadth of military and scientific-technical horizons in combination with a thorough ideological and theoretical training comprises a necessary condition for the commander's successful work.

Today the authority of the commander and any officer is determined largely by his competency, profound knowledge of equipment and understanding of those physical processes which are the basis for the operation of various models of weaponry. It stands to reason that the commander cannot and must not substitute for technical specialists or the directors of services subordinate to him. But he is obligated to know by heart the capabilities of modern weapons and combat equipment so as to make effective use of them in accomplishing particular tactical missions on the battlefield.

The foundation of our military cadres' scientific and technical knowledge is laid down in the process of their training in schools and academies. It is here that future commanders learn the principles of military science and become familiar with the latest achievements of military technology. But receiving a diploma is merely the first step on the path to development of a highly qualified military specialist. In order to be up to modern requirements, the officer must constantly concern himself with expanding his technical horizons, be in the know on the latest achievements of scientific-technical thinking and the most important directions in development of military affairs, and creatively apply his knowledge in

solving various questions in the life and work of army troops and naval forces. The ability to apply in practice the methods of systems engineering and make rational use of the means of automated control systems acquires special importance for commanders and staffs under present-day conditions.

Rich experience in the organization of various forms of technical training has been accumulated in units and aboard ships. Command training classes play an important part in expanding the military and scientific-technical horizons of officers. But in order to ensure that they serve not simply to acquire a specific sum of knowledge but also effectively facilitate an increase in the overall cultural level of service personnel, it is necessary to enlist qualified specialists to conduct them and see to the logistical support of the training process.

In addition to classes within the framework of command training, units and ships widely conduct military-technical propaganda, give lectures and briefings, and arrange reviews of scientific and technical journals and briefing sessions on military-technical topics. Such forms of scientific-technical propaganda as military-scientific and military-technical conferences, universities of military-technical knowledge, and technical sections under briefing groups also have given a positive account of themselves. For example, there is an active section of a nonregular lecture group under the political directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District. Over the last two years over 150 presentations by nonregular propagandists of technical knowledge have been prepared and conducted here. This work also is conducted actively in the Red Banner Northern Fleet and in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

We can name Capt 1st Rank A. Kazakov, Lt Col I. Vislous and Maj M. Mel'nichenko as among officers of the army and navy who devote much attention to the propaganda of technical knowledge. Tasks of increasing the combat readiness of units, ships and subunits are accomplished by these commanders in inseparable connection with concern for expanding the technical horizons of their subordinate officers and all personnel and unfolding invention and rationalization work. For example, Capt 1st Rank A. Kazakov, commander of a strategic nuclear-powered submarine, introduced the transfer of experience to young submariners into the system of constant work by all the crew, and primarily the officers, of expanding scientific-technical horizons. There is an active council of military-technical propaganda aboard the ship. The increase in technical knowledge has a real effect on results of combat training. The missile platform accomplished a difficult firing in outstanding fashion. Now every fourth submariner is a master of military affairs. Similar traits in style of leadership also are inherent to other officers.

Practice shows that officers' technical levels are raised most effectively where military-technical propaganda is arranged according to a precisely conceived system, where it is closely tied in with missions to be accomplished by subunits, units and ships, and where it is constantly the focus of attention by the command element of units, political organs

and party organizations, as well as officials of officers' clubs and libraries, and where there is active use of the military press and movies.

The self-education of officers has been and remains a very effective form for improving military knowledge and expanding scientific-technical horizons along with the unquestioned benefit of mass activities. Many service personnel have personal libraries and subscribe to scientific-technical journals. All of this helps them keep in step with the times, conduct the training and indoctrination of subordinates more fruitfully, and participate in the propaganda of technical knowledge.

Officers' self-education requires constant monitoring on the part of appropriate officials. The shaping in officers of a need for expanding technical horizons and the organization of monitoring over self-education must be viewed as important components of party-political work inseparably connected with the ideological-political and moral indoctrination of soldiers. It is this conclusion which follows from the requirement for an integrated approach to the training and indoctrination of troops. In light of the CPSU CC Decree "On the Status and Measures for Improving Lecture Propaganda," political organs and party organizations of the Army and Navy must devote constant attention to further development of natural science and scientific-technical propaganda.

The summer period of combat training is underway. During these days, on the basis of an analysis of the rich experience gained in the course of the struggle for increasing the combat readiness of troops in the previous period, units and ships are seeking reserves for further improvement in the effectiveness and quality of accomplishing the missions facing the troops. There is no question that an improvement in officers' technical training and an expansion in their scientifictechnical horizons will play an important role in this important matter.

COMMANDER OF MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT DISCUSSES TRAINING RESULTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 78 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Lazarev, commander of the Vyborg Order of Kutuzov Motorized Rifle Regiment, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Effectiveness and Quality are Most Important: The Value of a Training Hour"]

[Text] I recently visited a class in one of the platoons. It was not going in the best manner and the talk in the critique naturally was about the director's mistakes. Admitting the criticism was justified, the platoon commander still complained:

"It is a pity, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, that you came to this very class. I prepared more poorly for it than for others, for you can't make all classes demonstrations."

The young officer uttered the last phrase as something which stood to reason. Meanwhile, in my view, it gives cause for serious reflection.

In beginning the summer combat training, we read again and again the speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during his trip through areas of Siberia and the Far East and on his visit to ships and units there. We also tried to draw conclusions for ourselves from that advice and those recommendations of his which it appeared were not addressed directly to us soldiers. Doesn't a demand expressed by Leonid Il'ich really obligate us as well to a great deal, such as, for example: to learn to work rhythmically, without jerks and without interruptions? But it happened that in discussing the rhythmic nature of the training process, we focussed all our attention on precise fulfillment of plans and schedules, on the struggle not to allow disruption or postponment of classes, and so on. In other words, we placed emphasis on precision, efficiency and order. I believe no one can have doubt as to the importance of this.

But the phrase accidentally uttered by the platoon commander recalled another aspect of the matter and the shortcomings which can be called arrhythmia of quality. It is still not everything to conduct the prescribed classes. It is no less important and much more difficult to see to it that each of them meets the requirements of foremost methodology.

Our regiment completed winter training successfully. In practice battles the personnel performed all assigned missions. The motorized riflemen confidently fired all types of weapons and skillfully drove combat vehicles. Socialist pledges for preparing rated specialists were fulfilled. The number of those outstanding in training increased in some subunits. But there also were serious shortcomings. The greatest concern was aroused by the differing degree of preparedness of the subunits.

Why, for example, did the platoons commanded by Lt V. Rachinskiy and Lt V. Kochergin show different results in the exercise? The first acted in exemplary fashion and the other did not cope with the assigned mission. Perhaps the subunits were given dissimilar time resources? Of course not. Each platoon received everything prescribed by the training plan and program. It was only that Lt Kochergin's classes turned out to be "uninstructive" too often.

Do the senior comrades and the commanders of companies and battalions note this in time? Unfortunately, not always. If the class is disrupted, this is a ChP [extraordinary occurrence]. If it was conducted, even though at a low methodological level, then it would appear there was no reason to sound the alarm. But with the present intensity of the training process, an increase in the effectiveness of classes is an important and often our only reserve.

It is from these positions that we analyze the results of the first days of summer training. The struggle for training quality is many-sided. For example, the regimental headquarters inquired as to how officers of the battalion commanded by Capt N. Senyuk were using their working and personal time. It turned out that even in our best battalion many officers had a large gap between plans and their realization. At times they did not manage to prepare properly for classes due to conferences which were poorly organized and so were long drawn-out, due to imprecise assignment of missions, or due to lack of coordination in the work of officials.

For example, tank gunnery practice proceeded at a low level in the company commanded by Sr Lt V. Kazakov. One of the vehicles assigned to the problem proved to be unserviceable. Was only the company commander to blame for this? Also in evidence is the fault of Maj V. Revenko, chief of the regiment's armored service, who did not seriously delve into the training process. Many such examples can be cited concerning the interrelationship of our plans and productivity of day to day work.

I convinced myself prior to the beginning of summer training that all documents involving the training process had been worked up well in the battalion. But as the first classes showed, the organizational work took a back seat to planning in quality.

It stands to reason that the regimental staff and party committee not only react sharply to the shortcomings, but also carefully generalize the bits of new and foremost elements from the practice of the best methodologists and make foremost experience the property of all. The work style and experience of company commander Sr Lt V. Bersenev and platoon commander Lt V. Trashchenko was the subject at a party meeting and official conferences. A number of demonstration problems were held in the battalion commanded by Maj V. Gorbunov. In explaining to everyone the essence of particular techniques in the organization of the training process and socialist competition, we monitor their introduction into practice and demand a strict accounting of those who display inertia in this matter.

Collective forms of command and methods training in the regiment are supplemented by individual work with young officers. This includes assistance by senior personnel in preparing classes, indoctrination, and support with advice or a good word which elevates a person's mood. Much also depends on a mood. For example, if a platoon commander has reconciled himself with the thought that "you can't make all classes demonstrations," he thus has programmed as it were their low quality and backwardness and nonfulfillment of socialist pledges.

Just two weeks of summer classes are behind us. It is possible that the time still has not come for some kind of major conclusions. But to work with a long-term view means to see the dynamics of overall growth and the reserves which must be used tomorrow in the results of each day and in the achievements of squads, crews and teams.

RADIO-TECHNICAL UNIT TRAINING EMPHASIZES NEED FOR VIGILANCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 78 p 2

[Article by Engr-Lt Col N. Dolbunov: "Vigilance is Our Weapon: When the Narrative Problem Came"]

[Text] The communications system serving the command post of the radiotechnical unit was operating steadily. Data were passing in excellent fashion over all the primary channels and reserve links were functioning reliably. Suddenly a command came to open a new radio net. The command was given over an alternate communications channel where it was least expected. Narrative problems came one after the other.

Specialists had to work under difficult conditions, but the assigned mission was accomplished in excellent fashion and even with a bettering of the normative time. Just what ensured success? It was the high expertise, vigilance and constant readiness for bold and decisive actions by WO Yu. Kozharov, WO V. Ivanov, Pfc V. Mikhaylovskiy and other specialists.

Every Soviet soldier needs vigilance. It has special importance for communicators standing combat watch. While strictly observing communications discipline, they also must see to it that subscribers and stations do not violate rules for use of communications channels. For this they need the knowledge and strict observance of rules for passing traffic, an ability to establish communications quickly with distant stations, and the ability to operate expertly under conditions of a rapidly changing situation and the enemy's use of jamming.

Unfortunately, some officers, warrant officers and sergeants do far from everything to ensure vigilant performance of service by subordinates. Once we were checking the state of training of a section headed by Lt N. Chaplygin. The command for opening radio communications caught the specialists unawares and they fulfilled it late. The very first call-up in the radio net proved unexpected for radio operator Pvt V. Tatarin.

He made a mistake which complicated further work. It must be said that in his attempt to establish communications more quickly, the operator of the calling station also violated requirements ensuring vigilance and made an unjustified number of calls.

As was learned, the communicators were well trained in the specialized sense. Then just what let them down? Above all it was a relaxation of vigilance and attentiveness. The people were not psychologically attuned to unexpected narrative problems or to overcoming difficulties in acute situations.

Why does this take place? There appears such a false confidence in some specialists with much experience in performing service on combat watch that they know everything, are capable of doing everything and that they are up to any mission. They naturally relax exactingness toward themselves in performing their functional duties, which of course leads to mistakes in work, especially with unexpected narrative problems.

It stands to reason that the thoughtful commander and political officer will note signs of this "illness" in time and will take effective steps to eliminate shortcomings and activate competition among the soldiers. The young commander who still does not have sufficient experience is in a more difficult position. It might be that he may not notice this phenomenon at first, and later, having encountered a crude mistake by an experienced specialist in his work, he is perplexed: Won't I understand what the problem is? This is why it is important to teach young commanders daily the art of indoctrinational work with people and the ability to keep up their high morale on combat watch.

Vigilance does not come of itself. It is instilled both in the process of mass political activities and throughout all combat training and service and socialist competition. It is higher and more effective where explanatory and indoctrinational work is reinforced by organizational efforts to impose firm regulation order and to uproot instances of negligence and thoughtlessness. Unfortunately people sometimes forget about this principle.

A recent check showed that Officer N. Palatnyy would repeatedly give briefings and talks to personnel in explaining the importance of vigilance on combat watch, in day to day service and in life. All this is important and necessary. But here is the problem. Officer Palatnyy shows poor concern for the special training of communications soldiers and rarely organizes a check of how they perform combat watch. There also are shortcomings in the organization of competition by communicators.

Those who head the section play a large part in maintaining vigilance on combat watch. It is they who set the tone of the watch and their example is followed by all specialists. When watch sections are headed by officers A. Divakov, P. Kudryavtsev and N. Moskovets, one can be confident that no narrative communications problems will catch the soldiers unawares. Surprise checks show that the specialists are performing service vigilantly and that they are always ready for bold and precise actions in any situations, including emergencies.

The work of indoctrinating soldiers in a spirit of high vigilance must not be carried on in the form of campaigns, but continuously, objectively and purposefully. Deviations from this very important rule inevitably lead to negative consequences. At one time Lt G. Petukhov was doing a great deal to ensure vigilant performance of combat watch. As he erroneously assumed, everything would take its own course after that. The lieutenant ignored certain checks of the radio channel which were in his opinion insignificant. Then suddenly it was required to establish radioprinter communications. Immediately shortcomings were revealed which had evaded the officer's attention. He received a graphic lesson for himself and realized that vigilance could not be relaxed for an instant.

The assurance of stably high results on combat watch requires that checks of readiness to perform communications missions be conducted within the communications center with each section. All specialists of the communications center take part in such checks. The cohesiveness of the section is practiced and there is a check of the serviceability of apparatus and connecting lines between elements of the communications center during this check. As a result the soldiers gain a strengthened feeling of confidence in their abilities.

Experience teaches that where the organization of combat watch is done in a businesslike manner it becomes a real school of indoctrination for communicators in a spirit of high vigilance.

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TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CREW TRAINING FOR PARADROP DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 78 p 1

[Article by Gds Sr Lt A. Oleynik, of Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Report From Aboard a Military Transport Aircraft: Landing in the Mountains"]

[Text] Having landed in a mountain region, the airborne personnel penetrated the "enemy" defenses with a surprise attack, but were not able to advance into the depth. They were hindered by heavily fortified positions on dominant heights. Reinforcements were needed.

The order to drop a reserve—airborne combat vehicles—in a limited mountainous area came suddenly to the squadron, but it did not catch the subordinates of Lt Col V. Baykov unawares. For several years now this squadron has held first place in competition and the title of outstanding. During the winter training period every other pilot raised his class rating. Every crew is ready at any moment and under any weather conditions to perform the most difficult assignments.

But in spite of a high level of air training, every flight here is "played out" in preflight training. The peculiarities of the route, of the weather and of actions in the drop zone, and even the probability of flocks of birds cutting across the route all must be considered and foreseen in order for the march beyond the clouds to be concluded successfully.

The estimated time of departure was approaching. We hurried to the aircraft hardstands. We could see from afar the combat vehicles on platforms wound all about with cables and straps and with humps of parachutes stowed and fastened above them. The airborne personnel formed up near this equipment.

The platforms were metal surfaces on three wheels. Shock absorbers resembling blacksmith's bellows. A multicanopy system consisting of five units of cargo chutes.

The airborne personnel had done their work, and now it was the pilots' turn. The crew members smoothly prepare the aircraft for loading: they lower ramps, pay out cables, and place additional chocks under the aircraft wheels. Senior technician Sr Lt I. Khomenko switches on the winches and the platform with the combat vehicle slowly crawls into the black opening of the cargo hatch. There it is centered and secured. Senior gunner WO V. Denisov sets the locking device on the extractor parachute.

Then the powerful turboprop giants start one after the other. The commander places the air caravan on the assigned course. The fighter cover passes above us like lightning.

I look at Baykov's face. After the tension of take-off it has become a bit sunken, but it has retained an expression of calm and confidence. I was told that during his 15 years of service in military transport aviation the lieutenant colonel has qualified in around ten types of aircraft. He has been decorated with orders and medals.

We are approaching the "front line." For an instant the imagination pictures a wall of bursts from antiaircraft projectiles, the shadows of fighter-interceptors in the skies and skillfully camouflaged "enemy" strongpoints below. But now the front line is denoted conditionally with red color on the commander's map. There are only clouds under us resembling a boundless, snowcovered steppe. Bright patches of sun behind the clouds glisten on the glass of the navigator's cockpit.

The pilots act without an allowance for conditionality. Our aircraft presses to the mountains, then performs antimissile and anti-air defense maneuvers. The air transport personnel counter the "enemy" air defense system with a high degree of training, daring and tactical cunning. There is no other way to penetrate to the site of the cargo drop.

Before the beginning of the run on target, our AN-12 cuts speed and descends, plunging into the white foam of broken clouds and between the black rocky cliffs, outlined with white bands of snow and ice. Somewhere there below was supposed to be the drop zone.

"Technician take your place at the drop equipment!" commands the navigator, Maj I. Kaz'min.

Now he is the main actor aboard the airship. The precision of the approach to the limited zone with consideration of the wind now depends on his ability and knowledge. The navigator has no right to a mistake during the drop.

It is as if the pilots' faces have become petrified: the most important phase of the flight has arrived. I observe the navigator. Glued to the viewing hood of the radar sight, Maj Kaz'min is attempting to "catch" those very blips among the multitude on which he will have to press the release button. The assigned drop zone is covered with dense clouds, but this is no hindrance for a first-class navigator. His comrades say that Kaz'min is able to place a vehicle "on the very spot" even with zero visibility.

Lt Col Baykov and Sr Lt V. Neizvestnyy, the assistant to the ship's commander, have their own difficulties. During those few seconds that the cargo will pass along the monorails to the hatch, the aircraft's center of gravity shifts far to the rear. The aircraft must be kept in a strictly horizontal position and at the same time a set regime of course, speed and altitude must be carefully maintained. There was an incident in Baykov's practical work when a large cargo suddenly stuck, disrupting the aircraft's balance. The commander displayed self-control and composure. At that time he kept the aircraft in horizontal flight and then employed a skillful maneuver to "shake loose" the obstinate cargo.

"To the right five," says the navigator, giving target designations.

"Understood, turning," responds the pilot.

The yellow light goes on. "Get ready!" Tension reaches the apogee. I hasten into the loading hatch. Sr Lt B. Chernopenev looks steadily at the roof signal lamp. Behind his broad back can be seen the light rectangle of the open hatch, into which a stiff, cold stream of air is blowing. Seconds of waiting drag on. Another instant and the green signal flashes: "Release!"

The siren struck the eardrums. The platform with the combat vehicle shuddered and rolled with a clank along the roller platform toward the hatch. It traces an arc, turning over in the air, but the stabilizing systems level the platform. Then the enormous bouquet of giant parachutes open above it. Rocking from side to side, the platform slowly floats to earth.

Our air caravan was already on the return course when senior radio operator Capt M. Shevchishin received a radio message from the drop zone: "Drop normal. Thanks!" The pilots exchanged glances, smiling in satisfaction. And below, after successfully completing the march beyond the clouds, the airborne personnel were rushing into the attack.

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SHORTCOMINGS NOTED IN USSR PRE-DRAFT MILITARY-PATRIOTIC EDUCATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 78 p 2 LD

[V. Sysoyev article: "Bringing Up the Defenders of the Motherland: On Some Problems in the Military-Patriotic Education of the Younger Generation"]

[Text] More than 10 years have passed since the adoption of the USSR law "On Universal Military Service." In this time, thanks to the efforts of party and Soviet organs and state and public organizations, considerable work has been done on further improving the system of the military-patriotic education of the younger generation and preparing young people for military service.

A central place in this system is occupied by elementary military training-a study subject which has now become a firm part of life in general educational schools, vocational and technical colleges and specialized secondary schools. This subject, as practice shows, not only gives the future defenders of the motherland special knowledge and skills, but also helps to raise the organizational level of students and notably strengthens discipline.

An important part in preparing young men for service in the army and navy is played by Dosaaf schools and clubs, in which pre-conscript trainees master the basics of specific military specialities: as a driver of automobiles or track-laying vehicles, a communications worker, a radar station operator and many others.

The network of universities and clubs for the future serviceman, where Lenin readings, lessons in courage and meetings with heroes of the Soviet Union and war veterans are held, is developing. Trips to sites of revolutionary, combat and labor glory are spreading widely. Many young men and girls are involved in survey work. Thanks to their activity the names of thousands of heroes have become known and museums, rooms and corners of combat glory have been created. Pioneers and komsomol members take part with great interest in the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" military sports.

All these forms and methods of work, supplementing each other, pursue a single aim: to prepare young people better for service in the USSR Armed Forces, and

to educate them in a spirit of boundless devotion to the party and people and readiness to rise to the defense of the gains of socialism at any moment. And on the whole this task is being resolved successfully.

Take, for example, Moskovskaya Oblast, which came first in the competition for the preparation of young people for military service. Here work is carried out according to a comprehensive plan, in whose compilation and implementation party, komsomol and other public organizations participate. Questions of military-patriotic education are constantly in the field of vision of commissions created by party raykoms and gorkoms. These commissions insure the coordination of common efforts, which makes it possible to strive for high, stable results.

Certain successes have also been achieved in the military-patriotic education of young people and in preparing them for service in the armed forces in other oblasts, krays and republics. Nonetheless, in analyzing the state of affairs and studying work experience, you invariably come to the conclusion that all potentials are still not being used for raising the effectiveness and efficiency of work and not all reserves have been put into operation.

Until recently, for instance, in some places studies in elementary military training have taken place at an insufficiently high methodological and professional standard. The necessary attention is not devoted everywhere to the selection and placing of military instructor cadres and to raising their qualifications. In several schools the potentials of history, literature and geography lessons are not fully exploited and intersubject links are poorly implemented in cultivating love for the socialist motherland and its armed forces in pupils.

The question of training teachers and enriching them with the leading methods and forms of the military-patriotic education of students merits serious attention. This problem is now resolved mainly on the basis of optional studies. A certain amount of experience in this respect has been accumulated in the Azerbaijan, Rostov and Kolomna Teaching institutes. But optional studies are by no means attended by all students. We should obviously think about amending the teaching institutes' programs.

Unfortunately, military study rooms, rifle ranges, areas for drill studies and sports areas are not equipped in the necessary way in all schools, vocational and technical institutions and technical schools. There is often still a shortage of textbooks, especially in the military-technical training section. Much remains to be done in this respect. And here party, komsomol and Dosaaf organizations, voluntary sports societies and patrons from military units and military-educational institutions can and must give substantial assistance to organs of people's education.

A weighty contribution is made to the cause of military-patriotic education and the training of young men for army and navy service by Dosaaf schools and clubs. But there are still some flaws in their work too. In particular,

this concerns the development of military-technical and military-applied forms of sport and the broader involvement of students in them.

When this is discussed, you can often hear references to objective causes and existing age restrictions. People say that you can only drive transport vehicles and aircraft from the age of 18, make a parachute jump from 17, and make independent broadcasts from 16. What can you do for boys here, they ask?

But a great deal can be done, all the same. Students can work on collective radio stations, learn to shoot accurately and take part in races on mopeds and karts. Moreover, all kinds of model-making are accessible to everyone. It must not be forgotten that the way to the controls of an aircraft started with model planes for many pilots. Unfortunately, these directions in work with young people have not received the necessary development everywhere, and in some places a tendency to close clubs and sections has even been observed. Thus, in Tomskaya Oblast only 163 schoolchildren are involved in building model planes and ships, whereas in some other oblasts they number thousands.

It also happens sometimes that only the more active section of young people are involved in participating in events. And for those who are rather more passive, without a sufficient love for work or perseverance, who do not yet take pleasure in good results in sport, the path to clubs and sections turns out to be closed. Individual workers in schools, komsomol and Dosaaf organizations and sports clubs do not want to burden themselves with extra concerns and only work with those with whom it is easier and simpler. This formal approach to work leads to considerable harm.

Not everything is being done as yet for an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of educational work being carried out. Priority is often given to mass events. Individual influence is relegated to second place.

The 25th CPSU Congress stressed the importance of a comprehensive approach to the education of young people, and of insuring the unity of ideological, political, labor and moral education. The first steps in implementing these party instructions show that the formation of the qualities of a patriot and defender of the fatherland in young people is achieved by participation in practical activities. This is recalled by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution "on further improving the training and education of students in general educational schools and their preparation for labor."

The participation of schoolchildren in Sunday workdays and the collection of scrap metal deserves support in every way. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of boys' patronage over war invalids and the families of fallen servicemen. In several places a remarkable movement has arisen and is expanding—the creation of school harvesting detachments and units. For instance, Ol2 such units worked in the fields of Rostovskaya Oblast last year. And this is a very good thing. Work has a moral and physical tempering effect,

develops a feeling of personal responsibility for the task assigned, and teaches you to subordinate your interests to those of the collective. And all these qualities are as necessary as the air they breathe to the future defenders of the motherland.

Young people are our future. That is why questions of military-patriotic education and the preparation of young men for service in the USSR Armed Forces will remain at the center of attention of party and Soviet organs and state, komsomol and public organizations.

This is a matter of great state importance. The All-Union Teachers' Congress opens in Moscow today. In discussing questions of improving the work of the Soviet General Educational School and the preparation of young people for labor and public activity, it will without any doubt devote the necessary attention to work in the military-patriotic education of the younger generation.

The guarantee of further successes in this work lies in firm party leadership, the full exploitation of the inexhaustible potentials of the comprehensive method, the scientific crystallization of leading experience, the exposure of the real reasons for the shortcomings which exist, and, in their rapid elimination, the pooling of our efforts in this sphere. Concern about the younger generation is the concern of each and every one.

COMMENTARY ON PLANS FOR CREATION OF 'SUPER-NATO'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 78 p 3 LD

[Article by S. Aleksandrov: "What NATO is Thinking About..."]

[Text] Just now, when top U.S. officials and high-ranking NATO figures have joined in the militarist campaign which is being fanned in the West, statements made by two retired figures--U.S. Adm I. Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the NATO countries [as published], and British Adm P. Hill-Norton, former chairman of the Military Committee of this aggressive bloc--might have gone unnoticed. However, the Western press paid great attention to these statements and gave them every publicity. What was the reason for this? A certain British newspaper discovered the reason. This newspaper described the duet by these admirals as a "trial balloon sent up on behalf of the NATO supreme command and NATO politicians."

The fact is that T. Moorer and P. Hill-Norton have lifted the veil which was concealing certain plans being worked out in the headquarters of this bloc. The retired admirals can permit themselves greater candor than can officials of the North Atlantic bloc.

NATO should not restrict its interests to Europe, and the government of the bloc's countries must direct their gaze toward neighboring areas, Hill-Norton declared. But what "neighboring areas" is he talking about? According to the logic of this British admiral, such a neighboring area is the Zairian province of Shaba, where NATO countries are carrying out armed intervention. It does not matter that this province is thousands of kilometers away from Europe. Hill-Norton applauds this imperialist action as an instance of the practical transition of the NATO countries to an interventionist policy in regions lying outside the geographical borders originally laid down by the creators of this aggressive bloc.

In the future, Hill-Norton continues, demonstrating the appetites of the NATO military, the North Atlantic Alliance must become the "natural center or nucleus of a bigger organization." What kind of organization, precisely? As far as can be judged from the revelations of Hill-Norton, it is to provide for the unification or even the fusion, under the aegis of NATO, of all the existing imperialist military blocs of which the United States or other Western

countries are members, and the inclusion in these blocs of African and Asian countries linked with NATO countries by military treaties and agreements--ranging all the way to Japan and South Korea.

A "maxi-bloc" of this kind, as Hill-Norton sees it, must extend its "competence" to virtually all continents and take under its military control any region of the world where the development of events does not accord with the interests of the imperialist forces. The "super-NATO" must become a truly worldwide policeman, standing guard over the interests of the Western monopolies.

In the light of these global ambitions of NATO and the intervention in Shaba Province, the question naturally arises: In what region of the world does this "defensive" bloc plan to undertake its next armed action? The answer to this question is given by the other retired admiral--Admiral Moorer. He calls for "steps to be taken" in the region of the horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

True, Moorer is not as yet calling for direct intervention against any specific countries in these regions and is limiting himself merely to proposals that formations of aircraft carriers be deployed there urgently and that military maneuvers be held regularly. But in the wake of these appeals for military tension to be stoked and for a show of strength to be made, the next step can be clearly made out--direct imperialist aggression like that carried out in Zaire.

The "revelations" of the two former NATO military leaders are extremely significant. They are yet further evidence of the aggressive aspirations of NATO which are threatening the cause of general peace and the independence of the peoples of the entire planet.

But how do Hill-Norton and Moorer attempt to justify such aggressive aspirations? The retired admirals have not dreamed up anything new here. We have the same old hackneyed myths about the "Soviet threat." Of course, the admirals cite neither facts nor arguments to support this false thesis, because facts and arguments do not exist. Hill-Norton's reasoning sounds plausible only when he speaks of control over "sources of raw materials, foodstuffs and sales markets for the West." And this is the precise reason for the appearance of the plans for the creation of an imperialist "superbloc" and for the preparation of new aggressive adventures.

COMBAT TRAINING IN CBR ENVIRONMENT DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jul 78 p 2 LD

[Article by Maj Gen of Technical Troops N. Moiseyev, chief of chemical troops of the group of Soviet forces in Germany: "Reliability of Defense"]

[Text] On a tactical exercise the personnel of subunits of the Novgorod-Berlin Guards Tank Regiment had to operate in a difficult nuclear and radiation situation. The tankmen, attacking a "contaminated" locality over a long period of time, had, according to the tactical problem, already received a certain dose of radiation. And then it became known that the "enemy," trying to delay the attacking forces, had exploded "nuclear mines." Information arrived from the higher staff on the coordinates and strength of the explosions.

Guards Maj N. Abanin, commander of the regiment, with the help of staff specialists, quickly and accurately determined the nature of the radiation situation which had arisen. All the necessary calculations were made on the spot and methods of action were found which even in these conditions made it possible to preserve the regiment's combat capability and insure the fulfillment of its task. Operating in the danger zone, the personnel of the regiment displayed the ability to exploit the properties of combat hardware and means of individual protection with maximum effectiveness and showed high physical and psychological tempering.

The tankmen's success in the training battle was made possible by the correct organization of the day-to-day training process and by constant attention to practising actions under conditions involving the use of weapons to mass destruction. They also worked productively in the regiment on the eve of the exercise. Tactical drills were carried out with the subunits, helping to improve the personnel's skills in crossing zones of destruction, contamination and obstructions and eliminating the consequences of the "enemy's" use of weapons of mass destruction. The unit's headquarters organized several group exercises with officers at which tasks in assessing the radiation and chemical situation were resolved.

In the regiment commanded by guards Maj N. Abanin, as in many other units in the group of forces, a training and material base has been created which

permits high-level exercises in defense against weapons of mass destruction. For the initial training of personnel in subunits of the unit there are specially equipped classrooms and training grounds where officers explain to their subordinates the nature of the effect of various means of destruction on the human organism and on combat hardware, and measures for defense against them. Personnel learn to operate correctly in contaminated localities, master special methods of treatment of combat hardware and means of protection against incendiary substances, and acquire habits of skilful use of cover and engineering installations.

Of course, the training of personnel for defense against weapons of mass destruction in the regiment is not restricted to studies in classrooms and special training sites. The servicemen's practices and studies are improved in all field exercises.

The highest results are achieved where questions of defense against weapons of mass destruction are studied together with other training disciplines and above all with tactics. A particularly great role is played by tactical and special tactical exercises which make it possible to resolve defense questions on a full scale, with real consideration for the effect of weapons of mass destruction, the time factor, the rate of advance of your own and the "enemy's" troops, and local and weather conditions.

Carefully organized tactical exercises give commanders at all levels good practice in analyzing the nuclear, radiation and chemical situation, taking well-founded decisions, setting tasks in a tactically correct way, and determining expedient ways of fulfilling them. During the exercises held in units of the group, personnel of all categories of troops acquire the ability to operate for long periods of time in contaminated zones. Particular concern is displayed for forming among servicemen the ability to remain for a prolonged period wearing means of individual protection, and skills in the correct use of antiradiation preparations and preventive measures. In this connection the organization of nutrition and rest for servicemen in such complex conditions and the ability to work in a regime of observation and quarantine are not overlooked.

In leading units questions of defense against weapons of mass destruction are an integral part of firing, engineering, physical, military medical and other forms of combat training. Take, for instance, drill in firing training. In training personnel on shooting ranges they usually practise actions on the outbreak of nuclear explosions and ways of crossing "contaminated" sectors. On the shooting ranges themselves training sites are organized where servicemen wearing means of protection are trained in readiness for firing, aiming the weapon at the target, watching the field of battle and determining distances to reference points, and carry out special practice with weapons.

On drills in engineering training soldiers study the defensive properties of a locality, shelters and refuges, including those equipped with filter ventilation installations. Here they equip engineering installations in practice, taking into account the possible use of mass destruction weapons by the enemy. On physical training drills short forced marches in gas masks are practiced.

The provisions of the regulations for training in the fulfillment of special normatives have become of great assistance in the training of officers, ensigns, sergeants and soldiers.

Experienced methodologists organize training in such a way that the personnel reliably master ways of carrying out radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance in all types of battle and learn to carry out the special treatment of organic [shtatnyy] arms and hardware rapidly and correctly, use means of individual protection confidently, act correctly in destroying poisonous substances, and carry out service in contaminated zones.

However, it is not everywhere, unfortunately, that defense against weapons of mass destruction is given the attention it deserves. In certain subunits training amounts in essence to putting on gas masks.

A low level of training was displayed, for instance, in control drills by the motorized infantry company commanded by Snr Lt M. Vershigora. Here one serviceman in three failed to fulfill the norms laid down. This is mainly explained by the fact that Senior Lieutenant Vershigora and the company's other officers underestimated the significance of defense against weapons of mass destruction and did not try to work out program questions fully and to a high standard. In the company drills in defense against weapons of mass destruction were not combined with other forms of combat training. They often procrastinated on the pretext that in the first instance it is necessary to learn to shoot, to drive combat vehicles and so forth. On the day of control drills the study program was only 75 percent fulfilled.

There was a similar picture in the artillery battery commanded by Snr Lt V. Ivanitskiy. Here planned exercises in fulfilling norms were not carried out and the time was used for training in other subjects of combat training which the battery commander considered more important. The unit's headquarters did not react promptly to this.

There is obviously no need to explain how erroneous and harmful it is to regard defense against weapons of mass destruction as something secondary, and even more to contrast it with other training disciplines. The soil for such contraposition appears only where attempts are made to study defense, so to speak, in the pure form, in isolation from tactics, sometimes resorting to rush work and elementary coaching in training subordinates. It is clear that it is necessary to resolutely combat such an attitude to defense against weapons of mass destruction. Here it is mainly up to headquarters, political organizers and party organizations.

A special role in training servicemen in defense against weapons of mass destruction used by a possible enemy belongs to the specialists and above all the chief of the unit's chemical service and officers in chemical defense subunits. Much depends on their activity in the training process.

For instance, the training of subunits for actions in contaminated localities is organized well in the unit where Maj A. Baklushin is chief of the chemical

service. In special drills the personnel study in depth the combat properties of nuclear and chemical weapons used by the enemy, the rules for using means of individual and collective protection, and ways and means of special treatment.

Then ways of using the defensive properties of organic equipment, the locality and means of individual protection, as well as actions on notification signals, are practiced by the company's personnel at practical drills. The chief of the chemical service often personally leads drills or helps company commanders in preparing and conducting them. Battalion chemical instructors are brought in as advisers to the leaders, and a chemical defense subunit for practical demonstrations.

In the unit competitions are systematically held for the fulfillment of norms connected with defense against weapons of mass destruction. Great attention is devoted to this form of combat training in summing up the results of competition.

Summer combat training is in full swing. The personnel of units and subunits are persistently improving their combat skill. Servicemen resolve any combat training task with the understanding that both the ability to use their own combat resources to their full capacity and the art of defense and the ability to maintain combat capability in any situation are needed in order to gain victory over a strong, technically well-equipped enemy. To thoroughly and comprehensively study questions of defense against weapons of mass destruction is to raise combat readiness and the field training of troops to a new, higher level.

ACTIVITIES AT THE POPOV HIGHER NAVAL RADIOELECTRONIC SCHOOL

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 78 signed to press 7 Apr 78 pp 18-19

Article by Captain 1st Rank(Reserve) V. Nikolayev: "Imeni A. S. Popov"7

/Text/ The Higher Naval Radioelectronic School imeni A. S. Popov was 45 years old this past March. The creation of this school was one of the links in the chain of measures fashioned by the Communist Party to strengthen the Soviet Navy. It has played a large role in increasing the navy's combat effectiveness.

The school gives naval officers an engineering education required for service on surface vessels and submarines. Those who graduate from the school are given a diploma of a military engineer with an appropriate specialty, a badge for their chests, and an officer's rank. Among its graduates are ship commanders and admirals.

The school is located in the center of one of the most beautiful suburbs of Leningrad-Petrodvorets which is famous for its 18th and 19th century architectural collections. There are beautiful palaces and parks and unique fountains including the famous one of Sampson. For this reason the students do not have to rack their brains to know where to go to relax on their days off.

The Page Corps was here at one time. Sons of the Russian nobility were educated within its walls, preparing themselves for court service. Now Soviet lads, who have decided to devote their lives to service on military ships, stride along the gleaming parquet of its resonant corridors. They walk firmly, hammering out their footsteps harmoniously and smartly. Some have come to the school directly from high school, others served for a time in the navy and a flaming love for the sea in their youthful hearts brought them here.

Among them is Petty Officer Yuriy Lobanov whom I met at the school. He worked as a fitter after high school. He was drafted into the navy and served on the Baltic. The ocean cruises, the whistle of the wind in the riggings and antennas, and the lapping of the waves suited his soul. Above all, he fell in love with naval service with its routine, clear and calculated to the second, its alerts, the excitement of shipboard life. He became a student and is now successfully mastering an engineering speciality.

Nikolay Smirnov arrived at the school by a different route. An attraction for naval service was nurtured in him at a DOSAAF maritime school where he studied radioelectronics. The desire to become an officer proved to be so great that Nikolay began to make a thorough study of the subjects on which the entrance examinations for the school were based. It was difficult. His parents offered to hire tutors, at least for physics and mathematics. However, the lad flatly refused, declaring that he wanted to attain everything on his own. And he did attain it. He passed the examinations. He is now an excellent student. He awaits graduation impatiently and dreams about serving on a ship. For the present he is trying to spend as much time as possible in training classes and laboratories which are equipped with the most modern naval equipment and radioelectronic facilities.

I had a chance to visit a computer technology laboratory. The spacious area, filled with the soft glow of fluorescent lights, was filled with electronic computers. On ships they help the commanders make correct decisions quickly. Students worked with concentration near the machines. A senior instructor, Captain First Rank V. Polyakov, observed their activities. He has many years of naval service and he has an enormous amount of experience as a specialist and commander. Combining this with a mastery of teaching, Vitaliy Andreyevich skillfully instructs the students. This they know at the school: whoever goes through Polyakov's school, does well on a ship.

Incidentally, I should say something about the instructors. Great importance is given to their selection. Many of them are World War II veterare, have rich combat and teaching experience, more than one-third have academic degrees and the titles of doctors and candidates of science, professors and assistant professors. It is interesting to learn from such professors and one can obtain from them all of the necessary knowledge and habits for an engineering officer.

Many of the students are involved in technical work. In spite of being busy, the director of the school, Vice Admiral A. Rulyuk, finds time for this himself. One can often see him making some kind of clever simulator, instrument or model with the students. It is worth noting that the school received a USSR Ministry of Defense prize in 1977 for a watch officer simulator created by a group of students under the leadership of the admiral.

The director of the school is always among his charges and shows great concern for them. Everything in Anatoliy Antonovich's biography is military. During all of World War II he was a navigator on a submarine commanded by the illustrious Black Sea submariner, Hero of the Soviet Union M. Greshilov. After the war he commanded ships and sailed a great deal. If you plot on a world ocean map the courses taken by the ships under the command of Anatoliy Antonovich Rulyuk, then that map would be covered with a web of thin lines.

How the students await practical training! Each year after theoretical studies, all of them set off on combat and training vessels. They participate in exercises and go on long ocean cruises. The students go everywhere during this training time. The equatorial waters of the Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean, the Mediterranean, Black and other seas, for example. It is a rare student that does not have a "Distant Cruise" medal on his chest.

Practical sea training is an excellent school of courage. The students return to their beloved school from the distant voyages sturdier and physically and spiritually stronger. During this practical training they become experts in the sea and sea service.

At the school they have a fine sports palace with a swimming pool, open sports areas, and a firing range. Almost all of the students have sports ratings. In the past five years alone they have prepared here more than 20 masters of sports and hundreds of first-class sportsmen. Many students have often become champions and prize-winners of the armed forces, Leningrad, RSFSR and USSR.

The student years fly by unnoticed. The studies have been completed and the diploma has been defended. This is the cherished moment—gold lieutenant shoulder boards glitter on his shoulders. Good-bye, dear school. Awaiting the lieutenant are distant ocean cruises, a stormy sea, the difficult but honorable and responsible work of the sailor.

The school is already hospitably throwing open its doors to a new draft of naval service romantics—youths who have decided to link their fate for good to Soviet naval power.

Foreseeing that many of our magazine readers will, most likely, want to know the address of the school, we will give it: 198135, Leningrad-Petrodvorets, 4.

ACADEMICIAN ADMIRAL BERG INTERVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 78 signed to press 7 Apr 78 pp 42-43

/Interview with academician Admiral A. I. Berg/

Text The eminent Soviet scholar in the field of radio engineering and cybernetics, the academician Hero of Socialist Labor Engineer-Admiral Aksel' Ivanovich Berg began his military service as a navigator on the battleship "Tsesarevich" during World War I. Then he participated with the Baltic Fleet sailors in the rout of the White Guards and interventionists. Finishing the Naval Academy, A. I. Berg served in various posts, devoting much of his strength and energy to equipping the Soviet Navy with the latest radio equipment, and developing radar aids in our country. Now he is chairman of the scientific council on the complex problem of cybernetics of the AS USSR

Question Aksel' Ivanovich, you have seen the creation of the Soviet Navy with your own eyes. Please tell us about the most memorable episodes of that time.

Answer The October Revolution found me, a submarine navigator and naval officer, in Petrograd. I remember many things from the stormy events of those days, but especially the speech of V. I. Lenin to the first All-Russian Naval Congress on 22 November 1917. In his speech he highly praised the revolutionary services of the sailors, he thoroughly described the present moment, and he intelligently enunciated the tasks facing the party and nation. Lenin said the chief task was to build a new socialist state.

The speech of the Eolshevik Party leader explained much to me. I took part in active revolutionary work and was appointed to Ealtic Fleet head-quarters as deputy to the flag captain for operational matters. In this job I took part in directing the heroic Arctic voyage of the Arctic Fleet in April 1918.

In May 1919, I was assigned to the submarine "Pantera." The experienced submariner Aleksandr Nikolayevich Bakhtin commanded it at that time.

I was on the "Pantera" until August 1919, and then I was involved for several years in the repair of damaged submarines. The submarines "Rys'," "Volk," "Zmeya," and "Tigr" passed through my hands. Being involved with repair work, I encountered a wide range of problems and understood that a thorough engineering knowledge was required to solve them. Therefore, I enrolled at the polytechnical institute at the first opportunity and in the electrical engineering faculty of the Naval Academy where a radio engineering department had been set up for the first time.

Question Why exactly did you choose this department?

/Answer/ I understood that radio engineering had enormous possibilities. I dreamed of creating reliable communications for the entire navy and especially for the submarines. I myself was convinced on many occasions that the submarine, lacking communications with the outside world, could be attacked not only by the enemy but also by its own people. There was a famous event during World War I when one of our submarines was fired upon by Russian patrol ships. Not long before that a similar thing happened to the Germans--the submarine U-96 sank its own U-7. It was understandable therefore that I was very interested in the experiments with submarine radio communications which I observed in the summer of 1916 at the Revel'skiy roadstead. A submarine with some kind of incomprehensible metallic structures on its prow first submerged and then surfaced. I later learned that these were the experiments of Ivan Ivanovich Rengarten, the flagship radiotelegraphist of the Baltic Fleet, and Nikolay Dmitriyevich Papaleksi, the future academician, and then a young physicist.

The idea of receiving radio waves underwater fascinated me. I tried to devote myself to this, not suspecting, of course, the numerous difficulties which stood in the way of underwater communications.

Question You participated directly in the creation of the Soviet radio engineering industry and the re-arming of the army and navy. Could you tell us, even if briefly, about this?

Answer Radio engineering is so large a part of our lives today that it is probably difficult for young people to imagine a time when it simply did not exist. However, radio is my age. Popov's experiments became known in 1895. This great Russian scientist was not only the first who used electromagnetic waves for communications but he was also the first to test radio communications in the navy. He suggested the possibility of using electromagnetic waves for radar.

It became gradually clear that radio engineering promised a genuine revolution in military activities. World War I proved it. In spite of the primitiveness of the radiotelegraphic equipment in existence then, it permitted the maintenance of wireless communications over many hundreds of kilometers.

After the Russian Revolution and the end of the Civil War, the Communist Party exerted enormous efforts to strengthen the defensive capability of the young Soviet state and to equip its armed forces with the most modern combat equipment and, specifically, radio equipment. For this it was necessary to design new radio equipment, to test and to get series output going. There was practically no electronics industry. We had to create the necessary plants and set up series output of radio parts and tubes.

In 1927 I was commissioned to re-arm the navy, then equipped with obsolete radio sets, with new means of communication. I suggested that the navy be equipped with several types of radio sets, designed for specific outputs and frequencies. They had to be strictly standardized and adapted to the working conditions on ships and submarines with their increased humidity and intense vibrations. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, K. Ye. Voroshilov and A. I. Yegorov supported my proposal and the program was approved.

The first system to arm the navy with radio equipment came into being in 1934. Four types of radio receivers with capacities from 50 watts to 7.5 kilowatts were produced. Specific types of stations were installed on the appropriate classes of ships. Unlike the old longwave ones, the new stations operated on medium waves. The designers provided them with a handy conversion mechanism from band to band, from receiving to transmitting and the reverse.

The Soviet government highly valued this system of arming the fleet with radio equipment. I and several other individuals were decorated.

Shortly after the first system, the team of designers working under my direction created a second. In it were the already widely used short wave and even the ultrashort wave bands. New means of communications were also introduced into the army.

The re-arming of the army and navy with new equipment was not the only trend in the introduction of radio engineering into the military. At the same time, work on radar was unfolding. First I will say several things about its history.

After Popov's speculations, there appeared many patents on devices which were prototypes of modern radars. However, nothing happened for a long time after the idea. It was necessary to create special types of radio tubes, special antennas, recording systems. The main things needed to develop radar were short waves from several meters

to several centimeters, capable of being reflected off objects which were encountered. It was only at the beginning of the 1930s when electron tubes capable of generating such waves were created, that work on radar was widely developed in the various laboratories of the country. The names of Yu. K. Korovin, P. K. Oshchepkov, B. K. Shembel' and other specialists have been connected with the first advances in Soviet radar.

By 1935 they were successful in reliably detecting a small U-2 plane at a distance of 5-6 kilometers. Then the B-2 and B-3 radio selectors were produced which detected airplanes at a distance of up to 20 kilometers. In September of 1939 the RUS-1('Reven'") airplane radio detector was used to equip the PVO/air defense? troops and in July 1940 came the first RUS-2 pulse radar with a range of activity up to 150 kilometers.

The war proved the effectiveness of this new weapon, especially in the air and on the sea. Radars permitted the detection of enemy planes in any weather long before their approach to the target. Ship radars made it possible to see the coastline, rocks, icebergs and ships at a considerable distance. In some cases the radars themselves decided the outcome of battles.

You know that shortly after the end of World War II the imperialist circles started to nurture aggressive plans threatening our country. In order to maintain its security, The Communist Party is taking the necessary measures to increase the defensive capabilities of the Soviet state. Great attention was also paid to developing radio engineering. Work in this area was carried out at a heightened pace. It was necessary to build radars with high technical specifications in order not to be caught unawares. I had to coordinate this work over a number of years in various leadership posts. I say that the Soviet scientists, designers, engineers and workers accomplished a modern labor feat in a short period of time by creating a powerful industry equipping the armed forces with reliable radar facilities.

Question What problems have interested you lately?

Answer Generally speaking, they are, first of all, questions of control, communications and information processing, the solution of which is coordinated by the scientific council on the complex problem of cybernetics. The activities of the council are multifaceted. Modern cybernetics penetrated practically all of the sciences, examining questions of control. It has especially wide use in engineering, economics, medicine, and the military.

Some ask why I, an admiral and radio engineer, am fascinated by cybernetics problems. Such a question, I confess, always amazes me. For a military person having business with the most complex technology and with troops, control questions have been keen for a long time. I came into contact with them while still a navigator, and then while engaged in communications, radar and radioelectronics. I recall that the father of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, arrived at his ideas by working on automatic control, tracking and destruction of air targets.

Ecological problems also trouble me very much. As an individual born in Pushkin's century, I clearly see not only the enormous achievements of technical progress but also its costs. Much is written in the press about the fact that the earth's water and air are being poisoned, hundreds of types of living creatures have been destroyed, the forest is vanishing, and erosion is affecting the soil. Unfortunately, the outer limits of this process are still unknown. The preservation of the natural environment is an urgent task of mankind, a necessary condition for progress and, it is my deep conviction that it must be considered one of the highest aims of national strategy.

Question In conclusion, Aksel' Ivanovich, what would you like to wish for the young people who are starting their own lives and preparing themselves for service in the armed forces?

Answer Youth is a wonderful time, a time of bold plans, bright hopes and discoveries. At the same time, it is the most crucial period of one's life when the personality is formed. Those characteristics of the soul which an individual acquires in his youth determine the course of his entire life and his social nature. The personality is shaped not only by the family, the school, the youth's immediate environment, but first of all by himself. Therefore, my advice to the young is never to cease self-improvement and never forget that spiritual growth and knowledge have no boundaries or limits. An individual must cultivate in himself a need for knowledge, work and cultural relaxation.

The true character cannot be formed without effort. To do this there is a continuous need for introspection, self-sacrifice and self-evaluation. There can be temporary slumps, stumblings and various fluctuations. It is necessary to battle difficulties and conquer them.

For thousands and thousands of young people the route to adult maturity is connected with service in the armed forces. Here they receive ideological training, learn discipline and reach manhood.

Looking back, I see that our armed forces met their 60th birthday qualitatively renewed, having survived true revolutionary changes. As a sailor, the growing might of our navy is particularly noticeable to me. I will give only one example as a comparison. The submarine "Pantera", fighting the first Soviet submarine battle on 31 August 1919, sank the "Vittoria," the squadron destroyer of the interventionists. The Soviet vessel traveled 80 miles on that cruise, not surfacing for 30 hours. This was an outstanding record at the time. Modern missile-carrying atomic submarines can sail underwater for tens of thousands of miles and not surface for several months. A world of radioelectronics, telemechanics and atomic power surround the naval specialist on these modern ships.

The most complex military equipment with which all branches of our armed forces are equipped today makes new increased demands on the serviceman, his ideological convictions and his general educational

level. One must prepare seriously and purposefully for service in the army and navy. You must foster courage in yourself, strengthen the will, become acquainted with military equipment, and acquire the necessary fighting efficiency and morale. A defense society can give a significant amount of help to you, the youth, in this. I am convinced of the great effectiveness of such work, because I was at one time the deputy chairman of the committee for ham radio operators.

8524 CSO: 1801

TROOP UNIT RADIO SETS DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 8, May 78 signed to press 7 Apr 78 p 44

Article by Engineer-Colonel L. Migunov: "Troop Radio Sets"

Text Radio, in comparison with all other kinds of communications, has the broadest dissemination today. In many cases it is the only means of communication.

Radio communications depend little on the time of year or of the day, the weather conditions and the type of terrain. They are established almost instantaneously—it is enough to switch on the transmitter and the receiver, tuned to its frequency, will immediately receive the transmitted signals. The transmissions are available to any number of outlying stations located within the range limits of the transmitter's operation.

There was great interest in the appearance of radio in the Russian army. The world's first military radio unit was formed in Russia as early as May 1899--the Kronshtadt spark military telegraph which was equipped, to tell the truth, with cumbersome and not very reliable equipment.

Since then, the organization of military communications and equipment have changed beyond recognition.

The R-126, R-105, R-107, R-108 and R-109 radio sets and the R-113 and R-123 tank radio sets and others are used to direct subunits during combat operations and on the march. The majority of them operate in the ultrashort wave band(a wavelength of less than 10 meters, a frequency greater than 30 megahertz) and they provide communications which do not require searching or tuning. This means that the set does not need any kind of tuning--when a given frequency has been set, one can immediately receive or send communications.

The R-126 two-way hand radio is mounted in a special casing-a pack supplied with belts(straps) for carrying in the arms or at the side. It weighs 2.8 kg. Included in the radio set are a transceiver in the pack; a whip antenna; a throat microphone and a one-eared headset(the radio operators call them a microtelephone set); a cheek microphone with a one-eared headset and two SPD-12 batteries.

A radio set is constructed of blocks—an exciter oscillator; UVCh /high frequency amplifier; UM/power amplifier and frequency changer; variable capacitors; UPCh/intermediate-frequency amplifier; UNCh /low-frequency amplifier; a limiter-discriminator; DC converter; set filters and throat microphone autotransformers. All eight of the blocks are placed in a metallic pack which is made of aluminum or magnesium alloys.

The operating principle of the radio set is easier to see by using its functional diagram.

During transmission, the sounds uttered are changed by the throat microphone, which is part of the set, into electrical voice frequency vibrations. These vibrations are strengthened in the UNCh--during transmission it plays the role of a premodulator and they go into the frequency modulator which helps the driving oscillator vibrations to be frequency modulated according to the law of voice frequency vibration change.

The modulated high-frequency waves are strengthened in the UM and are fed through the antenna loop to the antenna which changes them into electromagnetic energy radiated into space. During transmission, the voltage of the UVCh tube heat, the mixer, the UPCh and the limiter is switched on and therefore the radio set receiver does not work.

During reception, the antenna changes the electromagnetic energy of the radio waves coming from the correspondent's radio set into high frequency voltage which is separated at the antenna loop. This voltage is strengthened in the UVCh and enters the mixer. At the same time, the oscillator voltage is fed to it from the driving oscillator. As a result of the displacement of these two voltages at the mixer outlet, a differential frequency voltage, equal to the intermediate frequency, is chosen. After strengthening in the UPCh, it is restricted in modulation by the limiter and is detected (demodulated) by the discriminator which chooses from the high-frequency frequency-modulated signal of the voice frequency vibration. Strengthened in the UNCh, they enter the mouth of the set's telephone and, changed there into sound waves, they are perceived by an individual as sound.

The operating principle of other troop radio sets is roughly the same as for the R-126. Some of them are capable of working in a remote control mode from an outlying telephone device which is connected to the radio set by a two-wire cable up to half a kilometer long.

Direct conversations concerning the control of the combat activities of subunits are usually conducted with the help of ultrashort wave low-power radio sets. The radio operator must remember that he can switch to transmission only when the other side has switched to reception. Such coordinated communications, where one transmits and the other receives, is called simplex working. The radio sets which we have listed(except the R-123) provide just this type of communications.

The R-123 tank radio set permits duplex, rather than simplex, communications (one can receive and transmit simultaneously) and also provides telephone communications between crew members and the assault landing force with the help of the R-124 TPU/tank intercom/ through the interphone headset. Two persons can go on the air.

Carrying out communications in a duplex mode requires special care and heightened discipline on the part of the radio operator because each word which he utters automatically switches on the transmitter and is radiated into the atmosphere and this can lead to a disruption of communications between other correspondents.

It is generally known that UKV/ultrashort waves/ are propagated in a straight line, they skirt obstacles poorly, they are absorbed by ground features and are reflected by them. Practically all ground features are obstacles for UKV -- homes, hills, forests, etc. Their sizes are comparable to the length of the wave. The closer these obstacles are to the radio set, the stronger is their influence on the quality of communications. Therefore, if the situation permits, it is better to put the radio set a little further away from steep slopes, heights, embankments, various structures (stone, reinforced concrete and others) and power transmission lines. It is impossible to work on the edge of a forest because of the influence of reflected waves. It is necessary to go a little deeper into the forest or move to an open area. In populated areas it is advisable to place equipment on the upper floors of buildings (but not under the roof itself, especially if it is iron), close to windows and doors, facing the correspondent.

One can achieve the best quality communications if direct visibility is maintained between the correspondents. It is advisable to use different elevated objects—the summit of a hill, the top of a tree, the roof of a house, etc.

To increase the communications range and provide high quality, it is very important to use an antenna correctly. If the radiotelephone operator is in a trench, then the whip antenna must be raised over the breastwork by no less than one half a meter. In order to improve the audibility, it is recommended that the antenna be tilted somewhat to the side, opposite to the correspondent's direction.

The communications range can be significantly increased if a tri-beam counterweight is used when working with a whip antenna. An even greater range is attained by using a beam antenna. In this case,

the antenna wire cannot be put on the ground. Using supports made of improvised materials, it should be raised 30-40 centimeters (by one meter at the housing outlet) off the ground and directed toward the correspondent.

As already noted, radio communications have many virtues but some of them change into shortcomings for military communications. We said, for example, that the signals of one transmitter can be picked up by any number of receivers. This means that such a possibility also exists for an enemy. Intercepting the communications, the enemy can decipher them and ascertain the location of the radio set and then of the subunit. Therefore it is necessary to observe strict radio discipline and to provide communications security. Besides that, radio communications are affected by natural, industrial, and deliberately enemy-made interference. Natural interference, which includes radio frequency radiation of the ground, meteorites, stars and galaxies in the UKV band, is insignificant. The effects of industrial interference produced, for example, by generators, internal combustion engines and power transmission lines are reduced substantially if the radio set is placed no closer than 100 meters from them or moved to a different operating frequency. It is more difficult to get rid of premeditated interference. Changing frequencies is one method. We would like to point out that it is necessary to learn to work under radio interference conditions.

UKV radio sets are very complex radioelectronic devices. Their reliable operation depends on constant care and concern. Along with periodic inspections, work capacity checks and preventive maintenance, one must prevent moisture and dirt from getting into the inner parts and elements of the radio set and they must not become covered with ice. One should protect them, and especially the antenna insulator, from sharp jolts, blows, and not place them on wet ground, in snow or on ice without a ground sheet. It is impossible to twist or bend feeder cables and microtelephone headsets at a sharp angle, especially in the winter.

If it is possible, then after working in damp or cold weather the radio set should be brought into a warm room, moistened and then wiped dry with a rag. It is especially necessary to protect the microtelephone headset. The loop antenna should also be wiped with a rag. The antenna insulators must not be wiped with gasoline, kerosene or fuel oil.

A radio set's efficiency depends mainly on the condition of the batteries. The radiotelephone operator must systematically check their charge and electrolyte level. In the R-126 radio set, for example, there are two red lines on the side wall of the plastic container for monitoring the batteries. If the electrolyte is at the level of the upper line, then the battery is charged. If the electrolyte reaches only the lower line, then the battery needs recharging.

Only that signalman can provide reliable and uninterrupted communications who knows his device and the operating principle of a radio set well and who knows how to protect and operate them.

8524

CSO: 1801

RECRUIT TRAINING PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German No 29, 17 Jul 78 pp 124-128

[Article by kirill Podrabinek: "It's Worst at Night"]

Conscript Kirill Podrabinek, 25, from Moscow, spent his 2 years of military service in a barracks in Turkmenistan. He describes the drill and bullying incident on the training of Soviet conscripts. Similar to the enlisted men of the U.S.Marine Corps (page 65), the Soviet conscripts experience hardship and degradation but, on top of that, hunger, beatings and theft by seniors and superiors. "Of course the conscript is not beaten every day, but he is kicked every day." Podrabinek managed to get a copy of his manuscript to the SPIEGEL—the original was seized in Moscow. In March last he was sentenced to $2\frac{1}{2}$ years prison for "illegal possession of weapons." His brother Aleksander, an active human rights fighter, went to prison in May.

"Get up," shouts the sergeant. The new conscripts drop from the upper bunks like peas from the pod. The somewhat more senior conscripts continue to snooze in the lower bunks. The location: A barracks of the Soviet Army in Turkmenistan, Central Asia.

The hierarchy is strictly enforced—by seniority and date of entry. First—year conscripts have no rights at all, second—year conscripts are the masters of the fate of the newcomers.

At that, there are intermediate ranks. Conscripts serving their first 6 months, for example, are the lowest of the low. Though those in their second 6 months have no official privileges, they are most rarely assigned to details for laundering footcloths for the seniors.

After 1 year's service the conscript undergoes a miraculous metamorphosis: The young conscript becomes a candidate. His functions are those of a policeman, responsible for maintaining "order." After another 6 months the candidate emerges as a senior—so to speak the elite of the barracks. The

highest position of authority, however, is the status of "grandfather." That is a career soldier shortly before release but still living in barracks.

Getting up is followed by physical fitness exercises, supervised by drill sergeants in their second year of service. It has a great deal in common with torture. After 20-40 "backward bends" across a bench, the feet hooked under a pipe let into the ground, the young conscript's body aches all over. Those with longer service stand around and, cigaret in mouth, comment the exercises.

In the so-called hippodrome the conscripts run in circles. The seniors bet on the speed of individuals. A "pony" falling behind is encouraged by kicks. Conscript S was harassed to the point that a surgical scar on his abdomen burst.

And where are the officers? Home, of course. Officers put in an appearance only at morning roll call, and that not too often either. When they do, the company is sent out on an exercise, while the officer disappears into the orderly room for a peaceful smoke.

The torture of physical education is repeated several times each day. The officers calmly leave all to their sergeants and devote their time to their own affairs.

Following physical exercise the recruit is chased into the barracks and made to clean the rooms. Two men have to do the cleaning, the others make up the beds--their own and those of the "aristocracy."

The officers demand the highest quality of bedmaking; the sergeants an even higher quality. They require the edges of the coverlet to be so tight that "they'd take the balls of a bedbug." If the ideal is not achieved, the order may go out: "If you can't do it with your hands, try your mouth." The coverlet then has to be tugged into place with the teeth!

As soon as the beds are ready, candidates and seniors plop down on them. In fact that is not permitted, but who cares for the regulations? As a result the beds have to be made afresh several times in the course of the day.

Then comes the morning roll call. Everything must be clean-clean collars, well polished boots, fresh uniform. Money is regularly deducted from the conscripts pay for the purchase of soap, toothbrushes and toothpaste, shoe brushes and shoe polish. The top sergeant does the buying and keeps the lion's share of the purchases for the future long-service men. The rest is shared out.

"Some Even Bury Their Property"

"Turn out your pockets and show what's in them," commands the sergeant. Woe to him who is discovered with a toothbrush, a letter, a razor in his pocket: "Quick march to latrine cleaning! Later you'll get something else!"

This practice has a great deal of meaning—the conscript should not possess anything; everything is owned by the barracks aristocracy. The conscript is unable anyway to hide anything, except on his body. His knapsack is inspected, and so is the bed, of course. Either everything is taken from him, or it is stolen.

Theft is an everyday occurrence in the barracks. The enlisted men steal from everybody, the conscripts steal from one another. Everyone tries to hide his possessions: In the armored car, the radio room, the guard room; some even bury them.

The most popular exercises are the periods of political instruction. There all the conscripts have to do is to sit quietly on the benches in front, listen attentively to the officer and, with their backs, shielding the sleeping seniors.

It is no secret that military canteen meals are not prepared by French chefs. However, if the conscript got everything he is supposed to get, nobody in the barracks would go hungry. Between the food allocation to the garrison and the canteen table, though, there are two waystations—storeroom and kitchen. Of an evening one may see the master sergeants walk home with overflowing pockets, and in the kitchen the cooks prepare sumptuous meals for the regulars. The conscripts are confronted with a new torture—hunger.

Ten people sit at one table--five "aristocrats" and five "slaves." The aristocrats sit in the vicinity of the bucket. The helpings are dished out by a conscript whom the seniors trust. The aristocrats get whatever they want, then the server takes his share. The remains go to the other side of the table--the slaves.

Should something special be in the bucket, potatoes for example instead of grits, the slaves get nothing at all. But the last man at the table--the weakest conscript or one whom everybody takes pleasure in bullying--cannot even rely on getting grits.

No junior conscript is permitted to take bread, butter, sugar or, in the evening, a piece of fish, before the seniors help themselves. After that he falls over the remains.

Those sitting closest to the aristocrats have the advantage. Every place is strictly assigned, determined by strength, guile, cowtowing to the aristocracy of the barracks, by gall and spite. It is not surprising that the conscripts are constantly hungry.

"Kicked Out of Bed"

Maybe packages or money orders from concerned relatives could help the conscript? Vain hope. The company letter carrier, evidently a senior, observes

the strict rule of reporting any receipt of mail to the master sergeant. The "lucky" conscript, accompanied by his sergeant or senior, walks to the post office, collects the package and carries it to the barracks.

Subsequently the seniors begin the festive meal. The same happens when the conscript gets a money order—he collects it at the post office and hands it to his honored master. Sometimes he may even get a ruble or a piece of bread.

Work is the next torture in the barracks. Worst is the kitchen detail—the conscript is on the run day and night, carries water, cleans the cauldrons, rinses crockery, peels potatoes, sets the tables—without rest and constantly chivvied. Yet even a conscript cannot be as quick as an antelope. So he gets beaten.

Conditions are actually those of slavery. Every senior jealously watches out to make sure that "his" conscripts are not put to work by another colleague. Sometimes, though, the slaves are hired out to friends of another company. Should a slave be "borrowed" without permission, his master will thrash him on top of everything.

Conscript uniforms are old and shabby—the new boots, caps, gloves, in short everything they are initially issued, is taken by the aristocracy. The conscripts are dirty because they work constantly and have no time to keep their equipment in order. On the other hand the boots of the seniors have a beautiful shine, their uniforms are washed and ironed, they may grow their hair longer and even have a mustache. Two stripes show their status—2 years of service.

The conscript must literally tighten his belt more than the senior: Two aristocrats yank his belt as tight as possible. That is how the conscript must move about in the barracks and is one of the worst tortures: After half an hour he cannot breathe.

The midday meal is past. A rest period of half an hour is nearly always followed by the cleaning of weapons. As usual the seniors do nothing. The conscripts clean all guns. Then it is time for more exercises and more work.

After the evening meal there are $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours of so-called private time--but only for candidates and seniors. The junior conscripts spend the time working for the aristocrats: Sew on collars, polish boots, and a million other things.

The pay is normally R3.80 per month (DM12.50) and is handed over by the company chief. The procedure goes something like this: The company chief sits in the orderly room, the conscript enters, signs and takes the money. Once outside the room he hands about R2 to the senior waiting for him.

The rest of the money is not even enough to keep him in tobacco. It is advisable always to have a packet of cigarets handy. At night the conscript is

often kicked out of bed with the command: "In 2 minutes flat you get me a smoke!" Where is he to find cigarets at night, unless he has a packet in reserve?

For the junior conscripts payday is followed by the so-called night of mourning. The seniors make the juniors buy wine for the pay received—a punishable offense. Then they get drunk and subsequently beat up the conscripts.

"The Feet Start to Rot from the Moisture"

When the alarm sounds, the conscript has 45 seconds to get dressed. This provides another occasion for bullying: "Get undressed in 45 seconds!" yells the sergeant. The conscript runs to his bunk, undresses on the run. The exact folding of the clothing is included in the 45 seconds. "Get dressed in 45 seconds," the sergeant shouts again. The herd of conscripts rushes out again, dresses on the run. He who is late is made to "train" for a long time. The seniors watch and enjoy the spectacle.

The conscript stands in front of his bunk, in his underparts. His best underpants were confiscated by the seniors; the conscript therefore looks funny in his underwear which is full of holes. Often the holes are located in the most interesting spots.

"Into bed," yells the sergeant. The conscripts jump into their cots. "Get up!", he shouts the next moment. The conscripts jump down. "Get up, into bed, get up, into bed!" The conscripts jump like squirrels between the floor and the upper bunks--until one lands on top of the other.

That concludes the official part of the evening. The seniors wash themselves, stroll around the barracks. The conscripts do not always have the energy to wash themselves of an evening. They also lack towels, especially towels for the feet. The seniors like to take the hand towels away from the conscripts—to use for their feet.

Slippers hardly exist. The conscript puts on his dirty boots to go to the washroom and wash his feet; after that he puts the boots back onto his wet feet. The boots are always damp--from sweat in the summer, from water in the winter.

The barracks are not centrally heated; what heating there is comes from a few stoves. The seniors hang their footcloths next to the stoves and set their boots down to dry below. The conscripts are not allowed to do that. So that the barracks should not stink too much, the conscripts are required to have clean footcloths. The conscript, therefore, washes his footcloths at night, but cannot hang them up to dry. In the morning he puts the wet footcloths back on. The feet start to rot from the constant damp; all conscripts suffer from footrot.

At last the lights go out. The period of conscription has been reduced by 1 day. "I wish a good night to all fathers!" hollers the conscript. "Thank

you, my son," the seniors chorus back. The evening is at an end, now comes the night.

In one corner some seniors are singing, in another a candidate plays the guitar. Here there is drinking, there talking. Some massage the sacred bodies of the "fathers." Life in the barracks never ceases.

Now the conscripts are in for the hour of the torture used most often, the torture of beatings. Of course conscripts are also beaten during the day, but it is worst at night. Sometimes they are thrashed for an offense, sometimes "just because."

The chosen conscript is given the command: "Get up!" To emphasize the order, he is kicked out of his bunk. "At attention!" The "son" stands to attention. "Thirty kneebends!" orders the "father." This is followed by: "At attention! You did a few things wrong, sonny!" A few blows to the face. The conscript keels over. "At attention!" yells the "father." The conscript gets up, blood streaming from his face. Sometimes he is not even allowed to get up and is kicked where he lies.

Entire groups of seniors often participate in the execution of one conscript. When the beating stops, the conscript goes to the washroom. If he is unable to walk, other conscripts—woken up for the purpose—drag him there.

Now it is the turn of the next. Nobody knows who it will be. A few dozen conscripts lie trembling. That is the torture by fear. The seniors are all familiar with this demoralizing process—they have all gone through it.

Should a conscript have committed a serious offense (serious in the view of the barracks aristocracy), he is flogged in the washroom. The selected victim is collected at night and taken to the washroom; a group of seniors hits with special viciousness—these are the fatal thrashings.

The conscript, flogged senseless, is left on the cement floor; he is doused with cold water and the washroom locked. In the morning the conscript is dragged to the barracks and thrown onto his bunk.

A special type of flogging is called "rolling to Volodya" (Volodya is the nickname of Vladimir Ilych Lenin). At the end of a corridor stands Lenin's bust on a pedestal draped in red. The corridor is about 30 meters long. The conscript is beaten, falls down, stands up, is flogged again and again falls down. He is thrashed ever closer to Lenin--that is the "rolling" to Volodya.

A barracks offers the mirror image of our society. Of course in a barracks the contrasts are starker, but in essence events are idential with those in society at large. Some sections of society live at the expense of the other. The relations between and within the groups are settled by violent means.

Life in the barracks is not ruled by the--rather imperfect--rules and regulations but by custom and tradition. To maintain superficial legality, customs

are often elevated to the status of rules: The result is lawlessness and the absence of any rights. The officers are obviously well aware of the system prevailing in the barracks, but they do not intervene—it is more convenient that way. To the outside world everything seems in order, even if only half the company is at work. No conscript dares complain aloud. It would take drastic measures to change the system.

The officers also shy away from publicity. Who would want to admit that such things happen in his unit? That could finish his career. Therefore political instruction hours and Komsomol meetings continue.

The conscript flogged at night mouthes grandiose words about the comradeship of fighting men. The senior who flogged him goes into great detail about the moral code imposed by the builders of communism. The meeting unanimously adopts new obligations for the next party congress. The satisfied officers write their reports.

As one conscript put it: "I prefer to be in the wrong with all of them than in the right on my own." To defend one's rights in the barracks one would have to be physically very strong or very clever and, most of all, have exceptional moral fortitude—and that happens very rarely.

A sportsman who was a skilled boxer and also matered Karate, was able to defend himself against 10 attackers, risked his life and virtually battled the seniors—he was finally left alone.

Pfc P, on the other hand, immediately understood the situation upon entering the barracks. He reported every thrashing-despite threats, even death threats. He forced the officers to deal with his case. He told them that he was provocatively disobedient so as to be brought before a courts martial where he would have his say. He also said to the leader of the seniors that, in case of another beating, he would kill him in his bed at night, regardless of the consequences for himself. He was thus able to evade degradation and torture, later refused to use them on others and, ultimately, improved the atmosphere in the barracks.

Not all conscripts can stand the strain of this life--suicides are a frequent occurrence. Usually the young men shoot themselves while on guard duty. Some hang themselves. Many try to go absent. If they are caught, they are returned to the same barracks--these are the doubly unfortunate ones. Those who are not immediately caught, are sent to penal battalions and prisons.

Everything I have written happened during my service in Turkmenistan from 1974-1976. Of course not every conscript is beaten every day. Kicks, though, are suffered every day. Not every day does a conscript land in hospital with broken ribs, but contusions do show every day. Not every day is the corpse of a conscript sent to his parents in a zinc lined casket. Degradation, however, occurs every day.

All the descriptions are factual, only speeded up. As far as I know conditions are better only in the Moscow and Leningrad military districts.

It is not correct to say: "That is all quite understandable--after all it happened in Asia." My unit, for example, consisted of 30 percent each Russians, Germans and Kazakhs. I quickly learned that nationality has no significance whatsoever. There were horrific villains among my Muscovite compatriots, and some Kazakhs were decent comrades.

"This System Arouses Animal Instincts"

This barracks system obviously undermines the combat readiness of the army. Should there be actual fighting, one half of the company would fire on the other. Occasionally something like this happens on guard duty. A conscript driven to desperation suddenly starts firing his submachine gun at the seniors. The officer on duty kills him by shooting him in the back.

On the other hand the system arouses the worst animal instincts in the men. Should there be uprisings at any time, the men will fire as ordered, regardless of the target—thereby opening the way to even greater tyranny.

The defenders of this system assert that it produces courage in the men. That is bunkum! The men become cowards in the process. A slave who resigns himself to his fate is bound to be a coward. The enlisted men also are cowards—they are slaves in their hearts. In wartime that could have dire consequences.

And in peacetime? The chief evil consists in the fact that human souls are crippled: A young man joins the army. There the attempt is made to break him, and he is forced to suffer the utmost degradation and helplessness. By the time he returns home, he has lost all human dignity and is psychologically deformed.

Every year millions of young men pass through this army! In their minds they keep on reliving the life of the barracks. They will not be able to be citizens, only to obey.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

- 1. Soviet soldiers at physical fitness exercise on the barrack square: "The conditions are those of actual slavery."
- 2. Soviet soldiers on combat exercise: "Outwardly everything is in order."
- 3. Officers club in the USSR: Service ends after the morning roll call.
- 4. Noncomissioned officers club in the USSR: Theft in the canteen.
- 5. Private club in the USSR: Pay R3.80.
- 6. Soviet soldiers at leisure: "Thrashed closer to Lenin."

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